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INTRODUCTION
This study will encompass an examination in depth of decisions made
by members of the Organization of American States to take collective
action against the Cuban Government in the following instances: (l) The
runta del Este Foreign Ministers' Meeting, January, 1962; (2) The
Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962; and (3) the Cuban intervention
in Venezuela, 1963-1964.
In each instance the necessary two thirds of the O.A.S. membership
acted to isolate the Cuban Government because of its threats and acts of
aggression against other nations of the Western hemisphere. In the
first and third cases dealt with at the Eighth and Ninth Foreign Min-
isters' conferences in 1962 and 1964, the O.A.S. voted to impose sanc-
tions directly against the Cuban Government. But in the case of the
Cuban missile crisis the O.A.S. nations voted to apply sanctions against
the Soviet Union directly and against Cuba only indirectly.
At the Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' Meeting six Latin American
states, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico refused
to support a United States-sponsored resolution to exclude the Govern-
ment of Cuba from the inter -American system on the grounds that the
Cuban Government's subscription to Communist ideology and practice was
incompatible with the principles of the O.A.S. Charter.
But in response to the Soviet missile threat based from Cuba in
October, 1962, the Latin American states rallied unanimously to support
the U. S. by authorizing a resolution to establish a quarantine against
further shipment of offensive weapons from the Soviet Union to Cuba.
Yet the expedient removal of the missiles did not remove the immi-
nence of the Cuban threat of intervention particularly in the Caribbean
area. This fact was poignantly demonstrated when a cache of Cuban arms
planned for use in the overthrow of the Betancourt Government was un-
covered on Venezuelan territory in the winter of 1963.
When the Ninth Meeting of Consultation was finally held in Washing-
ton in June, 1964 to consider the Venezuelan complaint of Cuban aggres-
sion, the O.A.S. nations voted (15-4) in favor of a resolution to re-
quire all O.A.S. nations to sever diplomatic relations with the Castro
Government. Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay voted against taking
such action. But only Mexico has to date refused to comply with O.A.S.
sanctions.
The particular concern of this study will be to identify the con-
ditions motivating the various foreign policy orientations of Latin
American governments in each of these situations in order to explain:
1. Why there was unanimous agreement to authorize forceful
measures in the missile crisis and less than unanimity
in the imposition of political sanctions in the other two
instances.
2. Why the positions of certain governments varied from the
Punta del Este Meeting in 1962 to the Washington meeting
in 1964.
Analysis of the dynamics of Latin American foreign policies
expressed within the O.A.S. during the period 1962-1964, concerning
sanctions against Cuba, will form the basis for a composite evaluation
of the present condition of harmony within O.A.S. ranks.
Finally it is the writer's objective to speculate concerning the
potential for developing greater mutuality of interests within the
O.A.S. in the future.
In approaching this investigation the writer, in a separate chapter
devoted to each O.A.S. decision, intends to characterize the general
political process within countries that actively or tacitly supported
sanctions. Then by way of contrast the writer will analyze the politi-
cal forces that prompted the decision of a minority of states to oppose
sanctions at the Eighth Meeting in Punta del Este, 1962 and at the Ninth
Meeting in Washington, 1964.
Analysis of the decisions of the individual Latin American govern-
ments taken at these three O.A.S. Meetings will be constructed by in-
vestigating the following indices as possible determinants of their
foreign policies: use of U. S. power and influence; military influence;
degree of advancement of social and economic reform; potential appeal
of f idelismo; principles of nonintervention and self-determination;
historical traditions of Pan-American cooperation.
In this study the investigation of the process of foreign policy
formulation of separate western hemisphere nations in these three situ-
ations has been keyed to an ultimate objective—adjudging the impact of
national foreign policy decisions on the O.A.S. as an international
organization. Because this study has been approached from a broad per-
spective, no attempt has been made to give background analysis of domes-
tic factors involved in these particular decisions by extensively con-
sulting original Latin American sources. For this part of the inquiry
a great deal of reliance has been upon dependable secondary sources,
from which it has been possible to select certain key factors relevant
to Latin American decision-making processes during the period under
investigation.
The information which will be cited in this study will include the
standard works of leading historians and political scientists in the
field of Latin American and O.A.S. affairs. The writer has relied on
the public documents of the United States, the O.A.S. and the United
Nations; articles in professional journals and other periodicals; un-
published Ph.D. dissertations; and coverage of the Punta del Este Meeting,
the Cuban missile crisis and the Cuban intervention in Venezuela through
the New York Times . Also important in developing overall perspective
and understanding of the O.A.S. including the gathering of documents and
research materials, was her opportunity to interview several officials
of the U. S. Department of State and the O.A.S. during a trip to Washing-
ton, D. C. in late July, 1965.
CHAPTER I
THE PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE
Introductory Background
Following the abortive Cuban exile invasion in April 1961, the
Kennedy administration began to sound out the Latin American govern-
ments on their willingness to take strong collective action against
Cuba*
Certain members of the Latin American diplomatic corps felt that
it would be possible to obtain support from two thirds of the Latin
American governments provided that extremely careful diplomatic prepara-
tion was undertaken in advance.
Initially, U. N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was dispatched to
Latin American capitals in June, 1961, as a personal emissary of Presi-
dent Kennedy to determine the effect of the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs
2
invasion on inter -American relations. Ambassador Stevenson reported
that the invasion had raised the spectre of U. S. intervention, and had
increased pressure from radical leftist elements on moderate constitu-
tional governments. Because of such internal difficulties, leaders of
these nations—to insure success for a program of social and economic
reform within a democratic framework--could not take a strong anti-Cuban
*New York Times , April 26, 1961, p. 21.
2New York Times . June 22, 1961, p. 1.
5
Dstand. To do so would have been tantamount to taking sides with the
United States against Cuba in what was widely regarded merely as a
3
Yanqui-Cuban dispute. The Ambassador also recognized that while in-
creased Communist subversion threatened the democratic governments,
right wing groups jealous of the loss of ancient privileges and opposed
to social reform, loomed as an equal menace to the existence of consti-
tutional government. These two extremes of left and right were joined,
according to Mr. Stevenson, in an unholy community of interest. Stress-
ing the positive policy of the Alliance for Progress, Ambassador Stevenson
concluded from his observations and interviews that the best long-range
policy of hemispheric defense against Communism and Castroism should rest
upon elimination of the desperate conditions which enlivened the Fidelista
4
slogans—the urban slum conditions and rural insecurity.
It would seem that Ambassador Stevenson's perceptive analysis fore-
cast the widening rift in the inter-American community concerning appro-
priate measures to deal with subversion emanating from Cuba, whose govern-
ment was fast becoming affived to the Soviet orbit through aid and trade
agreements*
Most South American governments officially treated the Cuban
revolution as an indigenous revolution, insisting that it had not been
5proven conclusively that Castro was taking orders from the Soviet Union.
3New York Times , June 22, 1961, p. 2.
4New York Times Magazine , August 6, 1961, p. 61.
^Adolf A. Berle, Latin America, Diplomacy and Reality (New York*
Harper and Row, 1961), p. 98.
But other governments which had been directly subjected to Cuban-
directed subversion, pressed for strong sanctions against Cuba.
The Peruvian Request * The threat of Cuban-based subversion
prompted the Government of Peru to request a Meeting of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty without prior diplomatic con-
sultation with the other O.A.S. nations. The Peruvian request invoked
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in reference to the subversive actions by
the Government of Cuba which allegedly constituted acts of aggression
within the meaning of the Treaty.
After considering the Peruvian request on October 16 and 25, 1961,
the O.A.S. Council submitted the draft to the General Committee for study.
The General Committee delivered its Report to the Council at the meeting
on November 22, 1961, recommending that the Inter -American Peace Com-
7
mittee study and investigate the Peruvian charges.
Premature, ill-timed and too-strongly worded, the Peruvian request
disregarded the strong disagreements within the inter -American system
concerning the Cuban problem. The Peruvian request conflicted with a
more careful diplomatic probe conducted by the Government of Colombia
g
for a more generally acceptable formula to deal with the Castro regime.
The Colombian Request . Cn November 9, 1961, the Government of
Colombia couched a request for a Meeting of Consultation in more general
^Organization of American States, General Secretariat, Inter -
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance . Applications . Vol. II,
1960-1964. (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), p. 61.
7Ibid., 62.
8Nei* York Times « October 25, 1961, p. 46,
terms also under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, not specifically mentioning
the government of Cuba. The Colombian note proposed that the Ministers
be asked
to consider the threats to the peace and the political inde-
pendence of the American states that might arise from the
intervention of extracontinental powers directed toward break-
ing American solidarity, and particularly to:
a. ^oint out the various types of threats to the peace or
certain acts that if they do occur, justify the appli-
cation of measures for the maintenance of peace and
security, pursuant to Chapter V of the Charter of the
Organization of American States and the provisions of
the Inter -American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance;
b. Determine the measures that it is advisable to take
for the maintenance of the peace and the security of
the hemisphere.
^
Although the United States Government had not officially initiated
the request for a Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers, it gave
active support to the more temperate Colombian request. For over six
months, the Kennedy Administration had devoted considerable time and
energy to bilateral diplomatic exercises to avoid an open split and to
cultivate mutual understanding among hemisphere nations prior to the
holding of any formal conference to deal with the Cuban threat. There-
fore, U. S. statesmen felt that the moderate Colombian resolution could
achieve the dual purpose of holding the system together while accomplish-
ing effective collective action against Cuban subversion.
A significant minority of states, particularly Mexico, objected
to this resolution strenuously. Vicente Sanchez Gavito, the Mexican
C.A.S. Council representative, stated that his government would vote
against convocation of such a parley under the Rio Treaty on legal
^Applications . Organization of American States, p. 67.
grounds. The Mexican Government did not believe that any American state
was being subjected to an armed attack or "any other act or situation
that might place in danger the peace of America," to justify applica-
tion of the Rio Treaty, The Mexican Government made it quite clear
that any broad definition of subversion could navex be fit into the
meaning of aggression as armed attack according to the Rio Treaty.
This uncompromising position on the relatively non-specific
Colombian proposal perhaps reflected the continued sensitivity of the
Mexican Government concerning what that government had defined as U. S.
intervention in the April 1961, Cuban exile invasion. This meeting to
be convened under the Rio Treaty was held suspect among Mexican diplo-
mats as a U. S. maneuver to secure collective legitimacy for another
assault on Cuban independence. Mexico haa been the only Latin American
government to draft a resolution in the U. N. General Assembly impli-
citly endorsing Cuba's charges of U. S. responsibility for the invasion.
The Mexican draft directly invoked the principle of nonintervention
against the U. S. and appealed directly to the U. N. for a solution.
Seven other Latin American nations introduced a draft which acknowledged
the seriousness of the situation and exhorted the O.A.S. nations to lend
assistance in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Mexican
draft was rejected by the Political Committee, while the original Latin
American draft, though accepted by a committee majority was rejected by
a narrow margin in the Assembly. However a revised Latin American draft
lONew York Times . November 25, 1961, p. 18.
^United Nations General Assembly, Mexican Draft Resolution ,
15th sess. First Committee, Agenda Item 90.
10
was adopted omitting all reference to the O.A.S., but exhorting all
U. N. members "to take peaceful action as it is open to then to remove
12
existing tension."
Convocation of the Foreign Ministers' Conference * Although the
U. S. regarded the open confession of Fidel Castro on December 2, 1961,
that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist as proof of the aggressive
danger of Cuban subversion, the Cuban Premier's statement did not alter
the positions of Latin American governments. Only a (14-2) two-thirds
majority with five important nations abstaining, weakly supported the
call for the Foreign Ministers' Conference to be held January 22, 1962,
at Punta del Este, Uruguay. Mexico joinea Cuba to vote no. Five nations
abstained—Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. Uruguay's
last-minute yea vote had been the one to complete a bare two-thirds
13
majority which authorized the holding of the Punta del Este Conference.
To the governments opposed to the holding of the Eighth Meeting of
Consultation, the link between the Marxist-Leninist confession of Fidel
Castro and his status as a tool of Soviet Communism was not self-evident.
A loose interpretation of the Rio Treaty to justify collective action on
an unproven supposition, to them meant giving cover to intervention-
feared more in Latin American than Communism.
Pre-Conference Diplomacy . The Castro statement of December 2,
1961, added to the urgency of the U. S. commitment to fairly strong
l^New Y rk Times . April 22, 1961, p. 1.
lAjeLesseps S. Morrison. An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy ;
Latin American Mission . (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 170.
11
sanctions at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. U. S. policymakers
decided that the risk of splitting the inter -American system was better
14
than delaying further.
Led by the United States, twelve nations definitely favoring
sanctions began a probe to discover an effective plan to cope with
Cuban subversion that would win the support of the maximum number of
Latin American governments. President Kennedy felt that any U. S. de-
mand for strong sanctions supported only by a bare two-thirds majority
of smaller nations, exclusive of the support of Brazil, Mexico and
Argentina, would project a bad picture to the world. But at the same
time he indicated that if the support of Argentina could be won, perhaps
15
it would be wise to press for mandatory sanctions. As the U. S. dele-
gation departed for Punta del Este, the President had approved a policy
that would aim for the hardest result consistent with the best possible
consensus, but would not strive for symbolic hardness at the expense of
substantial consensus.
Circulated by U. S. officials in early January, 1962, the State
Department White Paper, originally published in August, 1962, was
"clearly intended to prove the existence of a situation calling for the
application of measures by the O.A.S. By presenting a factual summary,
the paper called attention to the fact that
14New York Times . November 25, 1961, p. 18.
15Morrison, p. 172.
l6Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy
in the White House . (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 780.
17c. Meale Ronning, Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective
Security in a Troubled Hemisphere . (New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1963), p. 10.
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the Castro regime has established such extensive and
intimate political-military economic and cultural ties with
the Soviet Union, Communist China and the countries associ-
ated with them as to render Cuba an appendage of the communist
system. *•
The State Department referred to concrete activities to support
its charges that Fidel Castro was attempting to spread his revolution
by "example":
It ^the Castro regime/ is bringing hundreds of students,
labor leaders, intellectuals and dissident political leaders
to Cuba for indoctrination and training to be sent back to
their countries for the double purpose of agitating in favor
of the Castro regime and undermining the stability of their
own governments. It is fostering the establishment in other
Latin American countries of so-called 'Committees of Solidar-
ity with the Cuban Revolution' for the same dual purpose.
Cuban diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agitation
and subversion by dissident elements seeking to overthrow
established governments by force. y
Professor C. Neale Ronning, a scholarly observer of the Punta del
Este Conference for the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, has assessed
the weakness of the appeal of the White Paper to the nations opposed to
sanctions for which the matter of proof was so crucial to their de-
cisions:
What detracts from this part of the case is that these
are precisely the kinds of activities that while they may
threaten the peace, least require collective action. Those
governments threatened by the exchange of students, labor
leaders and intellectuals, presumably have it within their
power to take unilateral action. The use of diplomatic
personnel for subversive purposes could be prevented by
the simple expedient of declaring individuals personae
non gratae or, if necessary, of breaking diplomatic rela-
tions. As a matter of fact, the governments most concerned
IQlbid . , 10. Quoted from United States Department of State,
The Castro Regime in Cuba . (Washington: Government Printing Office,
August, 1961.)
19 Ibid ., 11.
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about Castro's activities had already severed diplomatic
ties by the time of the Punta del Este Conference.^
Likewise most of the evidence against Cuba presented in the
Inter -American Peace Committee Report dealt with proving the identifi-
cation of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc—"rather than to proving that
this identification was antagonistic to the principles established in
the O.A.S. Charter."^ 1
Apparently the Investigating Committee could not muster enough
facts to prove the allegation that Cuba had aggravated international
22
tensions by committing political aggression. Therefore the committee's
final recommendation for Rio Treaty action was based upon Cuba's "incom-
patibility" with the inter -American system.
To important segments of Latin American public opinion, such
evidence was regarded as superficial and unsubstantial, and very diffi-
23
cult to interpret within the legal scope of the Rio Treaty.
Opening of the Conference . As the Conference opened January 22,
1962, the O.A.S. nations had become divided into two opposing blocs.
The bloc favoring sanctions against Cuba included the United States,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay and the Central
American Republics. The bloc opposed to immediate sanctions included
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. Haiti and
Uruguay sent split delegations to the conference. Confronted by the
20lbid .« 11.
21lbid .. 11.
22lbid., 11.
23Ibid .
.
13-14,
14
impending split within the system on the eve of the Conference, many
24
Ministers doubted the wisdom of forcing this Conference to be held.
According to Ronning,
The major task of the Meeting, then became one of finding
a formula that would emphasize points of agreement while mini-
mizing the degree of discord. But it was not at all certain
that it would be possible to get even the bare two-thirds vote
necessary for sanctions. Seven states—Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, and Mexico—had openly stated
their opposition. With Uruguay's vote uncertain, this left
only twelve—two short of the required fourteen—firmly in
favor of sanctions. If there were going to be sanctions it
became clear that they would be something less than what the
twelve had originally wanted: a break in diplomatic and
economic relations and the expulsion of Cuba from the O.A.S. 25
From his vantage point, Ronning stated that despite the fact that
it was reported publicly that the U. S. stance had stiffened, in reality
"the State Department had for the most part given up the idea of seeking
a resolution calling for a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba."
The New York Times reported on January 16 that the United States, pri-
marily to increase its negotiating position, had proposed that the
Foreign Ministers order automatic sanctions against Cuba if she didn't
break with the Soviet Union in sixty days. The Times account stressed
that the State Department termed this plan a confidential working paper
rather than a proposal, calling special attention to the Department's
own qualification that the paper did not necessarily represent a firm
27
position.
Resolutions Adopted . Of the nine resolutions finally approved by
the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, substantial disagreement existed in
24lbid., 16,
25Ibid .. 16.
26lbid., 16.
27New York Times . January 16, 1962, p. 4.
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the case of two—Resolution VI entitled Exclusion of the Present Govern-
ment of Cuba From Participation in the Inter -American System, and Resolu-
tion VIII entitled Economic Relations. Both resolutions, though modified,
represented an attempt to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on
the Government of Cuba.
Every nation except Cuba (which opposed all resolutions) agreed to
the following paragraph of Resolution VI:
That adherence by any member of the Organization of
American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with
the principles of the Inter -American system.
A wider margin than a two-thirds majority was willing to agree that
"the present Government of Cuba had voluntarily placed itself outside the
29
inter -American system." No official record has identified the three
abstentions, although it is possible to surmise that these nations prob-
ably included Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador.
But six of the larger more populous states, Argentina, Mexico,
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador, abstained on the paragraph of
Resolution 6 that resolved:
'that their incompatibility excludes the present Government
of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system? and
'that the Council of the Organization of American States and
the other organs and organizations of the inter -American
system adopt without delay the measures necessary to comply
with this resolution. °
On Resolution VIII, seventeen states approved paragraph I which
resolved:
23Mew York Times . February 1, 1962, p. 2.
29r\onning, p. 20.
30Ibici ., p. 21.
16
'to suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms and implements
of war of every kind. ,3i
Again, no official record of this vote has been released, but it
can be inferred that the nations abstaining were Brazil, Mexico and
Ecuador, those apparently strongest in their anti-sanctions positions.
But only sixteen nations approved paragraph II which called upon
the O.A.S. Council to study the "feasibility and desirability of extend'
ing the suspension of trade to other items, with special attention to
items of strategic importance." Here the record shows that Brazil,
Mexico, Ecuador and Chile abstained.
Although Resolution II entitled Special Consultative Committee
on Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism,
33
was supported by a near -unanimous majority, the single Bolivian
abstention is of special note and will be given separate examination
and evaluation later in this chapter.
Other significant resolutions which were each approved 20-1
included:
Resolution I, which pointed to the threat of the communist
offensive in America; Resolution III, which offered a reitera-
tion of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination;
Resolution IV, which affirmed the need for the holding of free
elections; Resolution V, which called for the intensification of
efforts under the Alliance for Progress; Resolution VIII, which
excluded the government of Cuba from the Inter -American Defense
Board; Resolution IX, which called for a revision of the statute
of the inter -American Commission on Human Rights. 34
31Ibid., 22.
32Ibid ., 22*
33Ibid .. 23.
34Ibid., 23.
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Ail of the aforementioned resolutions affirmed principles and
proposed positive measures to deal with the threat of Communism to the
hemisphere. Agreement on principles is important, but implementation
of principles in the form of measures becomes the real test of a viable
international security organization. And the voting on the key resolu-
tions revealed a substantial lack of agreement between the United States
and the Latin American states on the meaning and desirability of col-
lective security measures.
That abstentions were recorded instead of negative votes,
however, can largely be attributed to Mr. Rusk's intensive
personal diplomacy and a reluctance of the six soft-line
countries to vote openly against the United States ••••**
The split within the inter -American system exhibited at Punta
del Este reflected a division with important implications for the
future ability of the C.A.S. to function as a viable international
security organization. To determine the constants and variants affect-
ing the determination of Latin American foreign policy, so that a
realistic appraisal of future C.A.S. capability can be advanced, it
is necessary to analyze in depth the general factors motivating both
the countries that supported sanctions and those that opposed sanctions.
Pro-Sanctions Group
The Uniteo States . At this Conference, the U. S. delegation
played a central role in forging a compromise acceptable to at least
two thirds of the member governments which would apply the strongest
possible sanctions against the Castro Government yet preserve maximum
35New York Times . January 31, 1962, p. 1.
18
consensus within the system. The Kennedy Administration was responsive
to domestic pressure which demanded positive action against Cuba, largely
because experts predicted that Cuba might become the central issue in
the upcoming November 1962, Congressional elections. Of equal concern
to President Kennedy was Congressional financing for the Alliance for
Progress. The New York Times observed:
That Congress and United States public opinion may^ take
a dim view of the role played here /at Hunta del Este/ by
Brazil and a few other countries is fully realized by their
delegates. The U. S. negotiators have told them so, not in
terms of threats, but in simple declaratory sentences, urging
the Latin Americans to think of the consequences of their
attitudes. 36
Despite these very real domestic pressures, the Kennedy Administra-
tion hesitated to hasten the impending split by making impossible de-
mands on the fragile bonds of inter -American unity. But O.A.S.
Ambassador, deLesseps Morrison, convinced that collective imposition of
sanctions on the Dominican Republic had successfully achieved a political
objective, persistently demanded throughout the negotiations that a like
37penalty be meted out to Castro.
36ftew York Times . January 28, 1962, "News of the Week in Review,"
n IV, p. 4.Sectio
37Morrison, P» 170. Trujilio, reactionary totalitarian dictator
of the Dominican Republic, had been implicated in a plot to assassinate
President Betancourt of Venezuela. The Sixth Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the O.A.S. in August, 1960 overwhelmingly voted to
break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, and suspend
trade in arms. The vote was unanimous among the nineteen nations eli-
gible to vote. Neither the Dominican Republic nor Venezuela was eli-
gible, since both were involved directly in the dispute. This action
proved that at least a significant majority of nations were willing to
act collectively to further goals of social, political and economic
reform. Therefore it should be noted that the political context of the
Funta del Este Meeting was not as favorable to the invocation of similar
sanctions against Cuba. While a majority of states might have given
19
Within the U. S. delegation during the difficult negotiations,
there was hope that at least a two-thirds majority might be possible
because some nations had not advanced firm positions. There was great
probability that a shift by an important member of either group would
bring others along. For this shift, the U. S. focused on the possi-
bility of altering the Argentine position, perhaps to influence the
38
votes of Chile, Ecuador or Bolivia.
Resisting many suggestions from members of the U. S. delegation
to compromise with watered-down Brazilian resolutions, Ambassador
deLesseps Morrison continued to argue for meaningful sanctions, approach-
ing Latin American delegations on the level of intensive personal diplo-
39
macy.
The U. S. mission to gain meaningful support for sanctions was
complicated by pro-Castro demonstrations in Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and
Mexico triggered by the opening of the Conference. These riots threatened
internal order and put great pressures from the leftist sectors on the
40
statesmen of these nations.
There was general agreement among the members of delegations
opposed to sanctions that the attitude of the u. S. was far more
enthusiastic approval of sanctions aimed at a reactionary dictator, it
was quite another matter to expect similar automatic response from a
like majority to punish Castro, a charismatic leader, the image of a
successful social revolution recently triumphant against the brutal
Batista dictatorship.
38R nning, p. 18.
39Morrison, Chapter 12, pp. 177-197.
40Moxxison, pp. 178-179.
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conciliatory than that of Colombia and the Central American govern-
41
ments.
A sympathetic reporter for La Nacion (Buenos Aires), described
the U. S. dilemma in this manner:
Rusk's mission will probably decide the fate of the Alliance
for Rrogress. The success of the program centers on whether
Congress will approve the funds to finance it. • • • With the
ghost of North American public opinion, Rusk has struggled day
and night in order to get the most energetic action against ._
Castro while preserving the unity of the inter -American system.
The Central American States . The strongest proponents of sanctions
were the Central American nations. At the outset of the Meeting these
nations, situated in the zone of geographical proximity to Cuba, warned
that they would walk out of the Meeting if the other Latin American
nations blocked collective action against the Castro regime. Also
they threatened to turn to the U. S. for a Caribbean regional system
if effective resolutions could not be approved by the larger O.A.S.
body.43
Ronning has emphasized that the governments of Central American
nations (excepting Costa Rica) had in common "domestic political situ-
ations that would make the example of Castro and his supporters highly
44dangerous to the governments in power." All were either dictatorships
41Ronning, p. 18.
42Ibid. , 19. Quoted from "El fantasma de San Rafael," La Mac ion
(Buenos Aires), January 29, 1962.
43New York Times . January 23, 1962, p. 1.
44Ronning, p. 15.
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(such as Nicaragua), or "democracies" run or effectively controlled by
the military and the oligarchy. Because of the tradition of "rigging"
free elections, governments of this area, "... were probably less
concerned about domestic repercussions of any O.A.S. action against Cuba
45
than the dangers Cuba itself represented for them."
Costa Rica. The Government of Costa Rica, unlike the neighboring
Central American republics has operated as a comparably viable political
democracy, largely because of the astute political leadership of former
President Jose Figueres. That nation has supported policies within the
O.A.S. which have been consistent with the ideals of democracy. Prior to
the Punta del Este Conference, the Costa Rican Government had severed
diplomatic relations with the Castro Government because of that govern-
4t>
ment's ant i-democratic development. It is possible to conclude that
three major factors influenced the Costa Rican stand in favor of sanctions
at Punta del Este: (l) a relatively non-dogmatic stand on intervention,
especially in favor of promoting democracy; (2) the fact that the Costa
Rican Government had already broken diplomatic ties with the Cuban
regime: (3) geographical proximity to the danger of Cuban infiltration
and subversion.
Dominican Republic . In January 1962, the first interim government
since the assassination of dictator Trujillo had been installed to prepare
47the Dominican people for free elections. Having emerged from a
45Ibid. , 15.
4
^James L. Bussey, "A Meaningful Democracy," in Martin C. Needier,
(ed). Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964) p. 126.
47A. Terry Rombo, "The Dominican Republic," in Needier, Political
Systems of Latin America > p. 177.
repressive totalitarian dictatorship and having been rescued from a
Trujillo family counter-revolution by U. S. naval presence, the demo-
cratic leaders in the Dominican Republic were primarily interested in
stabilizing the uncertain internal political situation. Geographical
proximity to the Cuban-based subversion worried Dominicans by compli-
cating this task.
In a declaration which equated the purposes of right and left-wing
dictatorships, somewhat understandably the Dominican Minister called on
the Punta del Este conferees to apply against Cuba the kind of sanctions
48
that helpea destroy Trujillo. Quite firmly, the Dominican Republic
aligned itself with nations seeking sanctions, approving intervention
to promote democratic ideals.
Colombia . The Government of Colombia, assumed a leadership role
among the Latin American nations in requesting the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers to work out an O.A.S. formula for combatting subversion. The
Colombian initiative complemented earlier U. S. attempts to sound out
Latin American governments concerning their views on O.A.S. sanctions
of Cuba. Under the guidance of President Alberto Lleras Camargo, the
first Secretary-General of the O.A.S., the Colombian Government has
become a mediating force within the O.A.S. Colombian leadership in
inter -American affairs has also developed in response to the cold war
and the growing awareness of the need for economic interdependence.
Lleras, a Liberal, was elected in 1958 as a result of a bipartisan
Liberal-Conservative agreement to alternate Liberals and Conservatives
in the office of Presidency for a twelve-year period. Joint bipartisan
48New York Times . January 27, 1962, p. 1.
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cooperation was undertaken to re-establish freedom and constitutional
guarantees after a lengthy period of civilian and military dictator -
49
ship.
President Lleras had preserved bipartisan support for the outlines
of his program of economic progress begun in 1960. But because of party
anarchy, Lleras had enacted his program largely through executive decree
50
or administrative initiative. Through the efforts of its President,
Colombia became the first nation to deliver a detailed development plan
51
to United States officials of the Alliance for Progress.
A "qualified" democracy, in 1962 Colombia had yet to substantially
reorient both attitudes and procedures to cope with the need for social
change. The challenge of f idelismo mushroomed during Lleras' term. Thus
the difficult decisions of Colombian foreign policy during this period
bore his personal stamp.
Dependent upon the Alliance for Progress funds to support a reform
program imperiled by both domestic uncertainty and Cuban subversion^
Lleras appealed to the inter -American collective security machinery,
in alignment with the U. S. , to support sanctions against the Cuban
regime. Apparently two major factors influenced the Colombian decision:
(l) danger of aisequilibrium to a relatively uncertain domestic situation
caused by Cuban subversion—a result of Colombia's geographical proximity
to Cuba and reputation for being a successful "Alliance for Progress
country;" (2) direct dependence on U. S. Alliance for Progress aid
49j hn D. Martz, "Colombia, A Qualified Democracy," in Needier
Political Systems of Latin America , p. 214.
5QIbid . , 216.
51Ibid .. 216,230.
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dollars to advance social reform.
Venezuela * The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution which antedated
the Cuban Revolution became permanent when Romulo Betancourt won 49 per
cent of the total vote in a 1958 election and his party Accion Demo-
cratica won a clear majority in both houses of Congress and in most
52 /
state legislatures. Seeking a revolution by consent, Romulo Betancourt
shunned the firing squad techniques employed by Fidel Castro. The Venezu-
elan regime instituted agrarian reform by law with just compensation,
not by arbitrary seizure. After its democratic revolution Venezuela
was able to maintain friendly established economic relations with the
U. S. and with other Western hemisphere countries. By contrast, Castro
through his own choice essentially had alienated himself from the U. S.
and had become entirely dependent upon Soviet trade. The Venezuelan
regime under Betancourt made no attempt, as did Castro, to regiment the
entire economy under state control, although Venezuelan leaaers made
provision for extensive governmental planning. Governmental ownership
of basic industries was mixed with private manufacturing, commerce and
53
agriculture.
Because the Venezuelan Democratic Revolution has represented the
antithesis of the Cuban Revolution, Castro has attempted to vindicate
his cause by labeling the Betancourt Government as a primary target for
overthrow by subversion. Robert Alexander, a noted authority on Latin
American affairs has compared the rivalry between Cuba and Venezuela
52R bert N. Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 57.
53lbid ., 316.
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to the contest between Communist China and India in Asia.
The Betancourt Government broke diplomatic relations with the Castro
regime on November 11, 1961, when the hostility between the two nations
55
precluded any correct diplomatic interchange. ' Thus because its politi-
cal symbolism as a model democratic revolutionary government marked it
for overthrow by Fidel Castro, Venezuela has supported proposals to
sanction the Castro regime. Geographic proximity also intensified the
urgency of Venezuelan support for collective O.A.S. sanctions. Con-
sistently in its foreign policy the Venezuelan Government has been a
foe of all dictatorships whether of the right or left, and has supported
collective intervention on behalf of constitutional democracy within the
inter-American system. And in 1962 the Venezuelan Government announced
that it would no longer extend diplomatic recognition to any regime
56
which came to power through illegal means regardless of the circumstances.
Peru . The recurring patterns of Peruvian politics from 1931-1962
have been governed by a feud between the Aprista party and the Peruvian
military. The Aprista party was organized by Victor Raul Haya de la
57
Torre to bring reform not only to Peru but to "Indo-America" as a whole.
With its cooperative efforts to unite laborers and intellectuals and to
blend Marxist economics with democratic philosophy it became more of a
social movement or a popular crusade than a political party. Apra 's
54Ibid., 315.
55Ibid ., 146.
56Leo B. Lott, "Venezuela," in Needier, Political Systems of
Latin America , p. 264.
57Rosendo A. Gomez, "Politics of Military Guardianship," in
Needier, Political Systems of Latin America , p. 303.
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program centered around five major points:
(l) Action against "Yankee" imperialism • • • ; (2) political
unity of Latin America; (3) the nationalization of lands and
industry; (4) the internationalization of the Panama Canal; and
(5) solidarity with all oppressed people and classes of the
world. 58
Frequently the Apristas on the side of social change and the military
59
on the side of status-quo forces, have clashed in the streets. The
modern Peruvian military, though more amenable to social change now than
in the past, has clung to its guardianship role, upholding a self -conceived
constitutional mission. It has been especially watchful of any attempt
by the Apristas to assume complete control of high offices, not only
because of ideological cleavages but because of fear of reprisal for
the past.
In the period 1931-1962 Manuel Prado served two terms totalling
twelve years as President (1939-1945 and 1956-1962). Prado served his
first terms as a conservative, numb to the problems of social change and
progress. Prado's second term, however, resulted from a compromise be-
tween Conservatives and Apristas forced by the rising influence of the
latter. Prado, in exchange for power, agreed to act as a moderate buffer
between the Apristas and the military in order to bring the Apristas for-
61
ward in the 1962 election with their own candidate.
Given the relatively conservative orientation of the Prado Adminis-
tration under the considerable surveillance of military guardians, Peru
58james C. Carey, Peru and the United States 1960-1962 (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 46.
59Ibid. , 304.
60Ibid .. 302.
61lbid., 298.
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favored a strong stand against Cuba. At Punta del Este, the Peruvian
delegation, which had actually been the first to demand collective
action against Cuba, contended that Cuban agents had intervened actively
62
in Peruvian politics.
Recently the radical left in Peru has been concentrating on forming
violent peasant movements among the Indians. Some Aprista politicians
have been drawn by more vigorous radical slogans. Many Apristas , pri-
marily students, have broken with their party because of its temporary
pragmatic alliance and compromise with the conservative Prado. Continued
defection of younger Apr 1st as to more radical and extreme political
groups could well deplete the reserve of capable moderate centrist
democratic leaders, and sharpen the edge of left and right wing conflict,
perhaps to nullify the hard-won progress in social reform made possible
63
by political oroer.
Paraguay . Under the iron hand of dictator General-President
Alfredo Stroessner, Paraguay has consistently voted with the United
States in inter -American councils. Somewhat of an embarrassment to the
United States, Paraguay has made little progress toward fulfilling the
economic and social goals of the Alliance for Progress. Opposing all
forces considered detrimental to its continued control, the dictatorship
outlawed the Communist party, and in 1961 broke relations with the Castro
government in Cuba. The Paraguayan stand in favor of strong sanctions
" New York Times . January 14, 1962, p. 35.
63Gomez, "Politics of Military Guardianship," in Needier, Political
Systems of Latin America , p. 307.
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against Cuba at Punta del Este reflected the reactionary vested interest
64
of the President -dictator in maintaining rigid control.
Uruguay . A rather atypical Latin American state, Uruguay has an
almost entirely literate population of chiefly European descent, and
has been noted for its democracy, remarkable political stability and
it
advanced social welfare.
However, Uruguayan political programs have reached a stalemate be-
cause of political division in the nine-member collegiate executive.
The original purpose of the collective executive had been to prevent
any seizure of power by an aspiring dictator. Six seats on the col-
lective Executive Council are distributed to the highest vote-getters in
the majority coalition (lema), while three are allotted to the highest
vote-qetters in the minority coalition. Under this lema system, several
political parties (sub-lemas) with similar programs are grouped together
fi>~7
for the purposes of winning the elections. Often those groups which
cooperate to win elections cannot cooperate within the National Council
or parliament to govern coherently. With no clear working majority,
nominations for important posts have often been left unfilled and coherent
68
policy has been difficult to formulate.
(La
°^Leo B. Lott, "Paraguay," in Needier, Political Systems of Latin
America
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The Cuban question has raised sharp controversy in Uruguay though
the Communist party has had only mediocre success. Among Democratic
Socialists and even fervent anti-Communists there has been admiration
for Castro. In January 1962, Uruguay had not yet severed diplomatic ties
with Cuba. The traditional two-party coalition system has effectively
controlled internal extremism. But the current fragmentation of politi-
cal unity, stemming from petty disagreements between party leaders, could
69
well be exploited by leftist -extremist groups for their own advantage.
Uruguay's indecisiveness at Punta del Este was clearly a reflection
of the political division of the National Council. Although the Uruguayan
Government voted to convene the conference, the National Executive Council
70
was split between two diametrically opposed groups. As a result the
Uruguayan delegation was sent to the Conference without prior instructions.
A position was to be charted according to new information presented or
71
new resolutions advanced. Clearly a compromise position was needed to
win the support of the Uruguayan Government. No hard-line resolution
calling for mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions could have
healed the breach within Uruguay's National Council. With regard to
Uruguay's indecision, Ronning has recorded, "Throughout the Meeting
Uruguay remained a microcosm of the split that was affecting all of
,
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Latin America.
69lbid .» 461.
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Very significant in contributing to this indecision was Uruguay's
difficult position between two large anti-sanctions nations, Brazil and
Argentina. One group headed by the Chairman of the Executive Council,
73
President Haedo, veered toward the position of these powerful neighbors.
Resolution VI which excluded Cuba from the inter-American system
in lieu of requiring a mandatory break in diplomatic relations, struck
the fine balance necessary to unite the factions in the Uruguayan Council.
The first paragraph of Resolution VIII which required the inter-
ruption of arms traffic was a specific sanction directly related to the
problem of subversion, rather than a vague punitive sanction that could
have been arbitrarily applied. A middle-ground position, this resolution
was calculated to unify opposing points of view—a necessary prerequisite
for obtaining a positive Uruguayan vote. The second paragraph of Reso-
lution VIII which referred to the O.A.S. Council the study of feasibility
and desirability of extending trade suspensions to other items, particu-
larly those with strategic importance, may also be construed as a compro-
mise measure. The relatively noncommittal language of the resolution
enabled divided governments such as Uruguay's to postpone a final de-
cision until more information could be collected or until a more pro-
pitious political moment.
Haiti . Governed by a dictatorial regime, Haiti is the only pre-
dominantly Negro nation and the only nation whose European culture is
Fxench in Latin America. The gross national product in 1962 was
$304,000,000, one of the lowest in Latin America. The population density,
424.7 persons per square mile, is the greatest of all Latin American
73Morrison, p» 171.
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countries. Complicating its low economic output and overpopulation
is a lack of natural resources, a rudimentary state of agricultural
technology, and the highest illiteracy rate (90 per cent) in Latin
America. These conditions are expected to hinder the development of a
responsible constitutional democracy.
The President -Dictator "Papa Doc" Duvalier has indicated little
desire to improve the overall social welfare of his nation. The greatest
share of his national budget has been allocated to defense spending,
representation abroad, and upkeep of the presidency and administration.
Originally one of seven nations that declared its opposition to
sanctions against Cuba, Haiti shifted its position to support sanctions
on the final vote. At the time Haiti's position was mysterious and un-
clear. However, it has become increasingly obvious that Haiti adopted
an independent position only to gain economic commitments from the United
States. U. S. aid formerly totalling $13.5 million annually was cut off
when President Duvalier insisted, against United States objections, on
dismissing qualified engineering personnel and replacing them with un-
qualified political appointees. A U. S. announcement of a commitment
to build a jet airport outside Port-au-Prince coincided with the Haitian
77
decision to vote with the two-thirds majority at Punta del Este.
74William Benton, The Voice of Latin America . (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965), p. 36-37.
75ftayford W. Logan and M. C. Needier, "Haiti," in Needier,
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Anti-Sanctions Group
Mexico . The Government of Mexico has been a most consistent
advocate of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples. Dr.
Howard F. Cline, an eminent authority on the history and politics of
Mexicot has characterized Mexican policy as follows*
In the hemisphere, Mexico has high prestige as an inde-
pendent spokesman for the Latin American point of view, based
primarily on the fact that it has shaken off most of the ills
that have beset its colleagues from time-to-time—dictator-
ships, foreign control of the economy, even national politics;
and has clearly, through its own Revolution set the nation on
the road to social and economic betterment. 7
Dr. Cline has made it quite clear that Mexico's adherence to the
doctrine of nonintervention has not always resulted in a passive foreign
policy:
Mexico has been among the leaders in organizing collective
defense against external intrusions in the internal affairs of
peoples, especially those of Latin America. This modern tradi-
tion which has prevented the rise of a Mexican neutralist or
third force concept was clearly demonstrated by Mexico's entry
early and vigorous, /under President Aleman/ into World War II
against a clearly visible Nazi threat.
The posture of Mexican foreign policy toward Cuba has been
officially correct through diplomatic channels, though not unnecessarily
cordial. Policy decisions are made within the all-inclusive moderate
Party of Revolutionary Institutions, a symbol of the Mexican experience
of revolution to evolution. The vocal pro-Castro Leftist groups were
Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution , (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 311.
79Howard F. Cline, "Mexico, Fidelismo and the United States,"
Orbis, V. (Summer, 1961), 153.
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dealt with effectively by the Lopez Mateos Government, and precluded
from capturing control of official Mexican policies during this period.
Thus the Mexican unwillingness to break diplomatic relations with
Castro or support mandatory inter -American sanctions against his regime
stems not from political sympathy with Castro' s goals, but from a deep-
80
seated tenacity to the dogma of nonintervention.
The juridical principles of nonintervention and self-determination
of peoples are mutually-related and derived from the experience of the
Mexican revolution. In his First Annual Message, Lopez Mateos re-
iterated the stand of every Mexican President since Lazaro Cardenas:
"The principles of our foreign policy emanate from our historical experi-
ence. We were forced to defend our territory, our sovereignty and our
integrity."
The absolute principle of nonintervention has been based on
Mexico's special sensitivity to the interventionary actions of all
nations which might block the legitimate aspirations of people to modify
their political, social and economic conditions by revolution if neces-
82
sary. Consistently Mexico has defended the right of the Cuban revolu-
tionaries to commit errors—as long as those errors don't result in
definitely proven overt acts of aggression against other states. Mexico,
having peaceful and friendly relations with the United States, has at-
tempted to interpose itself as an "honest broker" between the United
States and Latin America.
80c line, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution , p. 300.
Sllbid., 300.
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The support of sanctions against the Castro regime, in the absence
of conclusively proven overt acts of aggression, then was considered by
the Mexican Government as a violation of the doctrine of nonintervention
embodied in Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter.
Responding to the Colombian request for a Meeting under the Rio
Treaty to discuss and define attacks and aggression, the Mexican repre-
sentative on the O.A.S. Council announced that Mexico would vote against
a convocation of a Meeting under the Rio Treaty, because contrary to the
terms of Articles 3 and 6, no American state was being subjected to
either an armed attack or "any other act or situation that may place
84
in danger the peace of America." He further added during the debate
that the O.A.S. was not strong enough to sustain the burden of decisions
85
of this nature, and should avoid such issues.
Throughout the Punta del Este Conference the Mexican stand against
intervention was absolute and uncompromising. This stand was particularly
evident in Mexico's opposition to the resolution concerning economic sanc-
tions. Because no conclusive proof had been offered that Cuba's Marxist-
Leninist system had committed overt acts of aggression against other
states, the Mexican position was based on the argument that any application
of sanctions solely against a country's internal political system would
constitute an illegal intervention into that country's domestic policy.
Although the Mexican delegation assented to the vague resolution
declaring Cuba incompatible with the principles of the inter -American
^New York Times . November 15, 1961, p. 18.
35Berle, p. 100.
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system, Mexico opposed the key resolution excluding Cuba from participa-
tion in the inter -American system on juridical grounds. Adopting a
strict -constructionist attitude, the Mexicans argued that the C.A.S.
Charter did not make provision for the exclusion of a member, and if
this were to be done the Charter would need to be amended by calling a
special Inter-American Conference for this purpose. But Mexico was will-
ing to approve the resolution excluding Cuba from attendance of sessions
of the Inter -American Defense Board because that agency, created by the
Foreign Ministers, was within the competence of that Organ to regulate
without Charter provisions. Thus the Mexican Government's decision to
support this resolution appeared to be based upon political discretion
rather than juridical arguments.
Although the argument against the exclusion resolution was made
without reference to the doctrine of nonintervention, it appeared that
the Mexican bias against intervention was a factor in making this decision*
Though not technically listed as a sanction under Article 8 of the Rio
Treaty, the exclusion resolution carried the effect of a punitive action
(or intervention) against a state, strictly because of its "incompati-
bility" with the principles of the inter-American system—something to
which the Mexican Government had been opposed on the grounds of non-
intervention. As has been recognized earlier, the Bay of Pigs invasion
had alerted the Mexican Government to the possibioity that any collective
action might easily become an act of intervention.
Postponement of such a decision until the convening of an Inter-
American Conference conceivably would have allowed more time for the Mexi-
can Government to observe closely Cuban international actions as a
36
consequence of that government's conversion to Marx ism- Leninism. A
premature decision taken before Cuban aggression could be successfully
demonstrated, could have revived leftist agitation, perhaps violence,
and jeopardized Mexico's proud record of internal stability and security.
Brazil . The largest nation in South America, Brazil in recent
years has rapidly awakened to a new awareness of national identity and
destiny in world affairs. Inspired by the spiraling rate of Brazilian
national growth, in 1960 President Janio Quadros steered the ship-of-
state to an independent course. He premised the new foreign policy on
democratic economic development and social reform—an aim common to
Brazil and other less-developed countries united in their rejection of
86
colonialism.
By outlining this independent policy Brazil assumed the role of
self -appointed apokesman for the needs and grievances of the less-
developed nations, especially in the Western hemisphere. Quadros con-
demned the /shortsighted/ "ideological prejudices of capitalist democ-
racies, ever ready to aecry the idea of state intervention • • • " and
answered that "We /of the less-developed nations/ are not in a position
to allow the free play of economic forces in our territory, simply be-
cause those forces, controlled from outside, play their own game, and
87
not that of our country."
86Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," in Irving Louis
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He warned that "The Western world must show and prove that it is
not only Communist planning that promotes the prosperity of national
economies."
The Brazilian president challenged the United States to rectify
the economic imbalance which he considered to be the most critical of
all the adverse factors besetting the inter-American regional system.
Recognizing that the U. S. through its recent aid programs had taken
steps to revise a rather inoperative continental policy, President Quadros
expressed hope that President Kennedy would "sweep away the remaining
89
obstacles on the road to a truly democratic continental community."
For translation into reality Brazilian foreign policy was ultimately de-
pendent on the juridical principles of respect for the self-determination
of peoples and nonintervention as the best safeguards for each nation's
unhindered basic economic and social development.
A preface to the explicit Quadros third force policy had been
phrased by Horatio Lafer, Head of the Brazilian delegation to the United
Nations in 1960, who addressed himself to the problem of East-West con-
flict:
The only feasible path leading to solution of our age's
problems is that of permanent negotiation, the persistent
determination to continue to negotiate . • • •
Nonetheless to attain this state of peaceful coexistence • • •
a basic premise, a point of departure must be fixed. This premise
is the acceptance by each one of the reality, just or unjust, of
nations with regimes, ideologies and organizations not as we would
38
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wish them to be, but as they are today. This acceptance must
be accompanied by the pledge of non-intervention, direct or
indirect, by one ideology in the sphere of another. 9°
According to Senor Lafer, acceptance of the status quo is the
primary prerequisite for the resolution of the cold-war conflict. He
felt that a ". • . relevant role can be played, vis-a-vis the major
protagonists in the current political scene, by the lesser anti-war
powers /Brazil/ who can become the impartial interpreters of the world's
91
desire for peace."
When a partial cold war detente has been achieved through negotia-
tions, the Brazilian argued, the nations of the world will be able to
consolidate world peace permanently by channeling resources saved from
92
arms reduction into economic development.
Janio Quadros, the man responsible for articulating this major
shift in Brazilian foreign policy, assumed office as President with
elaborate campaign promises to raise the living standards of the masses.
Since 1950 Brazilian presidents have had to become more sensitive
to the clamor of the masses for social reform in order to win the elec-
torate. But these democratic leftist reform-minded presidents, including
Quadros, have faced both conservative Congresses, which have ignored the
executive's progressive programs, and conservative jealous military
93
guardians. As had previous presidents, Quadros faced an uncompromising
90Horacio Lafer, "The Survival of Mankind: United Nations Not a
Super State," in Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil , p. 111.
91Ibld .. 111.
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Congress, and as a result he resigned on August 25, 1961, less than
seven months after assuming office.
His resignation elevated Joao Goulart to the office of the presi-
dency. Because of Goulart' s radical leftist background as Labor Minister
under Getulio Vargas, in 1954, the military intervened to prevent his
95
assumption to full presidential power. ' However, a compromise solution
was worked out by the military to allow Goulart to assume office. A
parliamentary system was established, conferring more power on the
Congress, to insure that Goulart' s independence as president would be
96
even more severely constricted by conservative forces.
Thus Goulart, from the day he assumed the Brazilian presidency in
August, 1961, was forced to tread a narrow path between right-wing mili-
tary coup-d'etat and left-wing violent social upheaval.
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation offered the new Goulart Adminis-
tration its first major opportunity to shape the direction of its foreign
policy.
On September 10, 1961, the new Brazilian Foreign Minister reaffirmed
Quadros' independent foreign policy by announcing that his country would
"spare no effort to maintain Cuba within the inter -American system in
accordance with the characteristics that are the basis for coexistence
9?
between the countries of this hemisphere." Despite President Goulart 's
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difficulties with the conservative right-wing Congressional opposition
and the military, his initial foreign policy appeared as positive and
independent of the United States as had his predecessor's. This reaction
was the Brazilian answer to the careful U. S. probe of the dynamics of
Latin American foreign policy in the fall of 1961 prior to the call for
the Ministers' Conference.
On December 3, 1961, Brazil joined with Mexico and four other
nations to oppose the Colombian proposal for a Foreign Ministers' parley
to consider the (Cuban) problem of subversion as a form of aggression
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prohibited by the Rio Treaty. Consistent with its conviction that re-
spect for national self-determination and coexistence offered the best
permanent solution to the current international conflict, the Brazilian
Government on January 22, 1962, set forth a general plan for neutralizing
the Castro regime. Dr. San Tiago Dantas, Brazilian Foreign Minister de-
fended his government's proposal because it recognized the need for the
defense of American diplomacy against international Communism by aiming
to create conditions for the neutralization of Cuba on valid legal
grounds.
A more specific proposal was advanced by the Brazilian delegation
for consideration by the Foreign Ministers. The plan called for (l) Cuban
acceptance of a "status of limitations" to include reduction of armaments,
termination of subversion, cessation of purchase of Soviet weapons; (2)
a specially-appointed O.A.S. committee that would oetermine by negotiation
^%ew York Times . December 4, 1961, p. 1.
"New York Times . January 13, 1962, p. 6.
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Cuba's "status of incompatibility" after a sixty-day period. If after
this sixty-day period Cuba had shown no willingness to adhere to the
principles of the inter-American system, then the plan would have
implemented the strictest collective sanctions, including military forcer
Certainly the major emphasis of this plan was on negotiation with
Cuba, rather than punishment for Cuba, And for this reason the United
States rejected it although the plan had the merit of attempting to
bridge the gulf between the pro-sanctions group and the anti-sanctions
group. It would seem doubtful that strong military sanctions would have
been applied under this plan had it been adopted. If there was but slight
agreement within the inter -American system concerning the status of Cuba's
incompatibility it would have been improbable to suppose that within sixty
days all the differences could have been reconciled. Undoubtedly the
Brazilian Government understood this reality, and could propose sanctions,
knowing that they would probably never be applied under the circumstances.
A second Brazilian attempt to mediate also failed. Concerning the
matter of applying limited economic sanctions, a Brazilian draft "recom-
mended to the governments of member states immediate suspension of all
101
arms traffic or any other implements of war." Couched in terms of a
recommendation, the proposal would have avoided a controversial formal
collective decision in the compulsory terms of the Rio Treaty on whether
the Cuban regime "constitutes a situation that might endanger the peace
of America.
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Perhaps the proposal would have been acceptable to the
lOONew York Times . January 21, 1962, p. 32.
lQ1New York Times . January 28, "News of the Week in Review,"
Section IV, p. 4.
I02Ibid., p. 4.
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anti-sanctions group t but it was clearly too weak to win approval from
the nations of pro-sanctions group who wanted some manifestation of
action *
On the final tally, Brazil abstained on the exclusion paragraph of
Resolution VIII concerning limited mandatory economic sanctions. For
the most part the Brazilian Government was objecting to the immediacy
of the application ana the mandatory nature of these propositions because
all resolutions sponsored by the Brazilian delegation had sought to avoid
either immediate or required action.
Like Mexico, Brazil used juridical arguments for its decisions.
But Brazilian policy, the more flexible of the two governments, lent
itself to modulation according to the national self-interest. At Funta
del Este, Brazil advanced policies that were circumscribed by the state
of internal affairs. Roberto de Olivera Campos, a former Brazilian
Ambassador to the United States, has outlined practical considerations
of Brazilian politics which influenced his government's abstentions on
key measures sponsored and backed by the United States. If strong action
against Cuba had been supported by the Goulart government, leftist minor-
ities in certain key positions could have started a chain reaction of
strikes, street incidents and general disturbances at a time when Brazil
and other countries were in a delicate state of political convalescence
103
and needed normalization of economic life.
It would seem that any position the Goulart government might have
taken would have placed its political safety in jeopardy. A pro-sanctions
I03Roberto de Oliveixa Campos, "The United States and Brazil: A
Diplomatic View," in Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil * p. 360.
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position likely would have incited leftist rebellion with the possibility
of a military coup. The soft-line pursued by the Goulart Government put
the government under closer scrutiny by the military guardians.
Ambassador Campos also pointed out the unworkability of sanctions
proposed and adopted at Punta del Este. Because of the insignificance
of trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin America, commercial sanctions
would have been meaningless. Diplomatic sanctions, the Brazilian Ambas-
104
sador argued, would not have protected Latin America from infiltration.
Argentina . Because of upcoming elections, internal pressures on
the Frond izi Government were especially acute. Increasingly the govern-
ment's austerity program had encountered opposition from the labor-left,
particularly the peronistas , followers of ex -dictator Juan Peron.
For the Frond izi Government to have taken a firm pro-sanctions
stand at Funta del Este would have added to this already growing left-
105
wing opposition, and been an act of political suicide. On the other
hand President Frond izi was under pressure from the armed forces to take
strong measures against Cuba, although prior to Punta del Este, Argentina
still maintained diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. Argentine
armed forces leaders had been quoted as saying that "Communism was a
106
cancer, and with cancer half -measures would not do." A compromise
which would have reconciled these opposing pressures, in all probability,
would have won the approval of the Frond izi Government*
104Ibid .. 360.
i05Ronning, p. 17.
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Throughout the preparation for the Punta del Este Ministers*
Meeting, the U. S. had regarded Argentina hopefully as a pivot swing
state capable of influencing other votes. Hopes of State Department
strategists that Argentina would support sanctions were heightened by
the knowledge that President Frond izi himself was personally anti-Castro
and pro-West, and that his Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Carcano shared
107
his views. The following illustrates the effect of uncertain domestic
politics on Argentine foreign policy decision making. Just before the
Council voted to convoke a Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Argentine
Government presented a compromise formula to call the Meeting under
Article 39 of the Charter, a broader less-specific provision, to avoid
108
the controversial question of applying compulsory sanctions altogether.
When this proposal did not win acceptance, Argentina abstained on
109
the Colombian request to convoke the Meeting under the Rio Treaty.
During negotiations before the official opening of the Conference
a compromise formula was compiled from Argentine and Colombian draft
resolutions* The Argentine draft had strongly condemned Cuban-Soviet
ties and Cuba's violation of human rights. Added to this condemnation
was the Colombian proposal to issue Cuba an ultimatum to sever military
ties with the Soviet bloc and otherwise return to the inter -American
system, or submit to collective sanctions. This plan received little
I07Morrison, p. 104, 105, 192.
103New York Times . December 3, 1961, p. 4.
IQ^New York Times . December 5, 1961, p. 11.
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consideration because of the difficulty in determining the meaning of
"return to the inter -American system."
Ambassador Morrison reported that two high-ranking Argentine
officials were dispatched to Washington a little over a week before the
Conference opened. The team made it clear that Argentina would not favor
sanctions against Cuba, but would support a resolution bearing a lesser
penalty, excluding Cuba from the inter-American system.
Members of the U. S. delegation carefully probed the positions of
the pro-sanctions nations during the Conference negotiations. Towara the
end of the Conference when the resolutions were to be formally presented,
a decision had been reached to push for ouster instead of sanctions on
the virtual promise of Argentinian and possibly Brazilian support. But
when the U. S. confronted the Argentine delegation ready to accept the
Argentine plan to oust Cuba from the system, the Argentines were un-
112
receptive and evasive. Later they abstained on the exclusion resolu-
tion ostensibly because of juridical scruples. It was believed that
ftogelio Frigerio, a powerful pro-Castro Peronista adviser, influenced
President Frond izi's ultimate decision to abstain on the exclusion reso-
lution. 113
However, as a pivotal state, the Argentine Government deviated from
the strict anti-sanctions group, when it approved limited economic sanc-
tions barring arms traffic. The resolution directed the Council to study
the desirability of extending sanctions to strategic materials, which also
lllRonning, p. 18.
112Morrison, p. 193.
H3ibid .. p. 105.
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won Argentine approval seemed to be a modification of an earlier
Argentine plan asking the O.A.S. to study what should be done about
Cuban incompatibility.
President Frondizi's refusal to endorse the exclusion of the Cuban
Government from participation in inter-American Councils was soundly
condemned by the Argentine military. Armed forces leaders demanded
that Frond izi break diplomatic ties with Cuba, and force his Foreign
Minister to resign.
During the first week in February, President Frond izi, in an
attempt to appease the military and retain maximal civilian control
over Argentine foreign policy, agreed to break diplomatic relations with
115
Cuba gradually and to support resolutions adopted at Punta del Este.
When armed forces leaders demanded a full and immediate break, Frond izi
agreed but angrily stated that he would not preside over a puppet govern-
116
ment. But succumbing to heavy military pressures, President Frond izi
117
retracted by breaking relations with Cuba on February 8, 1962.
Military guardianship ultimately proved to be the most significant
short-term factor conditioning Argentine foreign policy toward Cuba fol-
lowing the Punta del Este Conference. But the reluctance of President
Frondizi to take an unrelenting hard line during the negotiations at
Punta del Este, was based on factors likely to persist in future Argentine
U4New York Times . February 1, 1962, p. 1, 2.
115New York Times . February 2, 1962, p. 6.
ll&New York Times . February 4, 1962, p. 1.
li7New York Times . February 9, 1962, p. 1.
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policy making: (l) the unknown quantities of leftist unrest in the
slums; and (2) the possibility of a thoroughgoing social revolution in
Brazil, Argentina's powerful and somewhat paradoxical neighbor to the
north.
Chile * Chile's position at Punta del Este also must be evaluated
most significantly in terms of the domestic political equation. A
balance of power between rightists, leftists and moderates has con-
tributed to the maintenance of orderly political democracy in Chile.
Through evolution, rather than revolution, Chilean parties and
statesmen have accomplished moderate political, economic and social
119
reforms in urban areas. But the most serious maladjustment that
has retarded Chile's progress has been the system of rural land owner-
ship and distribution. Because more than 30 per cent of the total
active population depends on agriculture, "monopolization of land, the
core of the plantation system, has been and still is an important source
of political power as well as a source of semi-feudal social relation-
.. 120
ships.
The combined power monopoly of elite groups of rural landholders,
urban industrialists and businessmen, was first broken in 1920 when the
middle-class-oriented and labor-supported Radical Party successfully
121
endorsed Arturo Alessandri for the Presidency.
* 18New York Times . February 9, 1962, p. 9.
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Progress in implementing social-welfare legislation was halting
and uncertain in the 1920' s and 1930* s. But a Radical- led popular
front middle-class-proletarian coalition government of 1938 yielded
the most advanced legislation for urban welfare and economic development.
The flood-tide of reform legislation ebbed in the immediate post-war
122
years, even though the Radicals controlled the Presidency.
The Socialist-Radical alliance fell apart in 1941 largely because
of intragovernmental rivalry between the two parties for control of
patronage and policy, a conflict that was exploited by the right-wing
123
majority in the legislature.
Socialist and Communist competition for control of the labor
movement further weakened the role of the Socialists as the left balance
wheel of the Popular Front.
Also within the middle-class Radical party, two distinct wings
emerged to complicate the political scene—one Marxist and leftist, the
other moderate, liberal and non-extremist. Although this "split person-
ality" muted the sharp edges of conflict and contributed to moderation,
policy-making effectiveness stagnated, and with it progress toward
124
social and economic reform.
The paternalistic persona lismo of ex-dictator Carlos Ibanez waxed
strong in the 1952 presidential campaign. Contributing to this temporary
reaction was widespread disillusionment among all groups of the electorate
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concerning party fragmentation and inertia, which was complicated by
125
the spiraling post-war inflation.
Failure of middle-class leadership consolidated the influence of
the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties* An observer of
Chilean politics has noted that:
A key to the power of the ^Liberal and Conservative/ rightist
parties was the fact that their hold on the rural parts of Chile
remained practically untouched. At no time during the years of
leftist predominance did the leadership of the temporarily allied
government parties attempt any program involving the partition,
the expropriation or even the increased taxation of the landed
estates. 1^6
By the presidential election of 1958, past political coalitions
in Chile had been regrouped along more definable ideological lines. The
right-wing Liberal and Conservative parties backed Jorge Alessandri,
son of former President Arturo Alessandri, who ran on an independent
platform.
Bduardo Frei, candidate of the Christian Democratic party appealed
most strongly to the middle-class intellectuals, technicians and non-
Marxist leftists as well as to Catholics. The Radical Party, formerly
a center stabilizing force in Chilean politics, ran for the first time
as a single isolated party rather than as part of any middle-class
leftist coalition group.
In the 1958 election, non-Marxist leftists* Socialists and Com-
munists joined ranks to form the Popular Action Front (FRAP). Led by
the dynamic Salvador Allende, this left-wing coalition emerged with
125i M.d ., 364.
126Ibid., 364.
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consolidated strength and influence, and came within a hair's breadth
127
of capturing the Presidency by popular vote.
Alessandri, the victor by a narrow margin, represented the Chilean
128
upper class and did little to alter the status quo. both moderate
center parties (Radicals ana Christian Democrats) following Alessandri'
s
election, expressed uneasiness about the consequences of Alessandri*
s
conservatism and his narrow election.
During the period 1945-1961, United States policy haa aided
rightist sectors in maintaining the established oraer by only mildly be-
coming associated with the pressing needs for social reform in Chile
129
through rather ineffectual aid programs. This position reflected the
interest of protecting considerable U. S. economic investment in that
nation. Nationalist noncommunist reform advocates, chiefly from the
center left, became attracted to a policy that would liberate Chile and
other Latin American nations from economic subservience to the United
States, and establish a Third Position in international affairs independent
of both Washington and Moscow. Such a Third Position was founded on the
130
tenets of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples.
Focus on Chile's adoption of an independent foreign policy became
more intense when its implications were considered in terms of U. S. -Cuban
127Ibid., 365.
128ibjd .. 365.
129Schmitt and Burks, p. 196.
130Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States. 1880-1962 .
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 269.
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conflicts which occupied the American states at Punta del Este. Dubious
of past U. S. motivations, leftist noncommunist Chileans have feared
that U. S. concern for the spread of Communism in Latin America by
Fidel Castro would be used as an excuse to suppress all meaningful
social reform by bolstering right-wing regimes that protected U. S.
131
financial interests.
The danger of a Communist take-over has not always been success-
fully demonstrated by the U. S. to Chileans. On the contrary, many
Chileans have credited the Communist influence in the leftist coalition
with accelerating the progress toward needed social reforms. It is
generally felt among Chileans that the non-Communist groups will be
132
able to control the Party's activities as an agent of Moscow.
The conservative elements in Chile have succeeded in maintaining
control through the democratic constitutional structure. Therefore,
the armed forces have not been called upon to intervene on behalf of
133
the status-quo interests. In 1958 the unified left seriously threat-
ened the conservative base of power. If the leftist coalition ever were
to gain power, then perhaps the military would, as it has done in other
Latin American countries, intervene and become politically conscious.
But when the Alessandri Administration assumed power, the military re-
mained apolitical. Subsequently, Alessandri, without strong military
support, was vulnerable to pressures of nationalist center and left
voices in the Congress, especially concerning foreign policy decisions.
131rbid., 266.
1321bid . , 266.
133iieuwen, p. 131.
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Therefore the Chilean delegation decided to oppose the convocation
of a Foreign Ministers* Meeting under the Rio Treaty to sanction Cuba,
ostensibly on the legal grounds advanced by Mexico, that the O.A.S. had
134
no jurisdiction because no direct act of aggression had been committed.
But cross-pressures of the Chilean domestic scene were evident when the
delegation was sent to Punta del Este virtually without specific instruc-
135
tions on the initial proposals.
Perhaps either a limited weak resolution or a soft-line resolution
would have been a likely alternative to enlist Chilean support, particu-
larly through Argentine leadership. But because the resolution to ex-
clude Cuba from the inter-American system was too strong, final and
lacking in sound legal foundations, the Chilean delegation decided to
abstain, most likely for reasons of political safety and fear of increas-
ing the advantage of the Communists.
But the Chilean position on the barring of arms traffic is not
quite clear. Official sources list a single vote on Resolution VIII
with votes of Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Ecuador listed as abstentions.
But C. Neale Ronning, a conference observer, has recorded that the vote
on Resolution VIII was done on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, though
the results were never published officially in this manner. Actually
there were three abstentions for paragraph I and four abstentions for
paragraph II. Because the U. S. had hoped to win Chilean support
I34New York Times . December 5, 1961, p. 11.
135New York Times . January 21, p. 32.
i36Ronning, p. 22.
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through Argentine mediation* it would seem likely that Chile, following
Argentina's lead, did not abstain on paragraph I, which barred arms
traffic. By the process of elimination, no other nation would seem as
likely a candidate as Chile for this position. Mexico's stand, as well
as Brazil's, had been based on its bids for leadership among the soft-
line nations at Punta del Este, and consequently was more rigid in
opposition to all sanctions. Ecuador's president had a record of leftist
leanings and was thus not likely to approve any sanctions. Also Chile's
secondary role as follower in hemisphere relations, as well as the pre-
carious ba la nce-of -power in her domestic affairs, lend credence to the
supposition that the government could very well support a strictly-
defined resolution sanctioning the probable source of aggression—the
arms traffic. It would be equally consistent with Chilean foreign policy
for the Alessandri Government to switch to the soft-line position on
a more vague resolution which in reality gave to the O.A.S. Council
undefined authority on the question of extending sanctions to undefined
categories of "strategic materials," because of the constant internal
leftist pressure.
Bolivia . Bolivia, together with Mexico and Cuba, has enjoyed the
distinction of having successfully accomplished a thoroughgoing social
revolution in the twentieth century. The revolution destroyed the
power and privilege of vested conservative groups, the landed aristo-
crats, foreign capitalists, the church and the military. Although there
are many parallels which prompted these three revolutions, the results
have been unique in all three circumstances.
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Prior to 1952 when the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
seized power, political control was maintained by a wealthy landed
upper-class elite that derived power from a monopoly on the mining
enterprises, reinforced by army support. The Indian majority had not
been integrated into the mainstream of national political or economic
life.
The challenge to this traditional order mushroomed following the
137
Boiivian-Faraguayan conflict in the Chaco (1932-1935). Regarding the
significance of the Chaco War it has been reported that
The severe losses in men and territory had eroded the
prestige of the army and the oligarchy. Widespread discontent
was openly voiced by the lower classes, who during the war had
for the first time experienced broad social contacts, new values
and aspirations, and a consciousness of nationality. *38
Led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, a middle-class radical intellectual,
the MNR protest took shape as "an anti-foreign nationalism focused pri-
139
marily against U. S. investments in Bolivian tin-mining operations."
Tentatively the MNR shared power with the military in 1943-1946,
140
and carried out a restrained reform program. Although Paz Estenssoro
and the MNR won the free elections of 1951, the army intervened to pre-
vent this orderly evolutionary transition. Early in April, 1952, the
MNR forces revolted and destroyed the military and last vestiges of
141
upper-class privileges in Bolivian society.
137Schmitt and Burks, p. 224.
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Merging the party machinery with the government at all levels,
the MNR embarked on an anti-privilege reform campaign of incorporating
the lower class into national life by redistributing the wealth* Dra-
matically the new regime nationalized the tin mines in October 1951—
the major focal point of discontent and distress. However Paz pro-
ceeded more slowly with expansion of education, wage and other security
142
benefits to the lower classes, and agrarian reform.
Although the Paz regime had originally exhibited a strong anti-
U. S. bias, gradually it modified that harsh position when the U. S.
recognized the government and expressed sympathy for the goals of the
revolution. The U. S. continued support of the revolution by purchasing
tin from the nationalized mines and extending large-scale Point-Four aid
143
and technical assistance.
After four years of rule by executive decree without a legislature,
144
Paz in 1956 allowed elections to be held for President and a Congress.
The MNR won impressive victories in the Congress and maintained
control of the Presidency. Her nan Siles Zuazo, a protege of Paz
Estenssoro, took office as president. Following a steady moderate
program, President Siles met determined opposition from left-wing
radicals led by Juan Lechin.
In the general elections of 1960, Paz was returned to the Presi-
dency as the MNR, though split internally into right -center-left wings,
145
won another solid numerical majority.
142Ibid., 225.
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The basically moderate orientation of the Bolivian government
was most seriously compromised by leftist pressure from Vice-President
Juan Lechin, a leftist, extremist—and a disruptive force within the
party. The left wing has conspicuously consolidated control over
the mining unions by exploiting the worker discontent with deteriorating
147
economic conditions. In the face of serious internal dissension
within his government and party, Paz could not be expected to take a
definitive stand against Cuba.
The Bolivian Government aligned itself rather consistently with
the anti-sanctions group led by Brazil ana Mexico, despite the heavy
U. S. financial assistance annually channeled into Bolivia.
Officially Bolivian Foreign Minister Jose Fellman Velarde, in his
press conference of January 23, alluded to the dilemma his government
faced because of economic dependence on the United States. He pointed
out that while the U. S. had underwritten 30 per cent of the Bolivian
national budget, for reasons of principle Bolivia would support the
148
Mexican position.
The Bolivian Government even went further to demonstrate its
opposition to strong sanctions by being the only nation except Cuba to
oppose the creation of the Special Committee on Security Against the
Subversive Action of International Communism. Explaining his government's
abstention, the Bolivian delegate compared the new Commission to this
Consultative Committee on Security which operated during World War II:
146Ibid .. 227.
147Ibid., 227.
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Eighteen years ago the men who now form part of the govern-
ment of Bolivia began on a small scale the first attempts to
advance, along the same road that we are now traveling, toward
the realization of our ideal of liberty and social justice.
Unfortunately, not only for us, our truth was hidden behind
a tin curtain and a great deal of misunderstanding and in-
accurate information; the result was that some governments,
which are now our friends and should have been then, were in-
clined to empower a commission to observe the conduct of the
Bolivian government and to punish it with the suspension of
diplomatic and commercial relations. This contributed to the
tragic failure of our declared object ives.149
Ecuador . The outstanding feature of Ecuador's political history
has been the lack of national integration. There are three basic dimen-
sions which explain this lack of integration: (l) rigid class system;
(2) political regionalism: (3) rural-urban cleavage.
The upper-class whites of Spanish descent have consistently been
the nation's landholders, political leaders and army officers. In recent
years the role of the mestizo, a fusion of white and Indian stock, has
been expanding in the country's national life. The rigidity of the
class system can be most sharply noted by the fact that half the popula-
tion are Indians relegated to the bottom of the social scale.
Politics in Ecuador has been reflected also by a competitive power
struggle between the coastal region, center of social and political
liberalism, and the Sierra highland, traditionally the stronghold of
social and political conservatism and Indian indigenous culture.
The rural-urban cleavage, symbolic of political fragmentation, is
closely related to the large rural Indian subculture in the high Sierras*
which has been separated culturally and socially from the upper and middle
ruling classes. Rural life, traditional and indigenous, has changed
149Ronning, p. 25.
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slowly. Tied to the soli, either through work on a large landed estate,
individual ownership of a small plot of land, ox collective ownership
of a small farm, the Indian has been as dependent and subservient as a
150
serf on a feudal manor in medieval Europe.
Lack of political integration has produced a pattern of in-
stability in Ecuadoran politics. So-called revolutions, merely changes
of governments, have been common and fairly frequent in the country.
Typically change has been restricted to an ouster of the President and
close aides, without accompanying alteration of the political system.
Revolutions have usually occurred because of constitutional violations.
Because Ecuadorian constitutions (fifteen since 1830) have been norms
for an ideal political system rather than real documentary indicators
of the status quo, "constitutional interpretation" has been reduced to
subjective argumentation among rival political leaders of the ruling
151
classes.
The class system, political regionalism and rural-urban divisions
have been reflected in the operation of the political process. Both
major parties, the Conservatives and Radical- Liber a Is, have appealed
to the upper classes by endorsing the principle of private land owner-
ship. The major doctrinal difference separating the traditional parties
has been the role of church in the state. Conservatives have upheld
church-state union, while Radical-liberals have supported and been able
152
to implement complete church-state separation.
150George I. Blanksten, "Ecuador, The Politics of Instability,"
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As the two major parties have declined in strength in recent
years , third as well as ad, hoc parties have become increasingly important
in Ecuadorian politics.
There are two chief minor parties—the Socialists and the Communists.
The Socialist party has been the only party concerned with integrating
the indigenous Indian culture into the national life, despite the fact
that the Indian himself has not been active in planning party policy.
The Communist party, small and relatively weak, has been very active
since the Cuban revolution. Though cooperating with Socialists domesti-
cally, the Communist party has independently adopted a sympathetic line
153
on poiicy toward Cuba. Ad hoc parties, extremely fluid organizations
created for the purpose of achieving short-range political objectives,
have assumed an even more significant role than third parties in recent
154
Ecudorian politics.
After over ten years of orderly constitutional transfer of power
the administration of Velasco Ibarra, a liberal, dependent upon ad, hoc
support, was overthrown by military coup d'etat in November 1961. The
Vice-President, Carlos Julio Arosemena, assumed the presidency in the
midst of hemisphere deliberation on Cuba. Arosemena also drew political
support from ad. hoc organizations. Though predominantly moderate,
155
Arosemena's backing drew initially from leftist and rightist groups.
Having a reputation for leftist leanings, President Arosemena had been
153Ibid ., 277.
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known to admire Fidel Castro prior to his ascent to power. One of
his first executive acts was to renew diplomatic relations with Castro's
156
Cuba*
Consistently, Arosemena's foreign policy favored a soft line
toward Cuba in the Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' deliberations.
But, in taking this position, the President was relying only upon the
will of a minority in his government. Given the precariousness of the
President's position and the fluidity of Ecuador's political process,
with the constant regrouping of ad. hoc parties, this position could not
be expected to be permanent.
Concluding Remarks
The bare two-thirds majority vote approving sanctions at Punta del
Este fell far short of the goal of inter -American solidarity on a criti-
cal security problem. Moreover the weight of this two-thirds majority
was unrepresentative of the will of the largest most populour states in
Latin America.
A consensus of the delegates believed honestly that the Conference
had been convened prematurely, since no overt aggression had been com-
mitted by Cuba against any American state—former ly a necessary pre-
condition for applying the Rio Treaty. A significant minority of states
failed to accept any hasty collective action against Cuba only on the
strength of that government's "incompatibility" with the principles and
objectives of the inter-American system. Such a collective action taken
without convincing proof of any international aggression resulting from
I56New York Times . November 10, 1961, p. 1, 3.
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that government's conversion to Marx ism- Leninism, it was argued, would
constitute intervention into the internal political affairs of a na-
tion—something strictly forbidden by Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter,
These essentially juridical arguments of the a nti-sanctions group
at Punta del Este, as it has been shown, more realistically corresponded
to the national self-interests of each state. Although it is difficult
to generalize, it would seem that the common denominator of pro-Castro
or leftist pressure on the respective governments opposed to sanctions
was a factor in shaping the foreign policy decisions at Punta del Este.
In Mexico and Bolivia, the social revolution had become institu-
tionalized in the form of civilian moderate-center-leftist governments.
Even though the objections of Mexico and Bolivia were registered strictly
on legal grounds, their anti-sanction positions cannot be completely
separated from the policy of their leaders to contain radical activity
by maintaining broad based support.
Anti-U. S. leftist pressures, however, were more acute and obvious
in the civilian governments of Brazil, Chile and Argentina. In these
nations the edges of social conflict were much sharper because the
privileged classes—the military, landed aristocracy, and the industrial-
ists—though their power had been diminished, were still struggling with
progressive forces for control. In order to prevent violent upheavals
generated by the pro-Castro left, almost a certainty if sanctions would
be approved, these governments opposed mandatory sanctions, upheld the
principles of nonintervention and self-determination, and sought compro-
mise and a softer more "recommendatory" line toward Cuba. The position of
Ecuador, though represented a separate case of a foreign policy decision
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which seemingly did not correlate with a dominant leftist political
combination* President Arosemena in making this decision seemed to
stand precariously alone.
Those governments that supported sanctions were also motivated by
factors affecting their respective national interests. Some governments
that supported sanctions
—
particularly most Central American nations,
Peru and Paraguay—were those least touched by social revolution, those
in which privileged groups, fearful of social change, had used their
power to maintain stability and upper-class predominance in varying
degrees*
Equally significant was the factor of relative geographic proximity
to the center of the Cuban subversion. Constitutional democracies that
had made remarkable progress toward the goals of development, Costa Rica
and Venezuela particularly, were influenced by considerations of immedi-
ate national security—as were other less democratic Central American
and bordering Caribbean states, who ail sought protection from collective
security.
Of perhaps lesser importance in motivating some governments to
favor sanctions was a heavy dependence on U. S. Alliance for Progress
aid. Colombia could possibly be included as a major example of this
type. Haiti used its critical "swing" position to win favorable economic
aid agreements from the United States, whereas other governments disre-
garded U. S. economic power to join the soft-line group. Bolivia and
Argentina are cases in point*
Of all the votes favorable to sanctions, Uruguay's was the most
unstable and indecisive. That the sanctions were ultimately less stringent
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and more limited probably resulted from the need to compromise in order
to procure the bare minimum for a two-thirds majority of votes, includ-
ing Uruguay's.
Community of interest on fundamentals concerning aggression and
methods of combatting threats to security is basic to the successful
operation of any mutual defense reciprocal assistance system; it was
clear that at the Punta del Este Conference such community of interest
was less than adequate to insure effective functioning of the O.A.S.
Wide disparities in level of social and economic development among the
Latin American nations and the United States contributed to the complex
gradation of factors that compromised the effectiveness of the O.A.S.
as a security system.
Correction of the internal disparities which divided the inter-
American community at Punta del Este would be the best long-range
approach to insure stabilization of Latin American politics, fulfillment
of economic goals and hopefully increased mutuality of national interests.
In the meantime, any astute observer of the extremely fluid inter-American
system would inevitably expect serious tensions to continue to divide the
O.A.S. members on the issue of applying mandatory sanctions against states
in questionable situations where evidence of aggression presented is vague
and unconvincing, and where collective intervention is proposed as a solu-
tion.
Whereas Punta del Este revealed the potentiality for disintegration
within O.A.S. ranks in a difficult and challenging situation, the Cuban
missile crisis,to be examined in the next chapter, demonstrated latent
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possibilities fox reintegration within the O.A.S. in response to a
difficult but equally challenging situation.
CHAPTER II
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Purpose
When the Soviet Union attempted to build a missile base with
offensive capability in Cuba, in an expression of unprecedented unanim-
ity, the Latin American states resolutely supported a collective measure
authorizing the use of force to prevent further shipment of offensive
weapons to Cuba.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the political
rationale of the positions of the United States and Latin American
nations in this crisis to determine what particular factors were most
significant in influencing this dramatic convergence of United States
and Latin American national interests within the Organization of American
States. Because the U. S. was responsible for detecting the evidence of
offensive missiles and precipitating the crisis, it is necessary to ex-
amine the chronological background of the Soviet military build-up in
Cuba, and the step-by-step formulation of United States policy which
culminated in the quarantine action.
United States Confirmation of Increased Soviet
Military Aid to Cuba
U. S. confirmation of a substantial increase in Soviet military
aid and technical assistance to Cuba in August 1962, did not suddenly
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a iter the consensus among the O.A.S. members following the Punta del
Este meeting, that the major threat poseci by the Castro regime was still
political and not military. At this time, there was no conclusive evi-
dence to indicate that the Soviet military build-up in Cuba constituted
an offensive military threat against any Latin American state.
Theodore Sorensen, a key member of President Kennedy's White House
staff, has recorded that aerial reconnaissance flights covered the en-
tire island of Cuba twice monthly beginning on August 27. The flight
on August 31 yielded photographs which provided the first "hard intelli-
gence" evidence of anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles, missile-equipped
torpedo boats for coastal defense and substantially more military per-
,
1
sonnel.
This new intelligence information which did not prove the construc-
tion of offensive ballistic missile sites, confirmed the earlier Adminis-
tration suppositions that the Soviet preparations were of a defensive
nature. Consequently the Administration officially reported to the
public that the defensive Soviet military installations had not signifi-
cantly increased Cuban striking power.
*
Reaction to the Administration Policy
When the Soviet Union finally announced its program of military aid
to Cuba on September 1, President Kennedy's deliberative approach to the
Cuban developments was increasingly subjected to skeptical criticism from
the Congress. The more extreme critics called upon the President to
^Theodore C. Sorensen, "Kennedy vs. Khrushchev—The Showdown in
Cuba," Look . XXIX, September 7, 1965, pp. 43-44.
2Ibid., 44.
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intervene unilaterally without delay, emphasizing the need to protect
United States security and defend the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Keating
(R., N. Y.), a more restrained critic of Administration policy, suggested
the possibility that the Soviets might be covering real intentions to
install offensive missile sites in Cuba. Keating' s remarks stemmed
mainly from his acceptance of exile reports which had reported Soviet
troop landings in Cuba as early as August 21, 1962, contrary to official
denials*
Central Intelligence Agency Chief John McCone also held this
view, speculating that the surface-to-air missiles might be intended to
3
protect offensive missile sites being constructed under cover.
Senator Keating, acknowledging that the military build-up in Cuba
involved the security of both the United States and the Latin American
states, advocated that an inter -American mission be sent to Cuba to
4
determine whether missile bases were actually in preparation.
Professor Hans J. Morgenthau also was opposed to the cautious
policies of the Administration. He acknowledged that decisions concern-
ing how, when and where to use U. S. military power against Cuba depended
on circumstances and a knowledge of details which was "a monopoly of
government officials." Morgenthau stressed that the permanent Soviet
military power in Cuba was detrimental "to the political position of the
U. S. in the western hemisphere," "the political and military position
3Ibid .. 44.
4Ibid. , 44.
5Hans J. Morgenthau, "Cuba—The Wake of Isolation," Commentary ,
November, 1962, XXXIV, p. 430.
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of the U. S. in the world," and "to the intellectual and emotional
health of our body politic." He continued,
Not only does the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet
political and military base challenge American influence in an
area which has traditionally been regarded as such for a century
and a half, it might lead to Kremlin speculation that it would
be less likely to protect interests elsewhere which are of more
recent origin and much more dubious validity ^Berlin/.
Morgenthau's thesis stressed the priority of executing an immedi-
ate action over the President's priority of resting any American re-
sponse on a sound collective foundation.
President Kennedy's Defense of the Administration Approach .
September 4. 1962
After conferring with a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders,
President Kennedy decided to clarify his policy objectives in a public
statement issued on September 4, 1962, concerning the military develop-
ments in Cuba. According to Sorensen's account, the President relied
heavily on the intelligence data from the August 31 overflight which had
7
net detecteo construction of any offensive ballistic missile sites. Con-
gressional and Administration leaders agreed that O.A.S. machinery should
be activated to deal with the Cuban arms build-up. But the President
did not yield to pressure as he continued to oppose any immediate
action, either unilateral or collective, because of the difficult un-
resolved questions concerning what O.A.S. organ to utilize and what con-
g
Crete measures to propose. The President's caution possibly can be
6Ibid ., 428.
7Sorensen, 44.
8?tew York Times . September 5, 1962, p. 1.
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attributed to the fact that his intelligence information was admittedly
incomplete, and that there could be no certainty that full Latin Ameri-
can support would be forthcoming. There was no indication from recent
O.A.S. actions that the members would support strong and effective
collective action, much less intervention in the internal affairs of
a Western hemisphere republic. The recent two-thirds narrow support
given to the United States-supported resolution to exclude Cuba from
the inter-American system taken at Punta del Este in January 1962, had
acquainted Administration leaders with the reality of dissidence and the
tenuous unity within the inter-American system.
In his September 4 public statement, President Kennedy announced
that he would pursue a flexible policy, advocating immediate action
only when hard intelligence evidence had proved the existence of a
significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet
9
guidance and direction. He stressed that any unilateral or collective
action would be premature and unwarranted because there was as yet:
... no evidence of any organized Soviet-bloc combat force
in Cuba; of military bases provided to Russia: of a violation
of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of
offensive ground-to-ground missiles ••••***
By implication President Kennedy had rejected anticipatory re-
sponse to a threat only then suspected. However, he had urged continu-
ance of a combined U. S. and O.A.S. policy to contain overt armed or
11
subversive aggression in situations when they became apparent.
9j_bid., 1.
10u. S. Department of State Bulletin , XLVII, September 24,
1962, p. 450.
lllbid ., 450.
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Secretary Rusk's Preparation fox an Infprmal
Foreign Ministers' Meeting
Soon after the President's September 4 pronouncement, Secretary
Rusk met with nineteen Latin American envoys to discuss the implications
of U. S. policy for the O.A.S. "Full unanimity" on the President's
policy was reported among the envoys present. Although no meeting
of the O.A.S. had been scheduled at that time, Secretary Rusk reportedly
was moving to prepare for an informal meeting of American foreign min-
. * 12isters.
Proposal for a Joint Resolution of Congress on Cuba
Congressional pressure on the President to adopt a firmer policy
continued to mount as Senate and House Republican leaders Dirksen and
Ha Heck proposed that the Congress by joint resolution authorize the
President to employ armed forces wherever necessary to meet the urgency
13
of the Cuban threat.
Announcement of the proposed Joint Resolution provoked a new
Soviet warning on September 11, that any United States attack on Cuba
would mean war. The Soviet statement declared that "the armaments and
military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive
purposes," denying that the Soviet Government had need to station of-
14
fensive missiles outside its boundaries.
l^New York Times . September 6, 1962, p. 1.
13Ne* York Times . September 8, 1962, p. 1.
I4New York Times. September 12, 1962, p. 1.
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The State Department termed the latest Soviet warning "obvious
propaganda," designed to cloak aggressive goals by a defensive posture.
Although Administration sources doubted that the Soviet Union intended
to risk nuclear war to defend Cuba, they continued to fear that Soviet
military aid would significantly increase Cuban capability to launch
15
subversive activities in other Latin American nations.
The President's Second Explanatory Statement .
September 13, 1962
In a second public statement on September 13 on the Cuban situa-
tion, President Kennedy explicitly singled out for special criticism
the war hawks in the United States who were demanding unilateral mili-
tary action against Cuba when no credible verifiable proof existed
that the Soviet military build-up constituted an offensive threat to
the U. S. or to other hemisphere nations. He statea that "it is re-
grettable that loose talk about such action might serve to give a thin
color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists.
A second time he underscored the distinction between offensive and
defensive capabilities:
If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to
endanger or interfere with our security in any way, or if
Cuba should ever become an offensive military base of sig-
nificant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country
will do whatever must be done to protect its own security
and that of its allies.*7
15Ibid., 1.
16U. S. Department of State Bulletin , XLVII, October 1,
1962, p. 481.
*6
I7Ibid., 481.
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When the President made this speech, the U. S. did not yet possess
sufficient intelligence information that the President thought would be
necessary in order to proceed with the support of Latin American nations
and the Western European allies* Neither group of nations had showed
any signs of supporting—or even respecting—a blockade or other sanc-
18
tions.
Adoption of the Joint Resolution of Congress
The Joint Resolution of Congress was passed overwhelmingly on
September 20 and 26, respectively, by the Senate and the House. It
underscored Administration policy and quieted the dissident voices
demanding immediate, stronger and more forceful action*
The Resolution advocated continued emphasis on the multilateral
approach, pledging the U. S. to take instant action only when direct
acts or threats of force threatened its own security or the security
of any hemisphere nation. Clearly the Resolution was founded upon the
President's thesis that the Soviet arms build-up did not signify enough
increase of Cuban offensive capability to justify preventive armed
action on the part of either the United States or the O.A.S. at that
time. 19
In Hearings on the Joint Resolution, Senator Keating, a leading
proponent of a stronger approach, had qualified his respect for and
i8Sorensen, 44.
*9u. S. Congress, Congressional Record , 87th Cong., 2nd sess.,
CVIII, September 10, 1962, pp. 18891-18951.
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support of the Executive Branch by again warning that the Administration's
public distinction between an offensive and defensive military build-up
was dangerous and unrealistic. The Senator emphasized that missile
launching facilities for the defensive short-range missiles already
based in Cuba could be transformed in a short period of time into a
20
facility for offensive intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles.
As previously emphasized, the Senator's own opinion was based on exile
21
reports which he did not offer to document.
Although Senator Keating had announced his preference for multi-
lateral action, he testified that in his opinion the Resolution should
broadly express U. S. intentions to act unilaterally in accordance with
the national interest if the O.A.S. refused to meet the situation
22
honestly, fearlessly, and without undue delay.
Secretary of State Rusk, who also testified before the Committee,
stated that the Executive Branch would value a Resolution which would
reaffirm and honor the commitments of the United States to other hemi-
sphere nations, according to the security arrangements of the inter -
23
American system. Throughout his testimony the Secretary presented
an effective defense of the multilateral approach currently being fol-
lowed by the Administration in dealing with the Cuban military build-up.
Defending this point of view, Secretary Rusk stated;
2
^U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services, Hearings , Situation in Cuba , 87th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1962, pp. 7-8.
2
^Sorensen, 44.
^Hearings, Situation in Cuba , pp. 7-8.
23Ibid., 31.
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I think it is of the greatest maximum importance, • • •
that we try to act jointly with our allies in a matter of
this sort, not only because we have commitments to try to
act on it with them, but also because the United States
cannot really act alone in these matters without heavily
involving those who are closely allied with us. 24
As the questioning proceeded to a discussion of the effectiveness
of a hypothetical naval blockade, Secretary Rusk remarked that the
United States Government would take such a step only if there were a
much stronger showing of a clear and present danger which would increase
the likelihood that the United States would have the political support
25
of the Latin American nations.
The Secretary then informed Congress that the Department of State
had been examining the possibility of seeking greater accord within the
O.A.S. concerning collective sanctions against Cuba. Although Secretary
Rusk reported that some governments were scrutinizing the possibility
of supporting collective sanctions more seriously, he declined comment
on the nature of these developments. To continue the effort to obtain
greater accord within the inter-American system, Secretary Rusk announced
that the American Foreign Ministers would meet informally on October 2
and 3 in Washington to consider what further steps against Cuba the
O.A.S. could take beyond the Punta del Este sanctions that would meet
with a solid majority of the hemisphere.
Secretary Rusk announced to Committee members that the U. S. had
invited the O.A.S. Secretary General to the informal Foreign Ministers*
24Ibid., 57.
25lbid., 58.
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talks to represent the overall interests of the regional international
organization.
Preparations for the Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The nations most favorable to an immediate concerted action
against Cuba included the ten nations in the Central American and
Caribbean area. United in this resolve because of relative geographical
proximity, and vulnerability, to the Castro threat, these nations spon-
sored a movement to seek greater politico-military cooperation among
the nations of the region supported by the U. S.
The U. S. looked with favor upon these renewed Caribbean initia-
tives. To the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees,
Secretary Rusk had previously explained that some action had clearly
been envisaged by the tU S» and the Caribbean states during the Punta
del Este Conference. The Caribbean states had given the strongest un-
qualified support for Resolution 6 which called for the exclusion of
the Castro Government from participation in the inter -American system.
Secretary Rusk had evaluated this support pragmatically:
... at Punta del Este where six of the so-called
important countries wanted to abstain on throwing Cuba
out of the O.A.S. We took the view that the important
countries were those who felt themselves threatened. 2^
This statement does not take into consideration the fact that the U. S.
had attempted to procure support from countries such as Mexico and
26Ibid .. 40.
27Ibid., 63-64.
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Brazil, that had abstained on the resolutions at Punta del Este.
Rather, the Secretary's attitude probably reflects more accurately a
rationalization and practical acceptance of the reality of division
within the O.A.S.
On September 26, Secretary Rusk met with several Central American
and Caribbean ambassadors to sound out their viewpoints on creating a
special ten-nation security organization to guard against Cuban-based
subversion or aggression. The organization would have:
1. provided for curbs on travel of Cuban agents*
2. prevented the transfer of funds for subversive purposes.
3. coordinated surveillance activities among the nations. 2**
These nations proceeded to join with the United States in an
"educational campaign" directed primarily at those nations still main-
taining diplomatic relations with Cuba including Brazil, Mexico, Chile,
29
Uruguay, and Bolivia.
The United States had continued to proceed as if the expected
threat from Cuba was more political and subversive than military and
overt, and had continued in attempts to convince the hemisphere nations
that cooperation on anti-subversive measures either on a hemisphere or
regional basis was vital.
The Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting, October 2 and 3« 1962
When the ministerial talks opened in Washington behind closed
doors at the State Department, Secretary Rusk declared that the U. S.
28New York Times . September 27, 1962, p. 1.
^Ibid., 1.
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was prepared to provide political leadership to defeat Communist in-
roads in the hemisphere. He announced that the United States desired
free expression and comment from the Latin American nations concerning
this common problem. Intentionally the Secretary refrained from making
specific recommendations to Latin American republics to take measures
against Cuba. This omission was significant in that it discreetly
allowed the Latin Americans to take the lead in discussing alternatives
without direct U. S. pressure. Secretary Rusk's approach followed the
Administration's announced objectives of carefully seeking effective
multilateral support in dealing with the critical Cuban situation.
President Kennedy also addressed the Foreign Ministers in the
same broad overtones. He stressed the common interest of the American
nations in consulting together to consider actions that could be most
usefully taken to contain the expansion of Communism from the island
of Cuba. The President did not explain what such steps might include,
but previously he had ruled out any military action under the prevailing
30
circumstances.
A separate working group represented all the Ministers, except
Mexican Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello, who was unable to attend. This
group was assigned the task of discussing possible collective measures
to isolate Castro further primarily in the field of limiting trade
and countering subversion. The debates reflected considerable accord
on the view that the Soviet military builu-up had more political than
military implications for the security of American nations.
30New York Times . October 3, 1962, p. 1.
78
In parallel diplomatic consultations among Central American and
Caribbean Foreign Ministers concerning regional collective security
action, Uttle progress Mas reported* The governments were divided on
the issue of applying forceful measures* Guatemala, in particular, had
31
persisted in demanding strong collective action*
The American Foreign Ministers concluded the meeting by issuing a
communique declaring generally that the Soviet intervention in Cuba
threatened the Americas am required collective measures* Although the
Ministers were unprepared and unwilling to authorize forceful measures
to eliminate the Cuban-Soviet arms threat, the Communique stated that
the G.A.S* ' should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly
,32
if the situation requires measures beyond those already authorized* '
But the Communique recommended increased economic pressure, including
the prohibition of the use of the ships of American nations in the Cuban
trade, and an appeal to world shippers to cease providing their ships to
Soviet-bloc countries for use in the Cuban tracte* The Ministers further
agreed that it was the responsibility of each republic to Intensify
efforts to halt internal subversive operations to conduct individual and
collective surveillance of arms shipments to Cuba, and to further study the
need to transfer funds to the Latin American nations to help them combat
33
propaganda emanating from Cuba*
3 *New York Times . October 4, 1962, p. 1.
32Ibid** 1.
^Ibid*, 1.
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Although the Joint Communique did not comprise authorization
for the preventive use of axmed force to reduce the danger of the
Cuban arms threat, it did recommend that each nation prohibit the
use of its ships in the Cuban trade. The United States used this
provision to justify a four-point program, to be activated within two
weeks, to penalize world shipping engaged in the Cuban trade. The plan,
which directed sanctions not only at Cuba, but against allied and neutral
shipping, outlined the following stepsi
1. Withholding from any shipowner cargoes owned or
financed by the U. S. government if his ships
engaged in carrying goods from Communist nations
to Cuba.
2. Closing of all U. S. ports to all ships of any
country, if any ship flying that country's flag
was engaged in transporting war materiel to Cuba.
3. Barring from U. S. ports any ship which on the
same voyage delivered nonmiiitary cargoes to Cuba.
4. Prohibition to all U. S. ships from carrying goods
to or from Cuba.**4
The plan would have penalized Chile and Mexico in particular,
because at this time they were the only nations in the Western hemisphere
35
that carried on significant commerce with Cuba.
New York Times Latin American affairs analyst, Tad Szulc, has
commented upon the effect of the Informal Ministers' Meeting of October 2
and 3 on the political unity of the inter-American security system:
^Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. The Organization of
American States . (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963)
p. 330. This sanction was never carried out because the effective date
was preceded by U. S. action taken in response to the new developments
of the missile crisis.
35New York Times * October 4, 1962, p. 1.
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Fox Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a man of immense
patience and tactful but clogged determination, this two-day
ministerial exercise in careful semantics and partial commit-
ment had the great value of increasing among the Latin Ameri-
cans the awareness of the cold facts of the Cuban situation. 36
Szulc observed that the results of the Conference had mended the
pending break in the tenuous hemispheric unity which had been strained
by the Cuban issue. Seen as significant by this journalist was the
fact that the October 3 Communique represented the first unanimous
recognition that "the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba is an attempt to
convert the island into an armed base for Communist penetration of the
37
Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere.
This statement reflects an oversight on the part of Szulc that the Mexi-
can Foreign Minister was absent and had not consented to the Communique's
terms. But it is important that other nations, particular ly Brazil,
endorsed this statement.
Detection of the Offensive Missile Sites in Cuba
According to the account of Theodore Sorensen, the first evidence
of the rude beginnings of a Soviet medium-range missile base was spotted
by photo interpreters from pictures taken from a camera aboard the
October 14 U-2 flight. After detailed analysis of the pictures, the
intelligence chiefs informea President Kennedy of the evidence on the
38
morning of October 16.
36New York Times . "News of the Week in Review," October 7,
1962, Section IV, p. 4.
37lbid., 4.
3°Sorensen, 45.
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Three steps were taken. First, the President ordered more photog-
raphy in order to record the speed of the missile site construction
and to detect the possible installation of intermediate-range missile
launching facilities. Second, the President directed his advisers to
make a "prompt and intensive survey of the dangers and all possible
39
courses of action." Third, President Kennedy admonished this
closely-knit group of advisers to guard their meetings with the tightest
secrecy until both the facts and the U. S. response could be announced.
He stressed that "Any premature disclosure . . . could precipitate a
40
Soviet move or panic the American public before we were ready to act.
Because of the security requirements surrounding the situation, even
41
"advance consultations with the allies were impossible."
According to the President's orders these photographic disclosures
were withheld from the public as the President and his fifteen advisers,
later called the Executive Committee (EXCOM) worked under conditions of
maximum secrecy to examine the meaning of the forthcoming threat, and
to prepare carefully an American response which would remove an obstacle
42
to security with finality without closing the avenues to negotiation.
Theodore Sorensen, a participant in these deliberations has written of
these men who were his colleagues, "/they/ had little in common except
the President's desire for their /independent/ judgment."
39Ibid., 45.
40Ibid. , 45.
41Ibid. , 45.
42Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course . (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1963), p. 13.
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Anatomy of the Decision-Making Process
Theories Considered by the Presidential Advisers . In the course
of the informal meetings of the Kennedy advisers, several theories were
43
advanced, "some inconsistent and some overlapping," to explain the
Soviet and Cuban motives in positioning offensive missiles in Cuba:
1, Cold War Politics : This theory, given considerable weight
by President Kennedy, speculated that the Soviet missiles constituted
a test of America's will to resist. Perhaps Khrushchev thought that
the American people were
too timid to risk nuclear war and too concerned with legalisms
to justify any distinction between our overseas missile bases and
his, that once we were actually confronted with his missiles, that
we would do nothing but protest, thereby appearing weak and ir-
resolute to the world, encouraging our allies to doubt our word
and to seek accommodation with the Soviets, ana permitting in-
creased Communist sway in Latin America in particular.
If this strategy produced these hoped-for results, then Khrushchev
could be expected to move in West Berlin or with new pressures on United
45States overseas bases.
2. Diverting Trap : The second theory advanced, conjectured that
Khrushchev might be inviting a U. S. invasion of Cuba, hoping to divide
the allies and to agitate the anti-American sentiment in Latin America
to divert all U. S. attention away from Soviet maneuvering so that the
Soviet Union could move on Berlin.
Sorensen, 45.
44Ibld_., 45.
451 bid ., 45.
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3. Cuban Defense : The theory presumed that Cuba, a Soviet
satellite in the western hemisphere, was a valuable asset to the Soviet
Union, both in its drive for expansion and in the contest with Red
China. Thus, Khrushchev could not allow the Castro government to fall
and risk invasion from the United States and some hostile Latin American
states. The presence of Soviet missiles in this case would seem to be
a tighter guarantee for Cuban security. 4°
4. Bargaining Power : This theory asserted that Khrushchev,
aware of Cuba's sensitive role in domestic American politics, "intended
to use these bases in a summit or U. N. confrontation with Kennedy as
effective bargaining power—to trade them off for his kind of Berlin
47
settlement or for a withdrawal of American overseas bases."
5. fissile Power : The theory was based on the reason that
perhaps
the Soviets coula no longer benefit from the fiction
that the missile gap was in their favor. To close it with
ICBM's and submarine-based missiles uvas too expensive.
Providing Cuban bases for their /VCBM's and IRBM's gave them
a swift, relatively inexpensive means of aading sharply to
the number of missiles targeted on the United States, posi-
tioned to bypass most of our missile-warning systems and
permitting virtually no tactical-warning time between
their launch and arrival on target. 4&
Thus, such a fait accompli might have enhanced the appearance
of Soviet superiority in matters of national wili and world leadership.
46 Ibid ., 45.
47lbjd . t 45.
43lbid .» 45-46.
49Ibid., 46.
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Preparation of the United States Position * The President's
advisers considered these theories, canvassed all possible courses,
prepared back-up materials, suggested time schedules, draft messages,
50
military estimates and predictions of Soviet and Cuban responses.
Pressure on the team of top decision-makers grew when aerial
reconnaisance photographs detected that six MRBM bases were rapidly
reaching the operational stage much faster than had been predicted
51
earlier, and that excavations for two additional IRBM sites had begun.
Various courses of action were suggested, but those given most
final attention were an air strike and a blockade.
Theodore Sorensen has related that initially the idea of a
"surgical" air strike appealed to almost all the advisers, including
the President. At first it was thought that "It /an air strike/ would
be over quickly and cleanly, remove the missiles effectively and serve
52
as a warning to the Communists."
But the obvious drawbacks soon became apparent. It became clear
for various reasons that an air strike would need to be backed up by
an invasion— a course consistently rejected by President Kennedy.
The problem of advance warning complicated the military and
logistical difficulties. Sudden attack without warning would have
created a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," and blackened the image of the
U. S. particularly among Latin Americans. Added to these problems was
the likelihood that Russians might be killed which would provoke a
50Ibid .. 51.
51Ibid .. 46.
52Ibid .. 51.
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Soviet military response. A warning, on the other hand, would have
enabled the Soviets to conceal the missiles and make their elimination
less certain, perhaps would have invited Khrushchev to commit himself
to bombing the U. S. if the attack was carried through, and would have
given the Soviet leader time enough to seize the propaganda and diplo-
matic initiative to stir up objections in the United Nations, Latin
54American and the Western allied nations.
A blockade had few supporters at the outset, largely because of
the disadvantage of the time factor. Of the initial reaction to a
blockade approach, Theodore Sorensen has written:
Instead of presenting Khrushchev with a fait accompli ,
it offered a prolonged and agonizing approach, uncertain in its
effect, and indefinite in its duration, enabling the missiles
to become operational, subjecting us to counterthreats from
Khrushchev, giving him a propaganda advantage, stirring fears
and protests and pickets all over the world, ... causing
Latin American governments to fall, encouraging the U. N. or
O.A.S. to bring pressure for talks, /before the removal of the
missiles had been secured/and in all these ways making more
difficult a subsequent air strike if the missiles remained.
^
In spite of these disadvantages, the Administration preferred
the blockade response. The pro-blockade argument shaped up in this
manner:
Precisely because it was a limited low- level action ...
the blockade ^against offensive weapons onlv/ had the advantage
of permitting a more controlled escalation on our part, gradual
or rapid as the situation required /extension of the blockade
to cover other items or an air strike/. It could serve as an
unmistakable, but not sudden or humiliating warning to Khrushchev
of what we expected from him. Its prudence, its avoidance of
53lbid .. 52.
54Ibid., 52.
55Ibid .» 53.
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casualties, and its avoidance of attacking Cuban soil would
make it more appealing to other nations than an air strike,
permitting G.A.S. and allied support for our initial position,
and making that support more likely for whatever air strike
or other action was later necessary, 56
nhiie these crucial decisions were being made, extra efforts were
made In official Washington circles to normalize the President's
schedule. The most important event of the week was the President's
two-hour interview with the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko.
Both the President and Mr. Gromyko conferred in routine way covering
generally topics from Berlin, to Laos and finally to Cuba. Cn the
historic occasion, while the American preparations to confront the
Soviet Union were being finalized, the Soviet Minister confidently
denied that the military build-up in Cuba serveu any offensive inten-
tions. But it should be noted that Gromyko did not really say in so
many words that Fidel Castro hau not obtained offensive weapons. Be-
cause the President chose to avoid clearing up the ambiguity, no doubt
Mr. Gromyko concluded that the U. S. government did not yet have in its
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possession evidence confirming construction of the missile sites.
Presidential Address to the Nation
A climax was reached on October 22, when the President denounced
Khrushchev in a nationwide television speech and explained the American
purpose and response. President Kennedy declared that "a strict quar-
antine of all offensive equipment under shipment to Cuba /was/ being
56Ibia., 53.
57Pachter, 27.
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en
initiated. The President warned that the quarantine could be extended
to other types of cargo, if necessary. Secondly, the President directed
the continued and increased surveillance of Cuba and its military build-
up to judge whether further forceful action was justified. For author-
ity the "resident referred to the Communique issued by the O.A.S. Foreign
Ministers October 3, which had rejected secrecy on such matters and af-
firmed that the O.A.S. "should stand in readiness to consider the matter
promptly if the situation required measures beyond those already author-
ized.'
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Here it is well to note that during this anxious week, the presi-
dential advisers had adequate time to prepare the scenario without the
pressure of public exposure. This time allotment enabled the State
Department to time consultations with O.A.S. nations at the most auspi-
cious moment—a factor which seemed to be significant in cultivating
hemispheric unity in this crisis.
Singling out the Soviet Union, not Cuba, as the major aggressor,
the President avowed:
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western
hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States,
requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. °0
Consistent with the pre-planned regional multilateral approach,
the President announced the request of the U. S. Government for an
58U. S. Department of State Bulletin . "Adoress by President
John F. Kennedy," XLVII, November 12, 1962, p. 716.
59ibid ., 718.
60lbid., 718.
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immediate tmergency Meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the O.A.S.
to consider the Soviet provocation as a threat to hemispheric security
and to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all
necessary action. Simultaneously the President called for an emergency
meeting of the U. N. Security Council to consiuer a U. S. resolution
calling for prompt dismantling ana withdrawal of all offensive weapons
in Cuba, unaer the supervision of U. N. observers.
On October 23, the Council of the O.A.S. met in Lxtraorainary
Session to hear the request of the U. S. Government for O.A.S. approval
under the Rio Treaty of the naval quarantine announced by resident
Kennedy.
Securing voluntary O.A.S. approval had always been a high priority
of President Kennedy's, but Theodore Sorensen has explicitly confirmed
that the President would have instituted the blockade without O.A.S.
approval, because the vital national security of the U. S. was at stake.
His profound desire to preserve hemispheric solidarity had led rresident
Kennedy to include a reference to the Latin American and Canadian areas
within the target range of the Soviet missiles.
O.A.S. Deliberation of U. S. Quarantine Resolution
When the Emergency Meeting convened October 23, 1962 the feverish
canvassing of the various Latin American Foreign Offices by U. S. officials
6iIbid., 175.
62rheodore C. Sorensen, "JFK's Greatest Hour—Khrushchev Retreats
in Cuba," XXIX, Look . September 21, 1965, p. 57.
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had revealed support of sixteen nations. Brazil, Chile, Mexico and
Bolivia remained in the doubtful column. All still recognized the
Castro regime.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk personally addressed the Council
as the U. S. Representative. The Secretary reminded them of the inter-
American resolve expressed in the Communique of October 4, to take
collective action against the build-up in Cuba if it should become
offensive. Then the Secretary outlined for the Council members the
threats the missile sites posed to the independent nations of the
Western hemisphere:
Their significance is immediate, direct, and perhaps fateful
to the maintenance of that independence. The principal implica-
tions are, first that the Communist regime in Cuba, with the
complicity of its Soviet mentors, has deceived the Hemisphere,
under the cloak of secrecy and with loud protestations of
arming for self-defense, in allowing an extracontinental power
bent on the destruction of national independence and democratic
aspirations of all peoples, to establish an offensive military
foothold in the heart of our hemisphere.
Secretary Rusk emphasized the President's statement that for the
first time Latin American capitals had become strategic targets within
range of the medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The
effect of this rapid build-up, the Secretary continued, would be that
"No country of this hemisphere can feel secure, either from direct
attack or from persistent blackmail /from subversion/*
63cieLesseps S. Morrison. An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy :
Latin American Mission . (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 239.
^Organization of American States, Council, Acta de la Sesion
Extraordinaria, El 23 de Octubre de 1962 , (Serie del consejo OEA/ser. g.
II./C-a-462) Washington: Pan American Union, October 23, 1962, pp. 4-5.
65lbid .. 5.
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Finally Husk stressed that the aggressor was the Soviet
Union:
The Soviet intervention in the Western hemisphere with
major offensive weapons challenges as never before the deter-
mination cf the American governments to carry out hemispheric
commitments for the defense of the peace and security of the
nations of this Hemisphere against extr acont inent a 1 aggression
or intervention. 6°
Secretary Rusk concluded his remarks by introducing the texts of
two draft resolutions prepared by the U. S. Government. The first, a
procedural resolution, provided for the Convocation of the Council as
Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The second, a
more substantive resolution to be considered immediately following the
adoption of the first, called for the immediate dismantling and with-
drawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capacity
and would
... recommend, though not seek to compel the member states
of the O.A.S. to take the measures necessary to ensure that this
build-up does not continue, that Cuba does not continue to re-
ceive offensive weapons, and if necessary, to prevent the offen-
sive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being
used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere. 7
The Council, according to the first U. S. draft resolution con-
stituted itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. U. S.
Ambassador deLesseps Morrison proposed that the session of the Council
be recessed until later that afternoon to allow the delegations sufficient
time to receive clear, definite and final instructions from their re-
spective governments.
66Ibid., 6.
6 ?ibjd .. 8.
68Ibid., 31.
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The American governments gave unanimous approval to the first
section of the U. S. draft resolution which called for the immediate
dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons
with any offensive capability.
The Uruguayan Ambassador did not receive his instructions in time
to make the decision unanimous before the quarantine went into effect.
But a favorable position was soon recorded to make support for the
resolution unanimous. Reasons given for the delay were, that with
elections only two weeks away, most of the members of the nine-man
Executive Council of State were campaigning in scattered parts of the
country and could not assemble themselves quickly enough to make the
decision.
Two governments, Brazil and Mexico, requested a separate vote on
the last phrase of the second paragraph of the resolution beginning
with "and ... continent, " so that each could approve the first part
and abstain on the second part. The section resolved:
To recommend that the member states, in accordance with
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance take all measures, individually and collectively,
including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary
to insure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive
from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies
which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to
prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever
becoming an active threat to the peace and the security of the
Continent. °
^Morrison , 31.
"^Organization of American States, General Secretariat, Applica-
tions, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Volume II. I960-
1964
. (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), p. 112.
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The Government of Bolivia joined the Governments of Mexico and
Brazil in abstaining on the second part of the paragraph. The Council
also expressed the resolve to:
inform the Security Council of the U. N. of this resolution
in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the U. N. and
to express the hope that the Security Council will in accordance
with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dis-
patch U. N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.
/and/ continue to serve provisionally as the Organ of
Consultation and to request the member states to keep the
Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by
them in accordance with paragraph two of this resolution. 7i
Firmly backed by the unanimous O.A.S. vote, the quarantine went
72
into effect at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time, October 24, 1962.
Several Latin American nations offered military aid to the U. S.
in support of the quarantine. On October 24, the Government of Argentina
took the lead in offering ships of its Navy to cooperate in the defense
of the hemisphere. Naval and port facilities were also offered by the
Governments of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Colombia,
73
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador.
Formation of a Combined Quarantine Force
On November 1, the Argentine delegation prepared a draft resolution
to coordinate the formal offers of cooperation made pursuant to the
October 23 resolution. That resolution, approved with modifications,
resolved:
71Ibid., 112.
72Ibid., 113.
73Ibid., 116-119, 138, 142, 144.
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1. to take due note of the military and other contributions
that the member states have made and are making in order
to give effect to the resolution adopted on October 23,
1962 by the Council acting provisionally as Organ of
Consultation*
2. to recommend that the member states participating with
military forces or with other facilities in the defense
of the hemisphere work out directly among themselves the
technical measures that may be necessary to the coordinated
and effective action of the combined forces, and that they
keep the Organ of Consultation informed of this action, in
compliance with paragraph four of the above-mentioned
resolution. 74
The Council also approved the following explanatory statement
delivered by the Chairman of the Council:
The Chairman states that a faithful record of the resolution
adopted must make it clear that the Council, established pro-
visionally as Organ of Consultation, is of the opinion that the
measures for coordination referred to in paragraph two in no
way constitute authorization for the formation of regional
military groups within the inter-American system. 7^
The nations cooperating to carry out the naval quarantine were
representative of three geographic regions, symbolizing the total unity
of all the Americas with regard to the quarantine. The partnership of
Argentina in this endeavor was valued highly, as an expression of inter-
American solidarity—Argentina's distant territory being least threatened
by the Cuban based missiles. Although the actual military value of
these Latin American contributions to the United States forces was
limited, the Kennedy Administration welcomed them highly as manifesta-
tions of inter-American solidarity.
74Ibld .. 151-152.
75Ibid., 153.
76Ne* York Times . October 25, 1962, p. 1.
94
Western Hemisphere Solidarity Vis-a-vis the United Nations
This unanimous manifestation of western hemisphere solidarity
strengthened the United States position in the United Nations forum,
when U. S. Ambassador Stevenson exposed Soviet duplicity to the Security
Council members by displaying photographic evidence of the missile bases
under construction in Cuba, Such verbal and concrete unity by Latin
American nations in the hour of crisis gave immeasurable political
support to the United States in its demand that the missiles be removed
from Cuba. It was believed that the Soviet Union did not presume the
77
solidarity of the inter-American system.
The U. S. resolution presented to the U. N. Security Council
October 23, 1962 called for the following measures:
1. As an interim measure under Article 40 of the Charter,
for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba
of all missiles and other offensive weapons.
2. It further authorized and requested the Acting Secretary
General to dispatch to Cuba a United Nations observer corps
to assure and report on compliance with this resolution.
3. Upon U. N. certification of compliance it called for the
termination of the measures of quarantine against
military shipments to Cuba.
4. In conclusion, it urgently recommended that the United
States and the Soviet Union to confer promptly on measures
to remove the existing threat to the peace of the world
and to report thereon to the Security Council. 78
Successful Resolution of the Crisis
Acting Secretary General U Thant played a leading role as Chief
Negotiator in the resolution of the crisis. Through Thant's good offices,
77New York Times . "A Step by Step Review of the Cuban Crisis,"
November 1, 1962, pp. 1, 6, 7.
78U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, U. S .
Charges of Soviet Military Build-up in Cuba . Publication 7458, Inter-
American Series No. 82, November, 1962, p. 23.
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Chairman Khrushchev was persuaded to call back freighters loaded with
contraband cargo from the quarantine zone to avoid escalation of the
79
conflict through a confrontation of the two powers at sea.
However, the Soviets were reluctant to halt work on the missile
sites as a result of the U. S. quarantine or U Thant's diplomatic
entreaties. A White House statement released October 26, 1962, re-
vealed that "The activity at these sites apparently /was? directed at
80
achieving full operational capability as soon as possible."
It became imperative that the American offensive had to gain
speed before the sites were ready and the missiles operational. Two
major alternatives were seriously discussed which would have increased
offensive pressure to insure the removal of the missiles. A "surgical
operation" consisting of pin-point bombing of the missile sites was
again discarded by the Kennedy advisers because of the possibility of
Russian casualties and the danger of disturbing the inter-American
solidarity by arousing dissidence from states opposed to intervention.
A less dangerous but more serious alternative that had frequently been
discussed was the tightening of the block; de to exclude oil shipments.
The major drawback of this plan was that it would have been directed at
Castro, and hence less effective, because the major contender and
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decision-maker had been identified as Chairman Khrushchev.
79Pachter, 43-44.
^U. S. Department of State Bulletin . "White House Statement on
Continuation of the Missile Build-up in Cuba," XLVII, November 12,
1962, pp. 740-741.
8IPachter, 50.
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But on October 26, it was reported that the U. S. was interpret-
ing the October 23, O.A.S. resolution as clear authority to use force
as an alternative in dismantling the missile bases. The U. S. inter-
pretation was endorsed by Jose A, Mora, Secretary-General of the
O.A.S. At a news conference, Dr. Mora stated that any measures taken
by the U. S. to dismantle the bases forcefully would be considered
multilateral measures, which would receive authority from paragraph
82
two of the October 23, O.A.S. resolution.
It was felt that the three member nations (Mexico, Brazil, and
Bolivia) that had objected to this enabling clause, would undoubtedly
have opposed any such action as unlawful collective intervention and
would have likely been joined by powerful sectors of leftist public
opinion in other Latin American states.
Although sufficient numerical strength within the O.A.S. approved
such a course of action, U. S. decision-makers consistently had re-
served pin-point bombing as the last alternative only in case other
measures should fail, in a bid to retain the substance of power gained
by full unanimity of the inter -Anerican system. U. S. officials pro-
ceeded with regard in this critical matter for the interest of all
Latin American states as part of the overall security interest of
the U. S.
Though the O.A.S. authorized such further forceful measures that
would be necessary to accomplish the removal of missiles, there is
legitimate doubt that the O.A.S. nations would have been in complete
Q^New York Times . October 17, 1962, p. 1.
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agreement as to the need for such action. So the degree of unity
behind the second paragraph of the quarantine resolution remained
untested*
After extending two somewhat conflicting peace offers, Premier
Khrushchev on October 28, agreed to dismantle the offensive arms under
mutually satisfactory arrangements for U. N. verification, and ship
83
them back to the Soviet Union.
Although in subsequent negotiations, aided by the services of
U Thant, the U. S. and the Soviet Union reached satisfactory agreement
on the modalities of U. N. inspection. Fidel Castro refused to permit
84
any on-site inspection of Cuban soil. Castro also turned a deaf ear
to Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's solicitations concern-
ing inspection during an unsuccessful three-week mission to Havana.
In the absence of on-site international inspection by a U. N.
team, the U. S. proceeded unilaterally to survey the dismantling process
through aerial reconaissance photographs and alongside inspection of
out-going Soviet freighters loaded with offensive weapons. After the
President was certain that the limited objective of dismantling had been
achieved, he instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift the naval quar-
Of.
antine on November 21, 1962.
83Pachter, 58.
84Tnomas, p. 332.
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Survey of Factors Producing Inter -American Solidarity
Latin American nations have been fearful of any foreign aggression
or threat of aggression aimed at their territorial integrity, sovereignty
ox independence. This quest for Latin American solidarity against out-
side aggression has been supported by the historical tradition of seek-
ing cooperation for purposes of mutual defense begun as early as the
'
f 87
Panama Congress of 1826 by Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator. The
unanimous response of the Latin American nations to the Soviet missile
threat in Cuba corresponded to this general historical pattern. Some-
what paradoxically, the rough idea for inter-American mutual defense
against external aggression was fostered when U. S. President James
Monroe proclaimed his famous doctrine in 1823. Although in the Monroe
Doctrine the United States had declared its opposition to further
extracontinental settlement and foreign encroachment on the independent
states of Latin America, the U. S. stifled all Latin American proposals
for any type of inter-American mutual defense union.
The potential idea of inter-American defense cooperation lay dor-
mant for a ha If-century. Intervening was the occurrence of an immediate
and nearly complete alienation of the U. S. from Latin American nations.
The U. S., strengthened by rapidly expanding power and an awakening
national consciousness, fulfilled its territorial "manifest destiny" at
87Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, Its Rise and
Decline
,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 26.
83Charles G. Fenwick, The Organization of American States—the
Inter-American Regional System , (Washington; Kaufman Publishing Company,
1963), p. 11.
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the expense of Mexico during the Mexican war in 1348. Latin Americans
afterward feared U. S. power as a threat to their own territorial
sovereignties.
Although the U. S. extended the offer of inter -American coopera-
tion to Latin American nations in non-political fields near the turn
of the century, the Latin Americans continued to distrust U. S. motives.
The "taking" of the Panama Canal, the U. S. supervision of Cuban politi-
cal affairs following the Spanish American war, and the l). S. assump-
tion of international police power in the Caribbean enforced by mili-
tary interventions, rekindled the Latin American fear that the superior
power of the U. S. was being used for selfish reasons.
Thus efforts to merge U. S. national interest, expressed in terms
of the Monroe Doctrine, with the Latin American desire to utilize U. S.
power to shield their vulnerable positions against overseas threats,
were not renewed until unrestricted German submarine warfare threatened
39
American shores in 1917. The war threat temporarily unified the
diverse nations of Latin America in rudimentary mutual defense coopera-
tion despite their anti-United States feelings.
President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy and his nonintervention
pledge in 1933 renewed respect for the motives and leadership of the
90
U. S. on a more solid basis of unity and mutual understanding.
Thus, when extracontinental aggression threatened the Americas
in 1935, the Latin American republics, encouraged by the change in
89J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and the Inter -American
Security System, 1389-1960 , (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1963)
,
p. 80.
90lbid
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U. S. policy, were prepared to establish the first permanent security
machinery to reinforce American preparedness.
In the Declaration of Lima, 1938, the American states in effect
"continentalized" the Monroe Doctrine by establishing the Foreign
Ministers of the respective republics as a permanent consultative
organ to agree upon and implement unspecified measures for defense
91
cooperation.
During World War II, the Foreign Ministers held three such formal
consultative meetings. This hemispheric policy-making body proclaimed
American neutrality and issued a Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance
before direct U. S. participation in the war. When the Japanese did
attack U. S. territory at Pearl Harbor, the Foreign Ministers "recom-
mended" that all American states display their solidarity by breaking
diplomatic relations with the Axis; in addition they establisheu the
Inter-American defense board and the Emergency Advisory Committee for
Political Defense to coordinate inter -American military and political
defense.
Because of confidence in the value of the inter -American security
system, as a shield against external aggression, Latin Americans in-
sisted upon the retention of regional organizations within the post-war
international order.
At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Latin Americans, alarmed
by the proposal that any regional enforcement action have prior Security
9 *Ibld .. 143.
92Ibid .. 212.
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Council approval, forced a compromise by insisting upon the insertion
of Article 51 into the United Nations Charter. This Article authorized
collective and individual self-defense against armed attack until action
93
could be taken by the Security Council.
The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, negotiated following the establish-
ment of the U. N. , institutionalized the informal development of the
inter-American system as a regional defense organization compatible
with Article 51 of the U. N. Charter.
Article 3 of the Treaty is concerned with action in the event of
an armed attack within the territory of an American state or within the
region. By its terms each of the contracting parties is obligated to
assist in meeting the attack by exercising the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the U. N.
94Charter. The function of the Foreign Ministers of the American States
is to examine the legality of immediate self-help measures and agree
upon collective O.A.S. action, which except for use of armed force
OR
would be considered binding upon all members by a two-thirds vote.
The O.A.S. is authorized to continue these self-help measures until
the U. N. Security Council has acted to maintain or re-establish the
96
peace.
Article 6 deals with an act of aggression which is not in fact
an armed attack, including such threats to security as extracontinental
93Thomas, 31.
94Ibid .. 249.
95Ibid., 249.
96Ibid., 250.
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ox intracontinental conflicts, ox othex facts ox situations which
might endanger the peace of Amexica, provided that such aggression,
conflict, fact ox situation affects the inviolability ox the integxity
of the texxitoxy or the sovexeignty ox political independence of any
Amexican state* When such a situation axises, the Oxgan of Consulta-
tion is authoxized to meet immediately to agxee upon the measures which
must be taken fox the common defense and fox the maintenance of the
peace and secuxity of the continent. In such cases Axticle 52 of the
U. N. Chaxtex pxovides fox the supexvision of the Secuxity Council in
utilizing xegional agencies fox pacific settlement of disputes and
97
enforcement action.
It would seem that the fxamers of Axticle 6 of the Rio Txeaty
pxedicated this section upon a broad intexpxetation of Axticle 51 of
the U. N. Chaxtex. Pxoponents of the broad interpretation of self-
dofense have argued that in view of the political and militaxy neces-
sities of modexn intexnational life, states should not be expected to
await an actual attack which in the face of an imminent thxeat, would
98
paxalyze their ability to resist.
The situation created by the covert construction of Soviet
missile bases in Cuba posed such a thxeat to the Westexn Hemisphexe.
In this C3*e then the Organ of Consultation was authorized to act to
preserve hemispheric security when essential legal rights had been
violated by the Soviet Union before actual armed attack was launched.
97Ibid . t 252.
98Ibid >. 252.
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Under this interpretation the actions of the O.A.S. under Article 6
could then have continued until the U. N. Security Council had been
99
able to restore the peace.
The clandestine construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba
marked the first time that Soviet nuclear weapons, located within the
hemisphere, constituted an offensive military threat to the security of
all American nations. That the Latin American nations, despite their
varying political orientations, unanimously supported the U. S. quarantine
to halt Soviet arms shipments, reflected the historical determination of
the Western hemisphere nations to unite in self-defense against extra-
continental acts or threats of aggression.
The Crisis and the Foreign Policy Shifts of the Six
Dissenting Nations at Punta del Este
The six nations abstaining on the resolution of the Punta del Este
Foreign Ministers' Conference to exclude Cuba from the inter-American
system seemed to reverse their foreign policy positions by approving the
quarantine action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in this crisis. It
is necessary to examine the conditions which prompted these nations to
shift their positions and support collective sanctions in order to give
a more meaningful appraisal of the implications of the "unanimity" for
the future of the O.A.S.
Mexico . Mexico had been a leading spokesman for the six nations
abstaining on sanctions against Cuba at Punta del Este. An inquiry
into the raison d ' etr
e
of the Mexican position will be significant in
"ibid ., 264,
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ascertaining general factors motivating the decision-making process of
the other five dissenting governments.
In September, 1962, when only unsubstantiated exile reports spread
rumors about secret preparations for Soviet missile installations, Mexican
Foreign Minister Manuel Tello stated unequivocally that Mexico would oppose
any kind of blockade of Cuba.
After the informal Foreign Ministers' parley in Washington
October 2-3, 1962, which the Mexican Minister had been unable to attend,
President Lopez Mateos declared at a news conference that the Rio Treaty
had "supplanted the Monroe Doctrine," and could only be invoked if an
American nation was the victim of aggression.
Implicitly, the Mexican President reminded the U. S. and other
Latin American nations favoring strong action against Cuba, that Mexico
would not support any collective action under the Rio Treaty unless
evidence could be produced to prove that Soviet military aid to Cuba
had transformed the island into an offensive military base.
But when the U. S. was able to produce convincing facts of the
existence of an intermediate range missile base rapidly being assembled
in Cuba on October 22, President Lopez Mateos responded that the Mexican
Government would stand by its obligations under the Rio Treaty in meeting
the Cuban situation. U. S. Ambassador deLesseps Morrison reported
that President Kennedy, in order to secure a positive Mexican vote, had
I00Hispanic American Report
. XV, September 1962, p. 792.
lOlEl Universal . (Mexico City), October 5, 1962, p. B.38. Quoted
in James F. Engel, Mexican Reaction to United States Cuban Policy. 1959-
1963 . (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science,
University of Virginia, 1964), p. 275.
102Guillermo Hewett Alva, Special to El Universal . (Mexico City)
October 23, 1962, p. 1. Quoted in Engel, p. 278.
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twice telephoned President Mateos who was then traveling in the Far
103
East.
The Mexican Foreign Office was divided. Vicente Sanchez Gavito,
O.A.S. Mexican Ambassador, was skeptical that the U. S. resolution
would in effect give Latin American endorsement to a possible U. S.
invasion of another Latin American state. But Antonio Carello F lores,
Mexican Ambassador to the U. S. , had consistently favored stronger
collective action on Cuba within the O.A.S. Ambassador Carillo F .Lores'
persuasion was known in State Department circles to be a significant
factor in securing a favorable reaction from the Mexican home office.
Although Sanchez Gavito would cast the final vote, his action was con-
ditioned on the nature of the instructions he received from his Govern-
ment, where the opinion and information of all Ambassadors would be
heard
•
Subsequently at the C.A.S. Meeting on October 23, Mexico joined
all Latin American representatives in supporting recommendations for
drastic action to halt the military build-up under Article 6 of the Rio
Treaty. However, Mexico abstained on the second paragraph which united
the American nations in their determination to prevent the missiles in
Cuba from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of
the continent. The delegate from Mexico explained his government's
abstention by declaring that the Mexican constitution had affixed precise
103Morrison, p. 244.
104Ibid .. 243.
^^Organization of American States, Applications , p. 112.
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limitations to the Executive power in accordance with the requirements
106
of the resolution.
This position can be traced to Mexico's rigid adherence to the
principle of nonintervention, considered inherently binding as a re-
straint upon the power of the Mexican President, It was thought that
the loose ambiguous wording of the second paragraph of the resolution
could easily be construed by the U. S. to give inter -American backing
to an invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles if they could not be
removed by negotiation. This inference has been substantiated by
Theodore Sorensen's commentary on President Kennedy's decision-making
process.
Editorial comment in Mexican newspapers of the political center
was dominantly favorable to the position of the Mexican Government.
One editorial in El. Universal , a moderate paper, severely criticized
Castro and supported President Kennedy, particularly lamenting that
Cuba had not had a chance for self-determination. The editorial ex-
pressed the wish that Khrushchev would leave Cuba and Castro alone.
However, the less politically powerful Mexican right continued to
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criticize the Mexican position and urged stronger action.
i06O.A.S. Council, Acta de la Sesion. El 23 de Qctubre de 1962 .
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The left-wing groups, usually quite influential in Mexican
politics, were divided, and their united influence diminished in this
crisis. One element was reportedly disillusioned with Castro and the
109
unilateral removal of missiles by the Soviet Union. According to
the assessment of one scholar:
It seemed that the general /popular/ emotion was one of shock
that Mexico was under the nuclear blanket, that Castro had actually
allowed this to happen, and that Castro was openly revealed to be
just what the United States had been claiming for so long—
a
satellite of the Soviet Union, no longer an independent revolu-
tionary force to which discontented Latin Americans would look
upon as an indigenous symbol. **^
It appeared that the Mexican Government's support of the quarantine
measure in response to the Cuban missile crisis was fully consistent
with that government's strict adherence to the legal principles of non-
intervention and self-determination.
As the Soviet military build-up had progressed during September,
1962, the Mexican president indicated that his government would not
support collective action under the Rio Treaty until significant proof
could be obtained that the Cuban build-up constituted an offensive
military threat against the nations of the western hemisphere. Even
then he did not specifically promise that Mexico would join other nations
in taking collective action against the Cuban Government. Because the
Mexican Foreign Minister had stated in early September that Mexico would
oppose any kind of blockade of Cuba, President Kennedy's advisory team
109Ibid., 286.
n0Ibid., 279-280.
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could not be certain that the Mexican Government would react favorably
to the U. S. request for quarantine action under Article 6 of the Rio
Treaty. Mexico haa always opposed collective actions under Article 6
of the Rio Treaty. The loose terms of Article 6, classifying Treaty
violations broaaly as acts of aggression other than armed attacks which
might affect territorial sovereignty and political independence of an
American state, were incompatible with the legalistic bias of Mexican
foreign policy.
Such terms which do not require extensive overt proof of actual
international aggression perhaps could have the effect of authorizing
collective intervention in the affairs of an American state on the basis
of a two-thirds majority political decision.
Because Mexican participation in international politics has been
conditioned by strict adherence to the legal norm of nonintervention,
each exercise in inter-American security cooperation has had to be
weighed against the potential that collective action would become col-
lective intervention. Thus Mexican decision-makers have been extremely
cautious in their assessments of the imminence, gravity and scope of
the aggression and type of collective measures under consideration, be-
fore aetermining the Mexican position on any O.A.S. action called for
under Articles 6 and 3.
The factor of obtaining unanimous Latin American support, especi-
ally that of Mexico, undoubtedly weighed heavily in President Kennedy's
first choice of a course of action that would apply sanctions not against
Cuba directly, but against the Soviet Union. This careful prior choice
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with its carefully defined objective of removing the missiles (not
overthrowing Castro) which appealed to the traditional Latin American
fear of extracontinental military aggression, while avoiding an un-
necessary collective intervention in Cuba, proved to be an acceptable
plan consistent with the requirements of the Mexican policy of non-
intervention.
Because U. S. decision-makers had weighed several reserve plans
which could have been activated had the quarantine failed to achieve
the removal of the missiles, the U. S. delegation advanced a loosely-
worded companion proposal which had been designed to procure O.A.S.
support for removal of the missiles by a possible bombing or invasion
of Cuba, if exigences demanded*
In predictable manner, the Mexican Government abstained on the
second paragraph of the resolution, refusing to give support to any
form of collectively-executed intervention on the territory of any
American state.
Although the Mexican Government had given its support to the
quarantine maneuver, it did not offer to participate directly in the
military effort—for under treaty terms no government was under an obli-
gation to apply armed force.
Mexico also expressed reservations on an Argentine proposal
November 5, 1962, which called for the coordination of military prepara-
tions of nine countries in the blockade of Cuba. Abstaining on several
paragraphs, the Mexican Government objected to what it called a precedent
for establishing a semi-permanent military structure within the
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inter -American security system—which in its interpretation was pro-
hibited by the principle of nonintervention in the Mexican Constitution.
The Cuban missile crisis did not bring about a shift in the offi-
cial Mexican policy toward Cuba either bilaterally or within the O.A.S.
The Mexican delegate restated the independent policy of his government
before the missile crisis had been finally resolved, by objecting
strenuously to a U. S. request for studies investigating the possi-
bility of stronger O.A.S. action to counter subversion. Mexico* joined
by other Latin American nations, argued that neither the newly-created
Special Consultative Security Committee nor any special committee of
the O.A.S. Council had the power to initiate such studies unless they
were authorized by the full membership. He was referring to the fact
that only the U. S. and three Central American republics had requested
112
the investigation. The Mexican Government continued to maintain that
the problem of security against subversion was fundamentally an internal
113
matter—insisting that its own security measures were fully adequate.
Brazil . Like the Government of Mexico, the Brazilian Government
also supported the U. S. quarantine resolution. Also like Mexico,
Brazil was divided. Ambassador to the U. S., Roberto de Oliviera Campos,
supported the resolution. But Ilmar Penna Marinho, the O.A.S. Ambassador,
a career officer who was always remote and noncommital, appeared to await
instructions. Thus the extent of his influence over this matter of
m-New York Times . November 6, 1962, p. 16.
112New York Times . October 25, 1962, p. 1.
II3Ibid ., 1.
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Brazilian foreign policy coulu not easily be assessea. But the activi-
ties of Campos, a brilliant world renowned economist, proved to be a
key factor in persuading President Goulart to accept the U. S. quarantine
114
resolution. But Brazilian approval also was limited only to measures
necessary to interfere with further shipment of offensive Soviet weapons
to Cuba* Brazil abstained on the portion of the resolution which would
have authorized collective intervention to remove the missiles already
in Cuba, if necessary. In the general debate the Brazilian delegate
expressed his Government's position by pointing out in the final part
of paragraph two, that the implied measures were ambiguous and of a wide
scope. He stated that because the uncertainty of the situation per-
mitted little time to specify such measures, the Brazilian Government
would abstain.
Brazil's stand on nonintervention at Punta oel Este, had been
based on practical as well as juridical arguments. Unlike the rigid
dogmatic determination of Mexican policy according to the legal norm
of nonintervention, recent Brazilian policy has been more frankly based
upon juridical safeguards as a justification for underlying political
realities.
Thus recent Brazilian foreign policy, characterized by an inde-
pendence from U. S. leadership and domination and premised upon the
doctrine of nonintervention, has largely resulted from resurgent
114Morrison, p. 243.
115O.A.S. Council, Aj
visionaimente como Qrqano de Consultation , October 23, 1962, p. 26.
^O.A. cta de la Sesion. Consejo Actuando Pro-
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nationalism common to all Brazilian political factions, and the impact
of the cold wax upon domestic politics of social and economic reform.
In April 1962, President Joao Goulart had reaffirmed the inde-
pendence of Brazilian foreign policy by clearly enunciating Brazil's
intention to free itself from the obligations of membership in a
politico-military bloc. This policy is of course basic to the re-
evaluation of the Brazilian role in mediating a detente in the cold war
in order that peaceful self-determination of peoples and economic develop-
ment be facilitated as the major stabilizing forces for worla peace.
Roberto de Oliviera Campos, Brazilian Ambassador to the Unitea
States during this period, has explained that
the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro antedates the cold war and
was not established as a ^/politico-military instrument/ in
connection with the present ideological conflict. It was
designed to protect the Latin American countries themselves
from aggression of their neighbors as well as an aggressive
resurrection of European Nazism. **"
Part of the implementation of the Brazilian independent position
in inter-American councils has been that government's emphasis on the
O.A.S. as an instrument of social and economic cooperation rather than
as a political and military alliance. To this end, President Goulart
offered qualified support to the new U. S. policy embodied in the
Alliance for Progress. Prognosticating on the practicability of the
li6Joao Goulart, "Brazil and the United States," in Irving Louis
Horowitz (ed) Revolution in Brazil. Politics and Society in a Developing
Nation . (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1964), p. 365.
il7Roberto de Oliviera Campos, "The United States and Brazil: A
Diplomatic View," in Horowitz, p. 356.
113
Alliance blueprint, President Goulaxt warned the U. S. that this policy
which placed the burden of responsibility for socio-economic and politi-
cal reform squarely upon Latin Americans, could "introduce hindrances
capable of impairing the urgency of solution which in many countries
118
cannot be put off."
President Goulart could realistically appraise this aspect of the
Latin American political scene principally because the immovable status
quo forces in Brazil had stultified his own program for social and
economic advancement in the face of growing pressure from the left.
Throughout the balance of 1962, President Goulart had to struggle
to maximize his presidential power by trying to consolidate control over
the military, curbing the impatient rauical opposition elements within
his own Brazilian Labor Party and persuading the Congress to call a
national plebisite in January 1963 to decide the fate of the weak
119
presidential-parliamentary system.
The factionalism of Brazilian politics, which hampered Goulart's
power, combined with inexperience in operating under a parliamentary
system, had produced "a regime that could not develop, enact or implement
120
a coherent policy." Confronted with deep divisions among Brazilian
leaders over method and means of tackling a worsening economic and
social crisis, and of the approaching elections in October, the
li8Goulart, "Brazil and the United States," in Horowitz, p. 365.
119"Charisma, Constitutions, and Brazil's Men of Power," in
Horowitz, p. 95.
120Karl K« Schraitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos .
Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics . (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 193.
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government was reduced to virtual inactivity during most of 1962.
Although the October 7, elections were primarily victories for the
moderates and centrists, left-wing parties formed a coalition front
122
which included Communist splinter groups, and made important gains.
While tensions heightened concerning the possible Soviet offensive
military build-up in Cuba, Brazilian attention was preoccupied with the
domestic campaign and approaching parliamentary elections.
The Brazilian response to the Cuban missile crisis conformed
to the general pattern of foreign policy shaped by the Goulart Govern-
ment.
Previously, President Goulart had announced that because of its
independent foreign policy, Brazil did not consider itself bound by
ties to any politico-military bloc. Although the Brazilian Government
had implicitly renounced the ant i-Communist politico-military character
of the O.A.S., it in no way intended to abandon the collective security
obligation of the Rio Treaty to defend the hemisphere and its own
national security against outside military aggression.
In this case the Soviet Union had extended its nuclear threat for
the first time into the Western hemisphere by basing intermediate range
ballistic missiles in Cuba. The U. S. position, based on conclusive
evidence which narrowly isolated the Soviet Union as the aggressor, made
it possible for the Brazilian Government, profoundly opposed to nuclear
weapons, within the requirements of its foreign policy to assent to the
quarantine of Cuba directed against the Soviet Union.
121Ibicu
. 193.
122iD id .. 194.
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President Kennedy's choice of a quarantine instead of an
invasion reflected the judgment that an irreversible military action
might well have had some serious repercussions both within the Americas
123
and in other areas of the world.
An invasion might have acted as a catalyst which would have
reinforced the strength of the Communist cause, already growing in
Brazilian leftist circles, because of widespread discontent with a
status-quo majority in Congress.
When the U. S. requested O.A.S. approval for a quarantine action,
however, it also asked for collective authorization of further measures
to remove the missiles already in Cuba if the quarantine failed to achieve
this objective.
The Brazilian Government objected to this paragraph, taking the
lead to split the voting on the resolution into two sections. Mexico
and Bolivia also abstained on this paragraph.
As at Punta del Este, Brazil refused to support any intervention
directed at Cuba because of the basic conviction that intervention,
especially military, could not permanentaly resolve the fundamental
East-West ideological conflict. In the missile crisis, Brazil also
fearea that any forceful military move was likely to escalate the criti-
cal situation into a full-scale nuclear war.
Therefore, Brazil as self-appointed leader of the anti-war nations
capita lizea on the opportunity to support avenues of negotiation for the
123George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations
,
A Contemporary Appraisal t (Gainesville, University of Florida Press,
1964), p. 232.
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peaceful removal of the missiles as an alternative to the forceful
measures largely to be executed by U. S. military power, ambiguously
alluded to in the secora paragraph of the resolution.
After Premier Khrushchev had agreed to withdraw the missiles under
international inspection procedures, Premier Castro's refusal to allow
the U. N. inspection team on Cuban territory, inspired a Brazilian
attempt to persuade him to reconsider. Joined by Bolivia and Chile,
Brazil by-passed the C.A.S. and set before the U. N. a resolution which
would have all Latin American countries pledge not to have any nuclear
weapons or delivery vehicles placed on their respective territories.
This clause would have enabled Premier Castro to accept international
inspection of Cuban missile sites as part of a general Latin American
agreement. The Cuban leader refused to accept this alternative plan,
though U. S. sources had indicated respect and support for the Brazilian
124
initiative.
In the aftermath of the crisis subsequent events showed that
efforts to persuade President Gouiart to support even the U. S. quaran-
tine paragraph had been quite difficult. Men violent reactions from
the extreme left immediately threatened to militate against President
Gouiart, the President changed course and summoned the G.A.3. Ambassador
back to Brazil, intimating that the latter had disobeyed instructions.
Ey/en before the crisis had been resolved, Gouiart ordered an Air
Force General to investigate Kennedy's charges—an empty maneuver which
was soon undercut by Khrushchev's own admission of Soviet nuclear
presence in Cuba.
124New York Times . November 9, 1962, p. 1.
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Only when public opinion in Brazil shifted to favor the U. S.
did Goulart consider it safe to acknowledge Brazil's role in approving
125
the quarantine resolution.
Chile * The Chilean decision to vote affirmatively for the
quarantine appeared to be consistent with the previous decisions taken
by the Chilean Government at Punta del Este.
The U. S. Ambassador in Santiago cabled Washington that although
Salvador Allende, leader of the powerful Socialist -Communist coalition
publicly had charged that Kennedy lied, Chile's Foreign Office would
\ 9 ft
support the quarantine resolution.
During the debate the Chilean delegate endorsed the Mexican
delegate's proposal that the voting be done separately on paragraphs 1
127
and 2.* Announcing that his government would support the quarantine
(paragraph l) because it was consistent with the requirements of Article 6
of the Rio Treaty, he indicated that the Chilean Government would not,
because of general constitutional limitations on executive power and
because of leftist pressure on his government be able to participate in
a collective action to remove the missiles already in Cuba. (Para-
graph 2.
)
Despite the above reason given for Chile's incapacity to execute
the provisions of paragraph 2, the Chilean Government did not abstain
or vote against that provision. Speaking on his government's position,
the Chilean delegate felt that each government should react according to
125Morrison, p. 250.
126Morrison, p. 250.
127q.a.S. Council, Acta de la Sesion , Consejo Actuando Provisional-
mente como Qrgano de Consultation^ October 23, 1962, p. 19.
1231 bid .. 19.
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its respective constitutional limitations as the circumstances demanded.
This showed that Chile intended to take full advantage of the fact that
the use of force was not mandatory. While respecting the security re-
quirements of other Western hemisphere nations strategically much closer
to the striking zone.
This position enabled the government, besieged by the leftist
coalition, to take a middle-ground position, and to maintain internal
stability. The government, by taking this position, could win partial
support from all political groups by claiming unfledging support for
the principles of collective security against extracontinental aggres-
sion and respect for the rights and needs of other nations, while main-
taining its own constitutional principle of nonintervention.
Its own remote geographic location, barely included in U. S.
estimates of Soviet striking power, would tend to insulate that nation
against pressure to take immediate action, felt by other nations located
more completely within the range of the missiles.
Such a relatively independent position would be consistent with
Chile's historical reluctance to align with other hemisphere nations
against overt threat of aggression in both World wars.
In connection with this particular crisis, Chile followed the
Brazilian lead in the U. N. to co-sponsor a compromise plan for inter-
national verification satisfactory to all, including Cuba, making Latin
130
America a nuclear-free zone.
129iMd .. 19.
130New York Times . November 9, 1962, p. 1,
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Because of a traditional Latin American confidence in the peaceful
settlement of disputes as opposed to intervention and military settle-
ments, Chile joined with Brazil to lead in a long-range arbitration for
world peace and order.
Argentina . The Argentine decision to support the quarantine
resolution and contribute military aid can largely be attributed to the
change of governments resulting from a coup d'etat which deposed Presi-
dent Arturo Frond izi on March 29, 1962.
The coup removed President Frondizi from office following the
March 18, 1962, elections in which the peronistas had scored a decisive
131
victory in the legislature and provinces.
Prior to the election, President Frondizi had assured the military
that moderate middle class political parties would capture the old
oeronista vote and consoHdate hi. government/32
When the election did not produce the desired political results,
the armed forces deposed Frondizi and set up a three-man governing junta.
The splits within and among the armed forces which developed during
the Peron era were noticeable in this coup. The Navy, unified by its
upper-middle class composition, traditionally anti-peronista and opposed
to any socio-political advance of the labor-left, prevailed to bring
133
about the ouster of Frondizi. Although the services coordinated moves
to depose Frondizi, the leaders found it difficult to form a smoothly-
working government. In late March, 1962, governmental power in Argentina
131Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, Neomilitarism in Latin
America . (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 10.
*32lbid ., 11.
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resided in an anti-peronista three-man junta representing the Army, Navy
and Air Force. Senate President Jose Maria Guido, a constitutional
successor, had himself sworn in as President to challenge the ruling
authority of the junta.
Guido exploited the split between the rival army factions to work
out a compromise between the alternatives of ^eronista election victory
and military rule. The President was allowed to retain his position as
head of the government, in return for his agreement to declare the
134
March 13, elections void and schedule new elections. After May 1962,
Guido could muster little organized civilian support, and found himself
a puppet of the military, buffeted about by the Navy, the competing
135
cliques in the Army and the Air Force.
Throughout the remainder of 1962 the armed forces retained the
substance of power; but the various factions continued to struggle for
dominance.
The issue of what type of formula should be used to establish
representation and whether or not elections should be held, divided the
conservative and liberal elements and touched off a major armed conflict
in August, 1962. By late September the moderates had subdued the con-
servative anti-oeronlstas .
The October missile crisis constituted a major test of the direction
of Argentine foreign policy under military rule.
i34ibjd .» 18.
135 lb id ., 19.
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Though somewhat moderate in its approach to domestic economic
and social reform, the armed forces majority in the junta government,
by offering military assistance tc the U. S. quarantine, pursued a more
conservative foreign policy than had Brazil and Mexico* That the
Argentine Government furnished naval aid, perhaps corresponded to the
prestige and influence of the Navy--the most consistently conservative
arm of the military— in Argentine politics.
latin American military governments have assumed power through
intervention (coups d'etat) to safeguard political stability and a
status quo threatened by leftist reform groups. In foreign policy de-
cisions, military governments have tended to support firm unilateral or
collective action against Cuba, for the broader objective of maintaining
hemispheric stability. Then, both domestically and internationally,
military governments have favored the expedient of swift inter vent ionary
action to achieve their objectives.
Most Latin American elected civilian governments have seemed to
use democratic representation and procedures when formulating foreign
policy as well as domestic policy. When sanctions against Cuba have been
opposed by significant segments of the population, civilian governments
have tended to weigh this in taking anti-sanction stands.
The Argentine military's enthusiastic endorsement of a blank check
on intervention, paragraph 2 of the quarantine resolution, deviated sig-
nificantly from President Frondizi's decision not to give Argentine support
to sanctions of Cuba earlier in 1962 at Punta del Este. The governments
of Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Bolivia, still controlled by civilian
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governments had refused to give the U. S. this blank check, to remain
consistent with their decisions to abstain at Punta del Este.
Ecuador . The reversal of Ecuadorian foreign policy in the period
February 1962-October 1962, also was the result of a change in the com-
position of the government brought about by the pressure of the military.
On March 30, the Ecuadorian Cabinet resigned under growing army
pressure for a break in relations with Cuba. A group of officers de-
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manded that the President either rupture diplomatic relations or resign.
In response, President Arosemena had ordered a national plebiscite
to let the people decide Ecuador's foreign policy toward Cuba. But be-
cause of pressure from a newly-formed democratic front composed of
liberals, moderate Socialists and independents, Arosemena agreed to
cancel the projected plebiscite.
The following day President Arosemena succumbed to the influence
of the moderate political coalition and the military, and severed diplo-
139
matic ties with Fidel Castro's government.
Again, military ultimatum was sufficient to alter the foreign
policy course of a left- leaning government. That there was no direct
military intervention in Ecuador as had been exhibited in Argentina as
a consequence of the Frond izi Government's vote at Punta del Este, re-
sulted from a pragmatic political accommodation with conservative forces.
137New York Times . March 31, 1962, p. 3.
138New York Times . April 2, 1962, p. 6.
I39New York Times . April 4, 1962, p. 3.
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Undoubtedly it seemed to moderate Ecuadorian politicians that the break-
ing off of diplomatic relations was not too high a price to pay for
greater internal stability with moderate social and economic reforms.
Arosemena's friendly attitude toward Castro, as has been pointed
out in the preceding chapter, had little domestic support. From the
beginning the character of Arosemena's program had been shaky because
his ao_ hoc support had ranged all the way from right to the extreme
left.
140
The realignment of Arosemena's new cabinet enabled centrist forces
to edge out the extreme leftists in the Ministry of Labor and the Minis-
try of Education whose position in Ecuadorian politics then was reduced
141
to influence in peripheral worker and student movements.
The pro-Castro left attempted a guerilla counterattack, but was
quickly suppressed by government forces. Any latent appeal of f idelismo
to the Indian masses had been at least temporarily checked by democratic
forces.
A potential advantage to leftist forces was the failure of the
Ecuadorian political system (hobbiea by continual shifting of ad hoc
groups) to develop any single uemocratic party with strong mass appeal
142
or any strongly-he j.o platform for social reform or economic development.
By July, 1962, Arosemena's basic political support was much
stronger, but his foreign policy position hau been reconstructed. On
l40New York Times . April 7, 1962, p. 1.
14ANew York Times . April 15, 1962, p. 13.
142Ibid., 13.
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July 24, the Ecuadorian President reaffirmed his Government's faith in
the Alliance for Progress, whereas in February, 1962 he had opposed any
strong or mild sanctions against Cuba, and in July of the same year, he
gave his government's approval to the formation of an inter-American
armed force as a defense against aggression. This position on Cuba was
much stronger ana more daring than any proposals set forth by any nations
of the pro-sanctions group at Punta del Este.
Though undoubtedly Ecuador's decision to support the U. S. quaran-
tine was influenced by a variety of factors commonly shared by C.A.S.
members with serious intentions to abide by Rio Treaty obligations, it
can be shown that Ecuador's new position prior to the intense Soviet
military build-up had shifted to a clear-cut anti-Cuban bias. This
shift was evidenced by the absence of any Ecuadorian reservations on
the second paragraph resolution authorizing whatever means necessary
(including armed force) to remove the missiles already on Cuban territory.
Bolivia . Political pressures remained constant in Bolivia from
January 1962-October 196^.
Bolivia's vote proved to be one of the most difficult to obtain,
although both the Bolivian Ambassador to the U. 5* and the Bolivian
Ambassador to the C.A.S. favored the quarantine. Poor communications
143
with the Bolivian capital further complicated the situation. Also
the Paz Government faced a small but highly organized vocal Communist
minority which threatened the overthrow of the government if Bolivia
went along with the U. S. resolution. Until U. S. delegate, Ambassador
i43Worrison, p. 245.
144ibid., 247.
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Morrison, began to concentrate upon winning the Bolivian approval, it
seemed that Emiiio Sarmiento, the Bolivian delegate, would not receive
instructions from his government and would have been forced to abstain.
However, deLesseps Morrison noted that Chile's definite approval could
have a significant effect on the Bolivian decision. Bolivia ana Chile
had been involved in a territorial dispute. Chile, desperately needing
irrigation, maintained that one half of the waters of the Rio Lauca be-
longed to her, ana had built a tunnel diverting that amount of water
to her arid land. As a result, the two countries had severed diplomatic
relations- Bolivia was trying to get O.A.S. action against Chile.
Morrison pointed out to Sarmiento that U. S. public opinion
might tend to demand support for Chile in the Rio Lauca dispute, and
reject Bolivian claims because Bolivia had failed to support the U. S.
quarantine resolution. Sarmiento was persuaded by this reasoning to
telephone this information to Foreign Minister Jose Fellman Velarde
and warn him of the possibility of a setback to Bolivia, perhaps even
an overthrow of the government. Subsequently, the Foreign Minister
promiseci a decision as soon as possible.
This move was timed perfectly and assisted by better than normal
telephone communications to La Paz. Sarmiento, however, decided to risk
his political future by promising to vote for the U. S. quarantine resolu-
tion even though he firmly thought that he would not receive instructions
145Ibid., 245.
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in time. Although he had been very skeptical, the Bolivian Ambassador
received the important assent from his government before the voting was
149
over.
Bolivia had strenuously objected to sanctions of Cuba at Punta
del Bste because of the relevance of nonintervention to the Bolivian
national revolutionary experience. In the missile crisis, the Paz
Administration modified an absolute position on nonintervention, as did
Mexico, by viewing the quarantine as a defense against Soviet (extra-
continental) aggrtssion which did not constitute intervention in Cuban
affairs.
Furthermore the factual background had changed since Punta del
Este. An ominous Soviet missile threat based in Cuba was obviously more
conclusive evidence upon which to base a Rio Treaty sanction than the
doubtful legal and factual grounds on which sanctions and condemnation
had been applied at Punta del Este.
But, as did Mexico and Brazil, Bolivia abstained on the second
paragraph for the same basic reasons. The vague language, on which
was designee to provide collective authorization to the U. S. possibly
to remove the missiles by a surgical air strike or an invasion, was
opposed as intervention by the Bolivian Government. Because of deep
reservations concerning intervention, unilateral or multilateral, and
internal leftist opposition, Bolivia proved unwilling to fulfill the
full requirements of collective security and reciprocal assistance in
149Ibio., 249.
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this instance. At the root of this decision of course lay the latent
fear of setting precedent for granting any state, particularly the U. S.
ox combination of states the right to intervene in the future, perhaps
to stop the progress of social reform, only because of an exaggerated
fear of Communism*
The position taken by the Paz Government in response to the shock
of the Cuban missile crisis, enabled the moderates to regain some of
their lost prestige ani influence temporarily in the aftermath of the
150
crisis.
tohen Bolivian approval of the quarantine resolution had been
registereu, the extreme left began xo riot in the streets. But in un-
precedented numbers, anti-Communists poured into the streets and silenced
151
the leftist sectors.
The individual foreign policy of Bolivia toward Cuba did not change
as a result of the crisis, for that Government continuea to maintain
diplomatic ties with the Castro Government.
Significance of the Crisis
The unanimity displayed within the O.A.S. in response to the Cuban
missile crisis resulted from a uniquely favorable combination of circum-
stances.
Of central importance was President Kennedy's choice of a multi-
lateral approach which consciously identified the national self-interests
150Schmitt and Burks, p. 228.
15lMOXrison, p. 251.
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of the Latin American states with that of the U. S. in an effort to
gain Western Hemisphere solidarity. This largely was accomplished by
isolating the Soviet Union as the outside aggressor. Quarantine measures
called for under the Rio Treaty were actually to be directed against the
Soviet Union, and would not interfere with Cuba's territorial integrity,
sovereignty or independence.
Such an approach successfully evoked the strong historical tradition
of multilateral cooperation and solidarity against emergencies created
by threats or acts of extracontinental aggression from the Spanish
threats of reconquest to twentieth-century threats of intervention
during World Wars I and II.
Although little objection was raised that the quarantine resolution
constituted a violation of the nonintervention doctrine, several nations
(Mexico, Bolivia and Brazil) abstained on the second paragraph of the
resolution which authorized collective measures to remove the missiles
from Cuba, if this expedient became necessary.
That the necessary numerical majority of O.A.S. nations implicitly
authorized the U. S. to prevent the missiles in Cuba from becoming an
active threat to the security of the continent seemed remarkable for
the progress of inter -American unity. Implementation of this provision
if the need had arisen as a last alternative, would have constituted
collective intervention in the territory of an American state. Such
action was, however, unnecessary, and the usefulness of the precedent
remained untested.
In retrospect, it would seem that the circumstances of the missile
crisis severely damaged, at least temporarily, Fidel Castro's image as
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the hero of the indigenous Latin American social revolution. The realiza-
tion that Castro was being used as a mere pawn in a cold war chess play
by the Soviet Union rudely shocked Latin American governments and im-
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portant segments of Latin American public opinion, especially students.
Pro-sanctions countries attempted to turn this anti-Castro senti-
ment into a collective willingness to further isolate the Castro regime
with more meaningful majorities than had been possible at Punta del
Este, earlier in 1962.
It soon became apparent that the mere removal of the Soviet nuclear
threat had not eliminated the danger of continuing Cuban subversion as
Castro launched new assaults to recoup his lost prestige. As early as
November 9, 1962, the Government of Venezuela furnished documentary
evidence linking the Cuban regime with recent acts of sabotage and sub-
version by Venezuelan Communists. However, the source of this information
was kept secret for security reasons.
U. S. Ambassador deLesseps Morrison urged the O.A.S.
As a community of free nations we need to be as alert to
the danger and as decisive in our response to this threat as
we were to the challenge of the missile bases. The nature of
the measures we should take will be different and will vary
from country to country. But the effectiveness of an individual
effort will be strengthened or weakened by the extent to which
there is cooperation between the countries in combatting sub-
versive techniques.*54
Therefore, the long-range significance of the Cuban missile crisis
for the viability of the O.A.S. as a security organization will be
152Personal interview with Mr. Myles Frechette, Cuban desk officer,
U. S. Department of State, July 27, 1965.
153New York Times . November 10, 1962, p. 1.
154u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings. Castro-
Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere , 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1963, 8.
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measured by its effect in alerting all Western Hemisphere nations to
the continued dangers of subversion—a more common but opaque form of
Communist aggression.
The circumstances which provoked the missile crisis were singular
and rare. So it is only from the impact and aftermath that the effect
on the inter -American security system can be judged. The crisis facing
the security system will be sustained and difficult as cases of aggression
will not be nearly as clear-cut as was true in the Cuban missile crisis.
Therefore a better cooperative system for detecting the source
and methods of subversion is needed. Then any concrete evidence
furnished by a multilateral consultation and investigation, in this way
should gradually lead to a clearer more precise identification of sub-
version as a form of aggression outlawed by the Rio Treaty and the O.A.S.
Charter.
If this rigorous multilateral procedure can be followed fairly,
then in future situations perhaps it will be more likely that a meaning-
ful majority of nations will find it legally, if not politically easier
to vote for mandatory sanctions against Cuba.
CHAPTER III
CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA
This chapter will examine the conditions motivating decisions to
impose mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba taken by
the O.A.S. Foreign Ministers at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation,
July 21-26, 1964, This analysis will be undertaken from the perspective
of the previous Rio Treaty applications concerning Cuba, particularly
the Punta del Este sanctions, and also the quarantine approved in response
to the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962.
On the surface, it seemea that the O.A.S. had overcome the barrier
that the principle of nonintervention had formerly raised to the imposi-
tion of mandatory sanctions on the Cuban Government. It seemed also that
the Western hemisphere nations had acquired a greater mutuality of interest
to enable the O.A.S. to function as a viable security organization. Where-
as six nations, some of the largest and most populous in Latin America
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador) had opposed rigid
sanctions at Punta del Este, only four nations (Mexico, Chile, Bolivia
and Uruguay) opposed the sanctions voted by the Ninth Ministers' Meeting.
Only three nations of the original six objectors remained stead-
fastly attached to the principle of nonintervention, while policies of
Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador had shifted to a pro-sanctions bias. But
Uruguay, once favorable to sanctions at Punta del Este in 1962, wavered
into the anti-sanctions column on the final tally at Washington in 1964.
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This chapter will examine the motivations responsible for these
significant alterations of national foreign policies within the O.A.S.
between 1962 and 1964, and evaluate the new political alignment within
the O.A.S. described by the United States Government as a "meaningful
majority."
Introductory Background
On November 29, 1963, the Government of Venezuela requested that
the Foreign Ministers as the Organ cf Consultation be convoked immediately
and on an urgent basis in accordance with Article 6 of the Inter -American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
to consider the measures that should be taken to deal with
the acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the
Government of Cuba that affect the territorial integrity and
the sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its
democratic institutions-. *
The request was studied and, at first, the O.A.S, Council acted
2
"with a dispatch and decisiveness that left nothing to be desired."
The O.A.S. Council began consideration of the Venezuelan complaint
on December 3, 1963. At that meeting the Venezuelan representative,
supporting his government's charge, referred to the discovery by
Venezuelan authorities on November 2, 1963 of 'abundant war equipment
hidden in a place called Macama on the seacoast of Falcon State,"
Organization of American States, General Secretariat, Inter -
Amerlcan Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Applications. Vol. II. 1960-1964 ,
(Washington, Pan American Union, 1964), p. 181.
2Arthur P. Whitaker, "Cuba's Intervention in Venezuela: A Test of
the O.A.S.,'' Orbis, VIII, (Faii, 19b4), p. Sll.
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regarding which the Government of Venezuela had ample proof of Cuban
origin and provenance.
A resolution was passed by the Council to convoke the Foreign
Ministers as Organ of Consultation in accordance with the provisions
at a oate to be fixed later, and in the meantime to constitute itself
as the Provisional Organ of Consultation. Immediately steps were taken
to appoint an investigatory committee to travel to Venezuela and report
on the acts denounced by that government that were attributed to the
complicity of the Cuban Government.
The Chairman of the Council designated the following countries
to compose the committee; Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United
States and Uruguay. Two military experts from the General Staff of the
Inter -American defense Board accompanied the committee to inspect the
evidence.
Following an eight-day mission to Venezuela in December 1963, the
Investigating Committee prepared an extensive report, released to O.A.S.
governments February Itf, 1964, fully substantiating the Venezuelan
charges. An important portion of the Committee Report was devoteo to
remarks made by President Roraulo Betancourt of Venezuela to the O.A.S.
team upon its arrivaj. in Caracas. The statement was a full explanation
aetailing the reasons for the accusation brought against Cuba before the
O.A.S. Council. The Committee reportea that
!O.A.S. General Secretariat, Amplications * p. 190.
Ibid.. 190.4 ,
5Ibio .. 191.
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.'-resioent Betancouxt particularly emphasized the fact
that Cuba's intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela
as confixmeu by the discovery of a shipment of arms in the
Province of Paraguana, was not an isolated incident, but rather
part of a process that had been evolving for some time and whose
implications were not only hemispheric but world-wide. 6
The President's analysis dated the deterioration in Cuban-
Venezuelan relations from the refusal of the Venezuelan leadership in
1960 to cooperate in Castro's scheme for "liberating" the hemisphere.
Thus the committee examined the evidence of "acts of intervention
and aggression" denounced by Venezuela—an aggregate of acts that violated
Venezuelan sovereignty and political independence—and that at the same
time "transgressed the most fundamental principles of the inter -American
8
system. M It was determined by the Committee that the international pro-
hibition of intervention in the external or internal affairs of an Ameri-
can state had been violates by systematic use by Cuba of raoio and written
propaganda, political indoctrination of Venezuelans in Cuba, training of
Venezuelans in Cuba in the techniques of sabotage and guerrilla warfare,
and continuous supply of funds and armaments to Venezuelan rebels.
It was conceded by the Committee that though technically the
aggressor in this case had not crossed geographical boundaries, he had
transgressed juridical limits by violating the sovereignty of another
state by "taking coercive measures to abolish the free exercise of its
o
sovereign will."
6lbid .. 194.
7lbid., 195.
8Ibid., 196.
9Ibid., 196.
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The immediate stimulus for the O.A.S. probe was the shipment of
arms found on the Paraguana peninsula, November 2, 1963 by a Venezuelan
fisherman. The Committee verified the Cuban origin of the weapons by
means of:
a* ocular inspection of the place where the arms were found*
b* detailed examination of the arms, carried out with the
advice from the military experts who accompanied the
Committee.
c* interrogation of witnesses*
d* examination of the information and evidence supplied
by the Government of Venezuela*
e* obtaining of evidence by the Committee itself*
f* chemical tests made for the purpose of determining
the characteristics indicative of the origin of the
arms* W
The Committee also reported that the arms shipment was related to
a plot discovered on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities to
capture the city of Caracas, prevent the holding of elections on
December 1, 1964, ana seize control of the country* Documentary proof
of this plot hao been seized by the Caracas police from a Venezuelan
citizen, who was later confirmed as a frequent traveler to Cuba, and a
member of the Venezuelan Communist Party living in Caracas under an
assumed name*
The manuscripts consisted in detailed plans for the
conduct of subversive operations and sabotage in the city
of Caracas sketches and reproduction of maps of the main
sectors of the city studies of certain instructions for
the use of various weapons and explosives.
U
On January 24, 1964, the Investigating Committee in a note trans-
mitted to the Government of Cuba, extended that Government an opportunity
i0Ibid*, 203.
^Ibid *. 206-207.
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to present its defense out of deference to the Government of Brazil.
In weighing the political orientations of the four Latin American
nations represented on the Investigating Committee, it would be diffi-
cult to conclude that the Committee was extremely biased against Cuba.
Although Colombia and Costa Rica had advocated strong sanctions against
13
Cuba, Uruguay had opposed it, while Argentina had a mixed record.
After the Report of the Investigating Committee had been
publicized in February 1964, the C.A.S. machinery lapsed into a political
stalemate. The uncertainty of winning a "meaningful majority" of states
postponed collective consideration of the Venezuelan complaint until
late in June when the O.A.S. Council voted to set the date for the
14
Ninth Meeting of Consultation for July 21. Only Mexico abstained.
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation, In ftashjnqtqn* Jytly 1964,
When the Conference opened, thirteen nations could be counted on
to support mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions, while four re-
mained unalterably opposed to sanctions (Mexico, Bolivia, Chile and
Uruguay). Argentina and Brazil were uncommitted to either group in
15
the early stages of the conference.
A working group within the O.A.S. Council composed of the United
States, Peru, Costa Rica and Colombia, prior to the Conference had
12Ibid . . 207. New York Times . December 4, 1963, p. 23.
i3Whitaker, Orbis . VIII, p. 513.
*4New York Times . June 26, 1964, p. 2.
15
»Vhitaker, Or bis . VIII, p. 528.
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drafted a compromise proposal to obtain greater agreement. The proposal
declared that the Cuban type of action in Venezuela constituted aggres-
sion under the terms of the Rio Treaty and made the severance of commerce
and shipping with Cuba mandatory, but only recommended the severance
of diplomatic ties. Suspension of air communications was also recom-
mended.
Venezuela and other Caribbean states demanded both mandatory
political and economic sanctions, and refused to compromise merely to
reach a shallow political accommodation that would exhibit a facade of
unity within the system. President Raul Leoni (the constitutional
*
s
successor and party cohort of Romulo Betancourt) said, on the contrary,
that the juridical basis of the O.A.S. would disappear if its members
were not prepared to act to uphold it. The unrelenting position forced
other nations favorable to sanctions into a more uncompromising position.
Because of the emphasis that the U. S. had placed on the goals of
obtaining a "meaningful majority,"—more than a bare two thirds, and
one that included significant countries and populations—Argentina and
Brazil held the balance of power. Both had stressed the need for
unanimity when the conference opened. This position meant their willing-
ness to concede to the soft-line nations still maintaining diplomatic
18
ties with Cuba, led by Mexico.
17
i6Ibid., 525-526.
17Ibid ., 526.
18Ibid., 529.
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Essentially the final resolutions adopted by the Ninth Meeting
of Consultation were hard-line, though they were softened by minor
changes principally to secure the approval of Brazil and Argentina.
After declaring that the acts verified by the Investigating Com-
mittee constituted aggression within the meaning of Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty, the American Ministers condemned the Government of Cuba
and applied in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty the follow-
ing mandatory measures:
a. That the governments of the American states not
maintain diplomatic or consular relations with
the Government of Cuba.
b. That the governments of the American states suspend
all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with
Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical
equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian
reasons.
c. That the governments of the American states suspend
all sea transportation between their countries and
Cuba, except for such transportation as may be neces-
sary for reasons of a humanitarian nature. *'
As a concession to the four nations opposing sanctions in paragraph
(a) the words "not maintain" had been substituted for "rupture" in the
original draft, although the effect was still mandatory. Also, a clause
prohibiting air transport to and from Cuba had been deleted from the
original draft to appease Mexico, the only nation still maintaining such
a connection. But the original draft had been strengthened by the addi-
tion in paragraph (b) of the qualifications that trade in foodstuffs,
medicines and medical equipment must be of a strictly humanitarian, rather
than of a prof it -making character. The qualification was significant
l^O.A.S. General Secretariat, Applications , p. 186.
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particularly regaxaing foodstuffs, because Uruguay at that time had
20
conducted negotiations to sell surplus beef to Cuba.
By a two-thirds vote, any of the foregoing sanctions could be
lifted when the nations determined that the Government of Cuba no longer
constituted a aanger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.
Perhaps the strongest long-term part of the resolution warned
the Government of Cuba that
if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess
characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or
more cf the member states of the Organization, the member
states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign
states by the use of self-defense in either individual or
collective form, which could go so far as to resort to
armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation
takes measures to, guarantee the peace and the security of
the hemisphere. 2i
Both the definition of subversion as an act of aggression under
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and the resolution to counter future Cuban
subversive aggression with forceful individual or collective self-defense
measures represented alternatives for interpreting the Rio Treaty so that
22
in the future quicker action might be taken.
This rule established a significant precedent for the hard-line
governments, no matter how few, to circumvent even a majority of soft-
line governments to meet renewed Cuban aggression with instant retaliatory
measures. But the implementation of such action would face obvious risks,
20whitakex, Qrbis, VIII, p. 530.
2*O.A.S., General Secretariat, Applications , p. 186.
^Whitaker, Qrbis. VIII, p. 530.
140
ranging from the disruption of the inter-American system to the initia-
23
tion of armed conflict that could escalate into a major war.
Within six weeks three of the no sanctions nations had complied
with the mandatory diplomatic sanctions, first Bolivia, then Chile,
24
and finally Uruguay. Only Mexico refused.
Pro-Sanctions Positions
Nature of the Situation . When the Ministers met for discussions
at Washington there was ample evidence corroborated by the Report of the
Inter -American Investigating Committee that the Cuban Government was re-
sponsible for committing an act of aggression against an American state.
25
None of the countries present disputed these facts.
Because the evidence had linked the Cuban intervention in
Venezuela as an international aggression, the soft-line nations could not
argue as convincingly as they had at Punta del Este that the principle
of nonintervention precluded collective action. Advocates of non-
intervention continued to maintain that because Cuba had not sponsored
a direct attack across an international boundary, collective action could
not be taken against Cuba under the Rio Treaty. But it seemed that under-
lying reasons responsible for dissenting positions more openly reflected
the internal political pressures affecting the governments especially in
Mexico.
23Ibid., 531.
24Ibid., 534.
25New York Times . "News of the Week in Review," July 19, 1964,
Section IV, p. 5.
141
Raymond Gonzales of the U. S. delegation to the O.A.S. Council
has commented that the clear-cut circumstances of this case were more
conducive to the application of sanctions of the Rio Treaty because
26
they were not confused with issues of intervention.
Venezuelan Diplomacy * Venezuela's persistence was a major factor
in prodding the O.A.S. Council finally to convoke the Meeting nearly
27
six months after the original request had been registered.
Even before the O.A.S. Investigating Committee had issued its
report in February, Venezuela had sent a military mission to several
South American countries to present directly to their governments
full proof of its charges against the Castro regime.
Venezuela encouraged the American states to accept the responsi-
bilities of membership in the inter -American security system, and pro-
tested against the absurdity of using the nonintervention rule to pre-
vent sanctions of Cuba for its intervention. President Betancourt had
pointed out that the O.A.S. Charter did not classify legitimate col-
lective action as intervention. Furthermore Venezuela warned that if
this folly prevailed, the hands of the O.A.S. would be tied and, so far
as it was concerned, Castro could go on repeating his interventions and
29
aggressions elsewhere in Latin America with impunity.
26personal interview with Raymond Gonzales, Member of U. S. dele-
gation to O.A.S. Council, July 28, 1965.
27whitaker, Or bis . VIII, p. 525.
28Ibid., 515.
29 Ibjd .» 521.
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That the leadership initiative came from a Latin American state
—
one that had demonstrated its ability to accomplish peaceful democratic
social and economic reform—rather than the United St3tes, undoubtedly
had a beneficial effect on influencing a "meaningful majority" of
states to take action against Cuba.
Change pf Governments * As far as can be determined, the Venezuelan
request for a Meeting might have been pigeonholed indefinitely were it
not for the military coup that toppled the pro-Castro Government of
Joao Goulart of Brazil in early April, 1964.
As one nation with the most advanced independent policy at Punta
del Este, Brazil under Goulart had consistently resisted pressure to
interrupt diplomatic relations with the Cuban government. Although
Brazil voted in favor of considering the Venezuelan charges in the
December 3, 1963, O.A.S. Council Meeting, and constituting a fact-finding
Committee, the Brazilian Ambassador demanded that Cuba, while excluded
from participation in the inter-American system be granted an opportunity
to answer the charges.
But by early January, Brazil's position had definitely hardened
to oppose sanctions of Cuba even before the results of the fact-finding
31
investigation were made public.
This hardening of foreign policy against sanctions of Cuba corre-
sponded to a concomitant rise in extreme leftist prestige and power in
the formulation of Brazilian domestic policy. These developments, taken
30New York Times , December 3, 1963, p. 1, 23.
3j-New York Times . January 5, 1964, p. 2.
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together, proved to be responsible for the events which culminated in a
military take-over in Brazil, April 1, 1964, After the coup, observers
explained that Goulart, for two years a moderate centrist, had become
desperate when inflation wrecked Brazil's economic life. Early in the
year Goulart had shown a tendency to alter the basis of his political
power. In a bid for poor peasant and leftist support, he favored
legalization of the Communist party, embarked on a radical land seizure
policy, asked for the lifting of all literacy requirements for voting,
and appealed for the military support of the lower-class noncommissioned
officers. He also moved to abolish the Congress in order to set up a
32
Socia list-synd ica list d ictatorship.
The upset of the leftist -veering government in Brazil was first
regarded by U. S. observers as a definite blow to Cuba, for Brazil had
been the mainstay opposition to the diplomatic and economic sanctions
33
proposed by Venezuela. Washington proceeded as if confident that
Brazil, under the new regime would take a leading part in advocating
sanctions of the Castro regime; but many Latin American diplomats specu-
lated that change in the Brazilian Government would not automatically
weaken that government's independent foreign policy instituted even be-
34
fore Goulart *s ascension to the presidency.
Nevertheless the Government of Venezuela seized the opportunity to
stress the need for a hemisphere foreign ministers' parley on Cuba, in
32New York Times . April 2, 1964, p. 10.
33New York Times . April 3, 1964, p. 11.
^New York Times . April 5, 1964, p. 30.
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the belief that the sudden changes in the hemisphere's political picture
35
had improved the possibility.
Although Brazil, three weeks after the coup, finally severed diplo-
matic and consular relations with Cuba, the new military leader,
President Castelo Branco, refused to give Brazilian endorsement to
37
mandatory sanctions imposed by the O.A.S. Council under the Rio Treaty.
Throughout the pre-conference deliberations Brazil's position seemed
38
quite uncertain.
When the Conference opened, Brazil continued to pursue a policy
that would reconcile the opposing groups, an acceptable compromise
39
formula that would avoid a split.
Largely at Brazilian insistence, the wording of the section of
the resolution dealing with diplomatic sanctions had been softened from
40
a decisive "rupture" to a more bland "not maintain."
The fact that a military coup had interrupted the orderly process
of constitutional transition in Brazil, did not, as had been true with
other countries, bring with it an uncompromising hard-line against the
Castro regime. Before breaking with Castro, the new president, General
35New York Times * April 5, 1964, p. 1.
36New York Times . May 14, 1964, p. 15.
37New York Times . May 16, 1964, p. 3.
38New York Times . June 23, 1964, p. 10.
39New York Times . July 21, 1964, p. 10.
40
Nei/v York Times . July 24, 1964, p. 7.
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Brancot was careful to establish the social-reform objectives of the
41
new government.
Secretary Rusk said of the Brazilian military:
It has been demonstrated that over the last several years
that the armed forces of Brazil basically are committed to
constitutional government in that country and that the coup
against President Goulart did not occur until there were many
Signs that President Goulart seemed to be moving to change the
Constitutional arrangements and to move toward some sort of an
'authoritarian regime.' 4 ^
Between the Eighth Meeting at Punta del Este in 1962 and the
Ninth Meeting at Washington in 1964, military pressure on the govern-
ments of Argentina and Ecuador had also changed their anti-sanction
position to a pro-sanction position on Cuba.
In Argentina, the armed services had first exerted pressure on
President Frond izi to break diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962
immediately following the Punta del Este decision to exclude the govern-
ment of Cuba from the inter -American system.
And in March 1962, following a Congressional election in which
the labor- left had made important gains, Argentine military leaders
seized power and deposed civilian President Arturo Frondizi. The con-
stitutional successor to Frondizi, Jose Maria Guido, was sworn in as
President, but he governed under the strict control of the military
chiefs. From March 1962 to April 1963, the Army, Navy and Air Force
leaders debated a decision and a formula to hold elections that would
suppress labor-leftist political power. When this intra-service
4INew York Times . May 25, 1964, p. 13.
42New York Times . April 4, 1964, p. 1.
146
43
political struggle was resolved, the elections were held in July 1963.
The armed forces had forced President Guido to take the necessary pre-
cautions to minimize aeronista influence by cutting ties with moderate
parties. As a result, a centrist Congress and government won the
elections. And on October 12, 1963, power was transferred to Dr. Arturo
Illia and his party. The Illia Government, in power when Venezuela
pressed charges against Cuba in November 1963, took a moderate position
on collective sanctions, despite the high residue of military influence
still exerted upon that government. The strong influence of Argentina's
big Peronist -control led General Confederation of Labor which admonished
the government to oppose sanctions of any kind, undoubtedly contributed
to Illia's desire for a compromise position in order to preserve hard-
won oomestic harmony.
A report was given to the O.A.S. Council early in July, 1964, by
the Argentine representative describing Cuban-inspired guerrilla activi-
ties in Argentina's northern provinces. The report, while demonstrating
the danger of Cuban subversion to remoter portions of South America,
was designed to strengthen arguments made by the soft-line nations
(Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay) that the C.A.S. members should cope
46
with subversion on an individual basis than rely on collective sanctions.
Seeking unity within the O.A.S. , Argentina pragmatically had
stressed the ineffectiveness and unworkability of sanctions that would
43Edwin Lieuwen, Generals Vs. Presidents. Neomilitarism in Latin
America, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 22.
44Ibid., 22.
45New York Times. July 5, 1964, p. 16.
46lbid., p. 16.
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only have alienated important members of the O.A.S. This attitude
certainly clashed with that of Venezuela and the United States who
together had been working toward symbolic unity of a "meaningful
majority" of states to impose sanctions, not because sanctions would
materially weaken the Castro regime, but because they would isolate
Cuba and strengthen the principles of the inter-American system.
On the eve of the Conference the Argentine delegation announced
its opposition to mandatory sanctions despite domestic military opposi-
tion.47
During the Conference, Argentina's role as conference mediator
caused numerous vacillations in that nation's position as it searched
for a formula acceptable to all nations. However, when it became
apparent that the positions of the anti-sanctions nations were completely
uncompromising, Argentina bridged the divide to join the pro-sanctions
group.
In another instance, a nation in which the military had intervened
had shifted from an anti-sanctions position to a pro-sanctions position.
Soon after President Arosemena had instructed the Ecuadorian dele-
gate to abstain at Punta del Este on resolutions excluding Cuba from
the inter -American system and curbing arms trade with Cuba, the military
forced Arosemena to alter his policy by breaking diplomatic relations
with Cuba. To accomplish this end, the military threatened to seize
power from the civilian government, and forced a political realignment
within the president's cabinet, purging it of leftist influence.
The accommodation did not prove to be permanently satisfactory,
because the armed services joined to depose President Arosemena on
47New York Times . July 18, 1964, p. 5.
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48
July 12, 1963. The military chiefs charged the President with
perennial ineptness, radicalism and inability to work with the Congress.
Although these were the ostensible reasons for the military coup, per-
haps as responsible as any other factor, was the threatened re-election
in 1963 of ex-President Velasco Ibarra, who had been deposed by the
military in 1961. The military feared reprisals should Ibarra again
49
assume power.
The armed forces immediately began to assume responsibility for
developing meaningful programs for social reform. The junta first
assumed the task of checking the internal Castro Communist threat,
50
however exaggerated.
As far as Ecuador's position on Cuba within the O.A.S. was
concerned it was not altered by the July 1963, military coup. Indeed
Arosemena had complied with the military ultimatum to sever diplomatic
relations and had become quite outspoken in appeals for an inter-
American police force, as well as supporting the U. S. -instituted
quarantine in the Cuban missile crisis without reservations. Therefore,
the effect of the coup should perhaps be viewed as a more permanent con-
solidation of military influence on the Ecuadorian decision-making
process.
Although the Government of Peru was a supporter of sanctions at
Punta del Este, in 1962 and again at Washington in 1964, it is significant
48Lieuwen, 50.
49lbid., 48.
50Ibid .. 50.
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to note a degree of alteration in that nation's foreign policy as a
result of intervening dcnestic developments. At Punta del Este, moder-
ate conservative President Prado had been one of the strongest advocates
of hard-line sanctions. But perhaps because of the relative security
enjoyed from geographical remoteness from the Cuban aggression, the
moderate reform-minded Belaunde government, in 1964 held back its whole-
51
hearted approval of sanctions even up till the time of the Conference.
Even during the Conference the Peruvian delegation was unenthusi-
52
astic about mandatory sanctions.
In June, 1962, the Peruvian armed forces provoked a military coup
to nullify the election of Aprista leader Haya de la Torre to the Presi-
dency. The election of Haya, who had been implacably opposed to all
forms of military guardianship, reactivated the dormant Apra -military
feud that had at times resulted in street fighting.
After a year, the ruling junta called elections for a second time.
Backed solidly by the military, Fernando Eelaunde Terry won election in
53
June 1963.
No longer did the Peruvian military act solely as the upholder of
54 'traditional status-quo forces. The election of Belaunde's moderate
progressive Government produced a distinct shift of that government's
O.A.S. position compared to the Prado Government's position at Punta
del Este. In an O.A.S. Council Meeting concerning Haiti, the new
51New York Times . June 10, 1964, p. 9.
52New York Times . July 23, 1964, p. 7.
53x.i,euwen, 32.
54Ibid., 32.
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Peruvian representative was quoted as having "specific instructions"
from his government against any step that couia in any way depart from
55
the principle of nonintervention.
Anti-Sanctions Positions
Although favorable factors temporarily converged to secure a
meaningful inter -American consensus to sanction Cuba at the Ninth Meeting
of Consultation, there still persisted four dissenting opinions, im-
portant to analyze as barometers of underlying division within the
Western hemisphere community of nations*
The Mexican Position * Of foremost concern was the Mexican position
that seemed to be even more uncompromising than at Punta oel Este, despite
the more conclusive and even damning evidence mounted against Cuba for
the Ninth Meeting of Consultation. Opposed to any inter-American measures
against Cuba as a result of her intrusion into Venezuela, at the December
3, 1963 Council Meeting, Mexico explained that such measures would set
56
off a new East -West confrontation and imperil world peace*
Initially, Mexico had voted against the Venezuelan request for a
Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Following bilateral consultations between
Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Lopez Mateos at Palm Springs after which
a communique had been issued February 22 indicating that the meeting of
the two Chiefs of State haa been completely harmonious, the Mexican
President declared at a press conference without qualification that
55New York Times . July 10, 1964, p. 7.
56New York Times . December 4, 1963, p. 1.
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Venezuela's charges should be handled not by the O.A.S. but by the
U. N. on the ground that Cuba was no longer a member of the O.A.S.
This surprise move was followed by a stronger pronouncement by Foreign
Minister Manuel Tello that if the O.A.S. insisted upon handling the
case, Mexico would not necessarily feel bound to support any sanction
57
it might impose upon Castro's government.
The Mexican bombshell obviously had been strategically timed to
neutralize in advance the stimulus that the O.A.S. Investigating Com-
mittee's Report would give to enforcement action against Cuba. Although
perhaps not a threat to secede from the O.A.S., the Mexican warnings
did give notice that Mexico was prepared to violate the Rio Treaty
(a two-thirds vote on sanctions makes action, except armed force,
collectively binding on all member states).
Mexico's uncompromising position threatened to drive a wedge among
members favorable to sanctions. Already there was disagreement within
this group concerning the practicality of mandatory economic sanctions
since there was but token trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin
America. And Mexico's statement heightened concern that such measures
might increase the danger of a permanent schism in the O.A.S.—for
Mexico was the only nation continuing to have significant diplomatic
59
ties, trading relations, and air communications with Cuba.
Mexico's devotion to nonintervention, self-determination and
absolute national sovereignty partially explained that government's
57Whitaker, Or bis , VIII, p. 516, from Christian Science Monitor ,
February 23, 1964.
58lbici .. 516-517.
59lbiQ., 519.
152
intense antagonism to sanctions in this case. As has been noted
earlier, however, the argument based on nonintervention was weakened
considerably. President Betancourt of Venezuela had pointed out that
legitimate O.A.S. collective enforcement actions against a state for
international aggression according to the O.A.S. Charter were not to
be regarded as intervention. Whereas the legitimacy of sanctions in
the absence of convincing evidence might have been seriously questioned
at Punta del Este, the legitimacy of sanctions in this case appeared
more clear-cut.
Mexico's opposition to diplomatic sanctions can be further explained
by the Estrada Doctrine of recognition, which has shaped Mexican foreign
policy since 1930. According to this doctrine, Mexico has continued to
recognize and maintain diplomatic relations with foreign governments
regardless of the manner in which they assumed power. Thus Mexico
has rejected the withdrawing of diplomatic recognition as a tool to
gain political objectives under any circumstances, whether on a uni-
lateral or multilateral basis. Diplomatic sanctions would be viewed
by Mexico according to this doctrine as an act of intervention in viola-
tion of the principle of self-determination. To make the carrying out of
diplomatic sanctions mandatory and binding on all nations would violate
Mexican sovereignty as well. This policy can be traced to Mexican ex-
periences during the revolution, when the nation suffered from the con-
sequences of recognition policies whereby foreign governments (particularly
6°Ibid .. 520.
"^Phillip Jessup, "The Estrada Doctrine," American Journal of
International Law
. Vol. 25, (1931), p. 721.
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the U. S. ) assumed the prerogative of passing on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of governments, thus subordinating national authority to
foreign opinion.
Reinforcing Mexico's traditional opposition to sanctions on legal
grounds were an upcoming election in July, 1964, and certain vested
interests built up in Mexico which opposed any change in Mexico's
favorable position as a main channel for what remained of western
hemisphere trade and communications with Cuba. Though the moderate
Party of Revolutionary Institutions was certain to win the election,
in an election year the Administration could take no chances of stirring
up powerful pro-Castro antagonism within the Party.
When it appeared that the Ministers had agreed to apply sanctions,
Mexican O.A.S. Ambassador Sanchez Gavito delivered a vehement speech
denouncing the proposed sanctions as not merely inappropriate under the
terms of the Rio Treaty but as a "flagrant violation" of it. He sup-
ported this charge by asserting that Cuba's actions had never disturbed
the peace of Venezuela nor violated its territory, sovereignty or in-
dependence and had at no time threatened the peace of the "continent."
This statement was uncharacteristic of Mexico's usual pattern of re-
straint based upon legal arguments. Sanchez Gavito's irrational display
of anger and flat denial of the findings of the Committee upon closer
examination perhaps indicated that some domestic stresses and strains
had surfaced.
62lbid .. 720.
63Whitaker, Orbis , p. 522.
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Mexico refused to comply with any part of the resolution. The
announcement was made official on August 3, 1964, when Foreign Minister
Jose Gorostiza stated that President Lopez Mateos had decided to "main-
tain the contacts with the Cuban government" without change.
Particularly, Mexico directed criticism at the portion of the
resolution authorizing collective ox unilateral self-defense measures
automatically in response to renewed Cuban aggression. Foreign Minister
Gorostiza objected to paragraph 5 of the resolution as an improper ex-
tension of the right of self-defense. He reasoned that because there
were conflicting interpretations of the Rio Treaty among O.A.S. nations
involved, the case should be submitted to the International Court of
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Justice, for a final binding settlement on all parties. To date
Mexico has refused to break diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Chilean Position . In response to the Venezuelan-Cuban situation,
Chile remained in alignment with the no-sanctions group which was
loosely formed and identified at Punta del Este in 1962.
Again the freedom permitted by Chile's geographical remoteness
enabled the government to tailor its foreign policy to meet the require-
ments of a potentially volatile domestic situation. Although openly the
Chilean Government justified its stand on the basis of a strict ad-
herence to the doctrine of nonintervention, it was clear that the
decision not to support sanctions closely mirrored internal political
cleavage.
64 1bid .. 534.
65Ibid., 534-535.
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The conservatively inclined Alessandri Administration, though
constantly under pressure from a well-organized labor and intellectual
Socialist -Communist left, faced an election crisis in the fall of 1964,
Salvador Allende, the Socialist-coalition candidate had come close to
edging out Alessandri in the elections of 1958, and had retained a
powerful opposition influence through control of the labor movement.
All signs pointed to a close race between Eduardo Frei, Christian
^snocrat, and Socialist Allende. An Allende victory threatened to
transform Chilean foreign policy in O.A.S. Councils, because Allende
haci unreservedly expressed sympathy for the Castro regime.
The supercharged electoral atmosphere in Chile made it virtually
impossible for Chile to take a decisive stand on sanctions. To take
such a position would have contributed to Aliende's already increasing
67
political capital.
Though Chile did not approve of sanctions, President Jorge
Alessandri, just before going out of office, agreed to comply with the
binding two-thirds majority decisions ruled by the Ninth Meeting of
Consultation to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Alessandri,
still sensitive to domestic repercussions, carefully explained that this
decision would not necessarily bind his successor, especially should
Salvador Allende win the election. The moderate Eduardo Frei Montalva,
victor by a slim margin, had originally opposed sanctions of Cuba, but
66Ibid .. 522.
67New York Times . July 19, 1964, "News of the Week in Review,"
Section IV, p. 5.
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was not expected to reverse outgoing President Alessandri's de-
cision.
Bolivian Position * Also one of the original hard-core anti-
sanctions group at Punta del Este, Bolivia consistently maintained its
official objections to sanctions despite the existence of more precise
evidence proving Cuba as an aggressor than was offered at Punta del
Este.
Bolivia's position, though predicated upon the legal norm of
nonintervention, perhaps can best be explained by internal dissension
within the I06U Aggravated by rising leftist influence of Juan Lechin,
although moderate, President i'az Estenssoro had been elected for another
term.
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Despite a seemingly unrelenting position, the Government of
Bolivia became the first dissenter to comply with the binding decision
of the Foreign Ministers by severing diplomatic relations with Cuba
70
after President Paz had been safely inaugurated for another term.
Uruguayan Position . Uruguay's government shifted its foreign
policy in the two-year interval between the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of
Consultation. While on record as a supporter of sanctions at Punta del
Este, Uruguay had not cast a final decisive vote. The nine member
Executive Council had been able to reach a decision only after great
deliberation and several compromises. Strict mandatory Rio Treaty
68Whitaker, Orbis , VIII, p. 534.
69ttew York Times . July 19, 1964, "News of the Week in Review,"
Section IV, p. 5.
70whitaker, Orbis . VIII, p. 534.
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sanctions had not been called fox in the final resolution which resulted
from the Punta del Este negotiations. While in this instance, Uruguay,
one of four nations unilaterally maintaining diplomatic ties with Cuba,
was being asked to comply with a decision contrary to its own individual
foreign policy. As did Mexico, Chile and Bolivia, Uruguay resteo its
decision on the legal norms of nonintervention and absolute sovereignty.
Although a member of the Investigating team that found Cuba guilty as
charged, Uruguay had maintained that such problems of subversion should
be handled by each country individually without relying on collective
sanctions. Perhaps Uruguay's geographical remoteness from Cuba made
it easier for the Government to take such a position.
Political division in Uruguay had worsened since the Punta del
Este Conference. The Executive Council members had been in a constant
state of disagreement, making the possibility of a military coup seem
more likely—the first time in many years.
Under these circumstances it would seem safe to conclude that
undoubtedly the collective Executive Council may have found it impossible
to reach any decision.
Uruguay was the last of three governments to vote to comply with
the mandatory diplomatic sanctions. According to one source, its de-
cision was influenced by the course of events in Chile, but even so, the
vote carried by only a slim margin; only five of the nine Council members
73
favorea the break.
7 *New York Times . July 5, 1964, p. 16.
72New York Times . July 19, 1964, "News of the Week in Review,
Section IV, p. 5.
73whitaker, Crbis, VIII, 534, from the New York Times .
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Significance of the Decision
The unity of purpose apparent in the O.A.S. Decision to apply
mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba in 1964 was
reached only after a gradual process of persuasion and compromise,
assisted by favorable changes in key Latin American governments.
Multilateral investigation to verify the legitimacy of the
Venezuelan charge of Cuban intervention was of crucial importance in
securing enough votes for a "meaningful majority" of nations.
Although every nation except Mexico readily complied with the
mandatory requirement to sever diplomatic relations and suspend trade
and sea transportation with Cuba, questions could be raised concerning
the substance of unity behind this decision. Governments of Brazil,
Argentina and Peru voted in favor of sanctions, but with reservations
concerning the impact of such mandatory sanctions on the unity of the
inter -American system. All of these governments had explored compromise
alternatives.
Mexico's uncompromising attitude should be a continuing source
of concern to students of the O.A.S., principally because of its sym-
bolic representation of dormant anti-sanctions sentiment in other Latin
American countries.
A "meaningful majority" of O.A.S. nations were convinced that
adequate proof had demonstrated subversion as a form of aggression
covered by the Rio Treaty, but they did not seem to be as resolutely
convinced that subversion should or could be curbed by mandatory
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sanctions. In view of these political reservations, there would seem
to be a question as to whether a "meaningful majority" of nations
would support the unilateral or collective self -defense action authorized
by the final resolution of Ninth Foreign Ministers' Meeting, prior to a
multilateral consultation which would establish proof of Cuban aggression.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The three situations selected to study the decision-making
process of the Organization of American States illustrate critical
challenges for the capability of the international organization to
function as a viable security system.
Although collective action was supported by the necessary
two-thirds majority, substantial dissent from leading Latin American
governments weakened that solidarity. Because of disparate national
interests, there was need for extensive negotiation and compromise to
compose the differences in national foreign policies.
As a security system the O.A.S. functioned with uncertainty,
as its decision-making process demonstrated marked sensitivity even
to slight variations in the domestic politics and international balance
of power. A more complete evaluation of O.A.S. solidarity can be made
by summarizing these complex kaleidoscopic forces shaping both pro-
and anti-sanction positions.
Factors Motivating Pro-Sanction Positions
Multilateral Verification of International Aggression . Multi-
lateral verification of an actual threat or act of aggression against
O.A.S. members was of signal importance in influencing the degree of
consensus within the O.A.S.
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The Eighth and Ninth Meetings of Foreign Ministers in 1962 and
1964, were convened to consider application of Rio Treaty sanctions
against the Cuban Government for subversive assaults upon other O.A.S.
governments. In each of these cases there was serious dissent from
several important Latin American governments concerning the legitimacy
of collective sanctions*
But in response to the Cuban missile crisis, the O.A.S. Council,
convened as emergency Organ of Consultation, responded with an over-
whelming approval for the U. S. quarantine which prevented Soviet
vessels from entering Cuban ports. Only three nations refused to en-
dorse the second paragraph of the resolution which approved intervention
in Cuba to remove the missiles.
The Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, examined a broad Colombian proposal that collective action
be taken to curb subversion. The initial request had not specifically
mentioned Cuba; but in pre-conference diplomatic negotiation, pro-
sanction governments drafted measures calling for action against Cuba.
Indictments were not sufficiently backed by conclusive evidence proving
a specific Cuban attempt to overthrow a government. Nor were charges
verified by multilateral investigation. Absence of convincing proof of
international aggression caused anti-sanctions nations to decide that
mandatory collective sanctions would violate the Rio Treaty. Any
action taken on such a shallow legal basis, they argued, would in
effect impose a majority political censorship on the internal govern-
mental structure of a member nation. This would constitute a form of
collective intervention prohibited by the O.A.S. Charter. The Foreign
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Ministers avoided an open clash between pro- and anti-sanction nations
through the major compromise proposal to exclude the Cuban Government
from participation in the Organs of the inter -American system. This
alternative, not a Rio Treaty sanction, was approved by a minimum
two-thirds majority. Still, six anti-sanction nations abstained on
the grounds that the C.A.S. Charter did not make provision for the
exclusion of a member.
The facts contributing to the decision of the Ninth Foreign
Ministers' Meeting to vote mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions
against Cuba for intervening in Venezuela, were significantly different
from those producing stalemate at Punta del Este. In this case the
Ministers dealt with a Cuban plot to overthrow the Betancourt Govern-
ment verified by an O.A.S. investigating team. For the first time a
meaningful consensus established that subversion could logically be
interpreted as a form of aggression prohibited by the Rio Treaty.
Also it was quite significant that a meaningful majority of O.A.S.
members adopted a resolution authorizing emergency unilateral or
collective self-defense measures against Cuban subversion without
prior multilateral consultation.
Anti-sanctions protests were raised because mandatory diplomatic
sanctions interfered with a nation's sovereign right to determine its
own policies of diplomatic recognition. Mexico's C.A.S. Ambassador
stubbornly refused to recognize that Cuba had even committed an
aggression against Venezuela. Furthermore he denounced the collective
sanctions as a "flagrant violation" of the Rio Treaty. Apparently
the rigid bias against intervention prevented that government from
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interpreting subversion as an overt form of international aggression
specifically defined by the Rio Treaty, The authorization of collective
and unilateral self-defense measures contradicted Mexico's interpreta-
tion of nonintervention.
The Cuban missile crisis represented a grave threat of extra-
hemispheric aggression. The O.A.S. nations voted promptly and unani-
mously to support the U. S. quarantine directly aimed at the Soviet
Union, indirectly at Cuba. However, three nations abstained on the
second paragraph of the resolution which authorized any necessary
measures to remove missiles already located in Cuba—the unconditional
objective of U. S. strategy. These objections were registered because
the C.A.S. could not legally intervene to violate the territorial in-
tegrity, sovereignty or independence of another American state. It
would seem significant for inter -American unity that some formerly
anti-sanction nations modified their interpretation of absolute non-
intervention to agree to a bl3nk check on intervention. There is some
question, though, that had intervention become necessary from the U. S.
point of view, some Latin American states might have challenged its
timing or implementation. Photographic evidence of a common threat to
hemispheric security presented to the U. S. delegation in multilateral
consultation was crucial in convincing O.A.S. members that sufficient
grounds existed for applying the enforcement measures of the Rio Treaty.
This case study has suggested that different criteria formed the
basis of collective action in response to aggressions of an intra-
hemispheric and those of extrahemispheric character. In response to
the missile crisis, the O.A.S. governments acted to prevent a
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predominantly extxahemi spheric threat from becoming an overt aggression.
But when Cuba was accused as the aggressor, the requisite two-thirds
majority to apply mandatory Rio Treaty sanctions was not obtained
until sufficient proof demonstrated that an act of international
aggression had been committed.
Perhaps the inconsistency can be explained by noting the funda-
mental differences in the two types of threats. Inherently the presence
of Soviet missiles in Cuba represented a grave and relatively self-
evident peril to inter-American security. The intrahemispheric Cuban
subversion was, on the other hand, more evasive, of less immediate
common danger, disguised by domestic politics of self-determination
and difficult to prove.
Geographic Proximity . In all three cases, the nations of Central
America and the Caribbean, nearest the Castro threat, were the most
vulnerable to subversive assaults on their governments. The threatened
nations were leaders in enlisting collective support to isolate Cuba
through diplomatic and economic sanctions. The U. S., Colombia, and
the Central American and Caribbean states were the major pro-sanction
nations that insisted upon the holding of the Eighth Meeting of Con-
sultation in January 1962.
Nations of Central America and the Caribbean located within
closest striking range of the missiles in October 1962, also were
the most active in offering facilities for the U. S. quarantine operation.
The Cuban intervention in Venezuela led the Betancourt Government
to press relentlessly for diplomatic sanctions at the Ninth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers in July 1964.
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Internal Weakness . The factor of internal weakness, added to
geographic proximity, made some nations in the Central American and
Caribbean region more vulnerable to the Cuban threat. Larger, stronger
Latin American nations, and some more remotely located from Cuba
(Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile) insisted that internal security
against subversion was a unilateral responsibility. But weaker Central
American and Caribbean nations lacked resources to combat threats in-
tensified by geographic proximity. In each case these nations sought
protection either from the U. S. or the inter -American security system.
Military Influence in Latin American Governments . In this study,
it has been demonstrated that governments under heavy military influence
voted for sanctions.
Except for the U. S., Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, who had other reasons for supporting sanctions, the most con-
sistent pro-sanctions nations were those led by corrupt dictator-
presidents perpetuated in power by the military.
In Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, the military did not
maintain absolute perpetual control over the governments, but exerted
a great deal of influence through the use of coups d'etat. In some
cases the mere threat of a coup was sufficient to modify policies of
civilian governments.
In both Argentina and Ecuador, the threat of a military coup
immediately following the Punta del Este Meeting, forced Presidents
Frond izi and Arosemena to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and
reverse positions recorded at Punta del Este. Shortly thereafter the
Frondizi Government fell, and was replaced by a military junta. During
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the Cuban missile crisis the Argentine junta backed up support for
the quarantine by contributing naval units to the U. S. maneuver.
Ecuador's President Arosemena, though not immediately overthrown, was
forced to reshuffle the Cabinet by forcing leftist ministers to resign.
The Brazilian military did not immediately depose the left-leaning
government of President Joao Goulart after his anti-sanctions stand at
the Punta del Este Meeting in January 1962. But when it was clear
that the Goulart Government had obviously identified with domestic
leftist groups, in April 1964, the military intervened to restore
equilibrium to Brazil's internal politics. After this coup efforts to
schedule a Foreign Ministers' Meeting to discuss sanctions of Cuba for
intervention in Venezuela picked up momentum. Military leaders in
Brazil did not immediately alter foreign policy concerning Cuba,
although eventually the military supported mandatory sanctions at the
Ninth Meeting in Washington, July 1964.
The conservative Prado regime that governed Peru with military
approval, backed hard-line sanctions against Cuba in January 1962.
When elections elevated moderately- liberal Aprista , Haya de la Torre,
to the Presidency, the military provoked a coup to nullify the election.
In October 1962, the junta gave strong support to the U. S. naval
quarantine. By 1963, however, the military agreed to a new election
under close junta supervision. The winner, Fernando Belaunde Terry,
had solid military support, yet he did not readily instruct the Peruvian
delegation to vote for sanctions at the Ninth Meeting in Washington in
1964.
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The Peruvian and Brazilian cases demonstrated that while Latin
American military governments in general voted with the pro-sanctions
bloc in the G.A.S., there was considerable variance in the hardness
of such positions.
United States Approach . U. S. prestige suffered a serious
set-back as a result of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs episode which had
implicated the U. S. in a direct intervention of Cuban territory,
April 1961* But confidence in U. S. motives slowly was restored as
the U. S. prudently exercised more restraint in its diplomatic relations
with Latin America throughout the remainder of 1961.
At Punta del Este, U. S. willingness to compromise to avoid an
impending split in the inter -American system, earned Latin .American
respect, and in the case of Uruguay a favorable vote. That the six
dissenting nations abstained rather than voted negatively seemed to
underscore the wisdom of a moderate U. S. approach.
Certainly it would seem that the display of photographic evidence
of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba in multilateral consultation,
greatly influenced the overwhelming approval of the U. S. position
by the O.A.S. Council.
The Alliance for Progress aid program as a part of U. S. concern
for Latin American welfare, as well as U. S. interests, undoubtedly
had some positive effect upon foreign policy decisions of Latin American
governments. For President Lleras of Colombia, the promise of economic
aid supplemented other factors influencing his decision not only to
support sanctions, but to assume concurrent responsibility with the
U. S. at Punta dei Este.
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Of somewhat minor importance in this respect, was Haiti's
opportunistic maneuver to gain U. S. aid despite Washington's dis-
approval of dictator Duvalier, by holding off a pro-sanctions vote
at a crucial interval.
History * An historic fear of foreign intervention evoked the
overwhelming Latin American support for U. S. measures to halt further
Soviet missile build-up in Cuba and bring about dismantling and re-
moval of the missiles already in Cuba, This fear had traditionally
produced an alignment with the U. S. for protection in times of peril.
Factors Motivating Anti-Sanction Positions
Nonintervention . Anti-sanctions positions were prefaced by a
reminder that the O.A.S. Charter prohibits unilateral or collective
intervention in the domestic affairs of member states.
Mexico was the most consistent and representative advocate of
the doctrine of absolute nonintervention. As the first Latin American
nation to complete a thoroughgoing social revolution, Mexico showed
sympathy for the ideals of the Cuban Revolution, and was relatively
patient with the "errors" of its leaders.
Because Mexico experienced intervention from the U. S. during
its own revolution, that nation has regarded the principle of non-
intervention as the best safeguard for the right of self-determination.
Mexican spokesmen argued that any collective action taken against Cuba
without convincing proof that Cuba had committed overt acts of inter-
national aggression against neighboring states would be illegal col-
lective intervention.
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The Mexican Government refused to comply with the binding decision
of the Ninth Foreign Ministers' Meeting to break diplomatic relations
with Cuba, because such a requirement interfered with its sovereign
right to determine policies according to its Constitution and doctrines
of recognition.
But Mexico showed greater flexibility when its security was
threatened by extra continental aggression. While the government did
not accept vague Soviet connections with Castro's subversion as justifi-
cation for collective sanctions, it did not find it inconsistent to
give full backing to the naval quarantine in the Cuban missile crisis.
But in accordance with its standard of absolute nonintervention, Mexico
refused to authorize invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles.
Domestic Balance of Power . All six governments opposed to
sanctions at Punta del Este were under strong pressure from leftist
groups who sympathized with the Cuban Revolution. Leaders of these
nations adopted anti-sanction positions to avoid strikes, other internal
disturbances and loss of broad-based political support. Of the heads
of state, only President Goulart of Brazil seemed personally inclined
to favor a pro-Cuban position.
All of these nations continued to maintain uninterrupted diplo-
matic relations with the Castro regime. All stressed compromise
solutions which would have included negotiation and recommendatory
measures as preferable alternatives to sanctions. The Brazilian
Government, in particular, stressed the impracticality and the un-
workability of sanctions.
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The unanimous response of the Latin American nations in support
of the U. S. quarantine of Cuba would seem remarkable in view of latent
leftist disruptive capability. In the missile crisis, however, leftist
opposition was uncoordinated and divided because Khrushchev admitted
to President Kennedy's charges by backing down—which at least tempor-
arily tended to diminish Castro's prestige.
But in the Cuban intervention in Venezuela in 1963, regrouped
leftist strength returned as a major factor influencing Latin American
foreign policies.
The increasing pro-Castro sentiment which developed in Brazil
during President Goulart's tenure, was a major cause of delay in holding
a Foreign Ministers' Meeting to deal with Cuba's intervention in Venezu-
ela. When the left-leaning Goulart regime was overthrown, preparations
for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting proceeded immediately. Leftist
strength in Brazil prompted the Branco military regime to adopt a
cautious approach toward proposed mandatory sanctions. Until the time
for voting, the Brazilian delegation explored possible areas of agree-
ment to heal the O.A.S. breach on the Cuban issue.
By 1964, a new civilian government had been elected in Argentina.
President Arturo I Ilia enjoyed military backing, but was vulnerable to
pro-Castro pressure from the left-wing faction of peronistas . Initially
Argentina, as well as Brazil, favored compromise positions rather than
mandatory sanctions to avoid domestic turmoil.
Chile's decision in 1964 not to vote for sanctions was also
directly related to a precarious internal balance of power. The moder-
ate Alessandri Administration was opposed by a dynamic presidential
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candidate from a united leftist coalition in forthcoming elections.
The President was vulnerable to this opposition that had nearly de-
feated him in a bid for electoral power in 1958.
Bolivia's negative vote was also explained by the rising
influence of leftist-extremist, Juan Lechin, who had challenged
moderate President Paz' control of the Government Party (MNR).
Uruguay's negative vote at the 1964 Meeting reflected that
nation's faction-ridden internal political structure. It was by only
a narrow margin that the Nine-Man Collective Executive Council sup-
ported watered-down sanctions at Punta del Este. Political strife had
grown more intense during the two-year interval. The negative vote
based on the juridical norm of nonintervention avoided a controversial
stand that might have split the government still more.
In 1964, domestic politics also added a new overtone to Mexico's
objection to and noncompliance with mandatory sanctions. In an election
year the government could not afford to comply with an O.A.S. decision
that would have had the effect of cutting off its vested interests as
the only Western hemisphere nation maintaining meaningful diplomatic
and trading relations and communications with Cuba.
General Observations
In spite of obstacles to unity, the O.A.S. functioned remarkably
well as a security system in response to these challenges. Though certain
differences remained unresolved, progress toward mutual understanding was
facilitated by patient diplomatic negotiation and multilateral consultation.
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The purpose of this study was to examine the collective
decision-making process of the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.) in dealing with three challenges to inter-American security,
1961-1964.
A case study method was used to investigate three O.A.S. de-
cisions to take collective action under the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty): (l) Eighth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 1962, which acted to
bar the Cuban Government from participation in the inter-American
system; (2) the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, during which
the O.A.S. voted to support the U. S.; (3) Ninth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in Washington, July 1964, which voted mandatory diplomatic
and economic sanctions against the Cuban Government.
At Punta del Este, six nations abstained on the final resolution:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile and Mexico. In the case of
the missile crisis, Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico abstained on a para-
graph of the resolution that would have authorized intervention in
Cuba to remove the missiles. At Washington, only four nations abstained
on the binding decision: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.
For each case, foreign policy positions of pro- and anti-sanction
nations were analyzed on a country-by-country basis.
The decision-making process of the international organization
reflected several important common legal, political, military and
geographic aspects of the national interests of its member states.
Multilateral verification of Cuban aggression was found to be
important in securing favorable votes for collective Rio Treaty
security measures. At Punta del Este, when request for sanctions
had not been adequately supported by convincing proof that the Cuban
Government had actually intervened in another American state, the
necessary two-thirds majority to apply diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions had been lacking, ana a compromise measure adopted instead. But
when Venezuela had been able to produce proof of Cuban intervention
which was verified by an inter -American investigation, the O.A.S.
nations voted to approve sanctions. Likewise, the O.A.S. nations
voted to support the U. S. quarantine when presented with detailed
photographs which confirmed the existence of Soviet missile sites in
Cuba and the target range of the missiles.
Central American and Caribbean nations geographically nearest
Cuba in all cases favored a strong pro-sanctions position, particularly
weak governments that sought protection from the U. S. or the inter-
American system.
Governments under strong military influence, in every case,
voted fox collective action.
A flexible multilateral U. S. approach which allowed for com-
promise, was instrumental in persuading nations to adopt collective
measures, particularly in the Cuban missile crisis.
An historical fear of extracontinental aggression led the O.A.S.
nations to approve the U. S. quarantine during the Cuban missile crisis.
Objections to sanctions were largely based upon an O.A.S. Charter
provision which prohibits both unilateral or collective intervention.
Although Rio Treaty sanctions do not constitute collective intervention
prohibited by the C.A.S. Charter, anti-sanctions nations have narrowed
through interpretation the circumstances under which collective action
may be taken legitimately. Essentially, collective Rio Treaty action
was equated with collective intervention by these nations. Noninter-
vention was acivocatea to bar sanctions in a variety of ways.
This principle prevented some governments from supporting
collective action in the absence of proof that an international
aggression had been committeu. Absolute anti-sanctions nations re-
fused to endorse collective entry into Cuba as an expedient to remove
missiles acknowledged as a grave threat to inter-American security.
Still another objection to sanctions was based on the position that
binding sanctions constituted an intervention in the internal affairs
of dissenting minority nations.
In all xhree cases investigated, governments under pressure
from strong leftist groups took anti-sanctions positions to maintain
political stability.


